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TRANSCRIPT
NOT FROM CONCENTRATE?
MEDIA REGULATION AT THE
TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL
MARCH 18-19, 2005
ROOM 25o, HUTCHINS HALL
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
LIZ WEI: Hi, my name is Liz Wei and I am one of the coordina-
tors of the event today. Ryan Calo, is the other coordinator, and on
behalf of Volume 38 of the Journal of Law Reform we want to wel-
come you to our Symposium on Media Regulation, NOT FROM
CONCENTRATE? MEDIA REGULATION AT THE TURN OF THE MILLEN-
NIUM. We are happy to see such a full audience today for the
opening keynote address, as we believe the issues of media owner-
ship are vitally important, and they certainly affect every person in
the room tonight.
We are lucky to have with us a truly impressive group of speakers
in this field, experts in law and practice, and we thank them for
making their way all the way to Michigan, where it's so cold out
still, so that they could share their research and their expertise in
this area and the discussions. Tomorrow they will be speaking over
the course of three panels, and we hope that everyone here will
join us again tomorrow. The first panel is at 10:00 in the morning,
and it's here in this room. We are truly thrilled to have Eric Alter-
man with us tonight, and I'm sure that you're all looking forward
to hearing him speak as much as I am. In bringing him here we
were generously supported by the University of Michigan Law
School and the Michigan Department for Communication Studies,
and in particular, Professor Susan Douglas and Professor Russell
Neuman lent us much support and advice. And with that I would
like to introduce Professor Susan Douglas, the Chair of the Michi-
gan Communication Studies Department, and she will introduce
Eric Alterman.
SUSAN DOUGLAS: I want to thank Ryan Calo and Liz Wei for
working so hard on this, and putting together what promises to be a
really terrific conference. They've worked very hard. I also want to
thank the Howard R. Marsh Endowment for the Study of
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Journalistic Performance, which makes this lecture and some of
this conference possible. When we were meeting back in the fall to
talk about who would be the perfect keynote for a conference on
media ownership and media concentration there was really one
person we really wanted to get, and that was Eric Alterman, who
many of you know as the dazzling media columnist for The Nation.
Eric is one of the leading experts on media concentration, and
particularly media bias, and on their consequences for democracy.
Eric Alterman has been termed and I quote, "the most honest and
incisive media critic writing today." He is the author of the national
best seller, What Liberal Media? The Truth About Bias and the News,
which I strongly, strongly recommend. It's a great book. He also
writes the "Altercation," his weblogger for MSNBC.com. He's also a
senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. His book, Sound
and Fury: The Making of the Punditocracy, another terrific book, won
the 1992 George Orwell Award, and his It Ain't No Sin to be Glad
You're Alive: The Promise of Bruce Springsteen, won the 1999 Stephen
Crane Literary Award. Eric Alterman is also the author of The Book
on Bush, How George W. (Mis)leads America, which he did with Mark
Green, and When Presidents Lie: A History of Deception and its
Consequences. Eric Alterman has also, in addition to all of this, been
a contributing editor to or columnist for Rolling Stone, Elle, Mother
Jones, World Policy Journal and the Sunday Express in London. He is a
senior fellow of the World Policy Institute at the new school and an
adjunct professor of journalism at Columbia University. He has a
B.A. in History and Government from Cornell, an M.A. in
International Relations from Yale, and his Ph.D. in U.S. History
from Stanford. Please join me in welcoming Eric Alterman.
ERIC ALTERMAN: Thank you, Susan. I'm genuinely honored to
be here, and I'm not sure I would have been the first person that I
thought of for this, but I'm happy that I see that you're closing
with my friend, Jonathan Adelstein tomorrow. And Jon-this is ei-
ther pathetic or really cool, butJon and his wife came to New York
last Saturday night so we could go see the Allman Brothers to-
gether, who formed I think the year Jonathan was born, which
makes him more successful in life than I am. Like I said, you can
divide people by whether or not they think that's pathetic or cool. I
can go either way, and I was one of them. Just a tiny corrective mat-
ter-I'm no longer at Columbia. I'm now professor of journalism
at the City University of New York, and I'm very proud of that. So I
throw that in. It's the first honest living I've ever actually had to
make, to be somewhere at a certain time. It's traumatic.
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Okay. One thing I really like about this gig is nobody gave me
any clue as to what I should say, and it's a good place for me to be
in the beginning of the conference, because I don't have to pre-
tend to know things I don't know about. You know? I can talk
about what I do know about, and one hopes that that will stimulate
further debate for the rest of the conference just in a sort of the
odds are kind of manner that one of these things will be worth
talking about later. Because the thing about issues in media owner-
ship and media concentration is that you can kind of explain the
whole world through them, but if you do you're going to miss im-
portant parts of it. In other words, the issues are so important and
so central to so much that it's very easy for those of us who've spent
a lot of time talking about it, and writing about it, and thinking
about it, to think that if we solve these issues somehow we would
solve our problems with the media and with our democracy, and
that's not the case. I just wanted to sort of keep this in the back of
our minds.
I wrote a column. I'm sure most people in this room remember.
A little over a year ago when Ted Koppel was reading all of the
names of the dead in Iraq, and there was only about 400 back then.
Now it's up to about 1,100-no, 1,500. It's up to 1,500. So, Sinclair
Broadcasting wouldn't run the show, and I wrote a column in The
Nation saying, "Here is one more argument about why we need a
diverse media ownership," because twenty-five percent of the coun-
try that has Sinclair Broadcasting is going to be denied this for
clearly political reasons. And somebody wrote a letter to The Nation
saying, "Well, that's kind of stupid, because it's Disney who Sinclair
is censoring." And Disney is supposed to be the bad guy. They're
Disney. They're one of the big six, and Sinclair is a relatively small
player in this field. So if you had a lot of Sinclairs and no Disney in
this case, you wouldn't be getting the news you wanted then. It's
not all about media concentration from the standpoint of the mar-
ketplace of ideas in any case. Now, that contradicts the thrust of
most of what I'm going to say, but it's just worth keeping in mind
that if you're a liberal or if you're just someone who likes to see as
many ideas at play as possible in public discourse, media concen-
tration is an enormously important lens through which to view the
problem, but it's not the only one.
That said, it is at a kind of crisis. I don't know how many of you
are familiar with Ben Bagdikian's book called The Media Monopoly,
that was the book that sort of introduced this issue as a political
issue beyond the bounds of the expert field to the rest of the
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world. It came out in 1983, the first edition, and he identified fifty
companies which controlled the flow of the vast majority of infor-
mation in the western world, particularly in the United States. I
think he just published his seventh edition of that book this year
2004, and that number is down to six. From fifty to six. There's six
companies that control the vast amount of what people see and
hear in all of the various media. Now, that's a little bit misleading,
because the information that these companies broadcast and
communicate often comes from other places, and these other
places are, family owned newspapers, like the New York Times and
the Washington Post, which are relatively small players in business
terms. As well as little magazines, like The Nation, and The New Re-
public, and The Weekly Standard, and The American Prospect, the
National Review, and even some web logs play a role in the forma-
tion of these ideas. Nevertheless, the control point is in the hands
ofjust six companies, and although the CEOs and the communica-
tions directors of these companies like to talk a very good game vis
, vie the public interest. They sort of have to because they're given
access to the broadcast spectrum by virtue of their alleged public
interest commitments. You'd have to be very naive to believe that
their own personal interests are inconsistent with what most people
would understand to be public interests. They have their own in-
terests. They have their own corporate interests and they have all
kinds of interests. And, the fact that there are only six of them is
quite astonishing, because they're not all that shy about asserting
those interests, whether or not those interests are consistent with
their public rhetoric. And I'll talk about a few cases of that as we go
on.
Now, the obvious problem with having only six major compa-
nies-and does everybody know which six companies they are? It's
Bertelsmann, Disney, GE, Viacom, News Corporation and Time
Warner. To just give you an example of how vast their holdings are,
I have a list here. This is actually outdated. I just made a short list
of what AOL took over when it engineered its takeover of Time
Warner. That takeover's sort of been reversed. Now it looks like
Time Warner took over AOL. But in any case, somebody took over
all of these companies at once. This is what Time Warner was when
AOL and Time Warner merged-It was Warner Brothers Pictures,
Morgan Creek, New Regency, Warner Brothers Animation, Satellite
Pictures, Little Brown and Company, Bullfinch, Back Bay, Time
Life Books, Ox Morehouse, Sunset Books, Warner Books, Book of
the Month Club, Warner Chapel Music, Atlantic Records, Warner
Audio Books, Electra, Warner Brothers Records, Time Life Music,
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Columbia House, Sub Pop Records-That's like Pearl Jam in its
time- Time magazine, Fortune, Life, Scoffield's, People, Entertainment
Weekly, Money, In Style, Martha Stewart Living, Sunset, AsianWeek, Par-
enting, Weight Watchers, Cooking Light, DC Comics, half of Six Flags
Theme Park, Movie World, Warner Brothers, HBO, Cinemax,
Warner Brothers TV, Comedy Central, E!, BET, Court TV, some-
thing called the Sega Channel-I don't even have any idea what
that is-the Home Shopping Network, Turner Broadcasting, the
Atlanta Braves, the Atlanta Hawks, World Championship Wrestling,
Hanna Barbara Cartoons, New Line Cinema, Fine Line Cinema,
Turner Classic Movies-which by the way is the best TV station
there is-Turner Pictures, Castle Rock, CNN, CNN Headline News,
CNN International, CNN SI, CNN Airport Network, CNN FI, CNN
Radio, PNT, WTBS, the Cartoon Network. I think that that was it
then. Now I think it's expanded somewhat.
Now, the obvious problem with all of those properties, all of
those communications entertainment properties being owned by
one corporation, and only six of them being in play is the problem
of the marketplace of ideas. Now, it's notjust the problem. The way
we're taught about it in high school. That you know, you need. All
ideas need to be heard so that people can have a fair choice of
what the best democratic solution is. It's a bigger problem than
that, because depending on how you understand the way democ-
racy operates and the way the role that the media plays in
democracy. There are two models that I use when I try and think
about this conflict, but I think they both are to some degree true. I
forget whose definition of genius is the ability to hold two abso-
lutely conflicting ideas in your head at the same time and not go
crazy.
So on this very tiny issue we're all going to have to be geniuses.
It takes me back to the debate between Walter Lippmann and John
Dewey that took place when Walter Lippmann published Public
Opinion I believe in 1922. Public Opinion is a blistering indictment
of democratic practice as it's practiced compared to democratic
theory. Lippmann argued that democracy was essentially impossi-
ble because the press wasn't up to the role of informing citizens
with the kinds of knowledge that citizens needed to perform their
functions as in choosing their leaders, that he compared citizens to
spectators at the very top of a football stadium. They didn't have
binoculars. They didn't understand the rules of the game. They
just saw a lot of people running around doing different things, and
had to make their decisions on that basis. Therefore, they were
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enormously easy to manipulate with inflammatory rhetoric.
Lippmann obviously couldn't imagine the world that we live in to-
day with table news and talk radio. But you can imagine that if you
don't have, special inside knowledge of the kind he was talking
about, how are we supposed to know if Iraq really has WMDs? It's
impossible for any of us to know that. And it's very easy to manipu-
late them on the basis of emotions and get really anything you
want out of them. The media were really no help in this regard,
because the media were not there behind closed doors to get the
kind of information that policy makers had access to.
And so Lippmann basically declared democracy to be impossi-
ble. To be a waste of time. He said that that really wasn't so terrible,
because people were more interested in results rather than in
process, and if you gave them good results they wouldn't mind so
much that they weren't really playing in the game. They were kind
of fooling themselves that democracy was taking place at all. And
nobody's really been able to puncture a hole in that argument in
terms of its essentials. In other words, and I just gave you that little
example, and I could give you any number of examples that are
just really too complicated for people to understand unless they're
unbelievably dedicated people who spend all of their time trying to
do nothing but read, and read and read about something, and
then they've got to find the right sources, and those sources have
to be not fooled. How often do we find out twenty years later from
historians that everything we thought about something twenty
years ago turns out to have been based on misperceptions?
And John Dewey, who reviewed the book in The New Republic in
1922, and then he took five years later to respond to his own book
called The Public and its Problems, and I think this Lippmann/Dewey
debate is really after the federalists' debate over the Federalist Pa-
pers. I think it's the most important debate in the history of this
country's contributions to political philosophy because Dewey
didn't try and argue with Lippmann that citizens were competent
to make these kinds of decisions based on the information that
they possessed. He didn't take issue with this idea of what
Lippmann called "omni competence." What he took issue with was
Lippmann's model of knowledge. Dewey's great metaphor was,
"You can be the greatest shoemaker in the world, but only the per-
son wearing the shoes can tell you where it hurts." And he pointed
to the fact that if you become one of these insiders as Lippmann
called them, one of these special men and women-he wasn't be-
ing deliberately sexistat the time-then you develop your own set
of interests and class identity that make it impossible for you to leg-
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islate or rule on behalf of the people with whom you can no longer
identify. It's a kind of obvious observation about the way social
groups operate. If you're in high school and you live with your
parents, and you go to college and you have a whole different peer
group, well, naturally you're going to start behaving differently to
impress your new peer group rather than your old peer group by
whom you're no longer surrounded. And so, then the model of
special men and women breaks down because these special men
and women can no longer identify accurately with the people on
behalf they're sent to Washington to rule. You can see this in the
media all the time. That when someone becomes the Washington
correspondent for some hometown newspaper, and they stay in
Washington for twenty years they become part of Washington
rather than their hometown. They start to understand all these
reasons why it's important not to tell people things that will only
confuse them by upsetting their understanding of the world.
Dewey said, "Well, this is all true, but it's not that terrible, because
there's very few kinds of knowledge where it's really important to
make a decision based on the facts of the situation" because there's
some forms of knowledge like a baseball score or how many hits
and errors were made, or, a flight schedule where it's very impor-
tant to know what's happening when. But most of the kinds of
decisions that body politics find themselves making are the kind of
knowledge that you find deriving through various forms of com-
munication and conversation. Dewey once said, "I don't know what
I think about a problem until I hear myself say it." This form of
knowledge that grows out of community conversation where peo-
ple discover the truth rather than learn the truth is a much more
valuable form of democratic knowledge. Because it implicates eve-
ryone in the community, even if it doesn't turn out to be the "right
decision" it's a better decision because it speaks to everyone be-
comes invested in it, and it gains a kind of legitimacy that makes it
true in Dewey odd sense.
Now, if we only have six companies giving us our information,
and if the forms of participation that are open to us for democratic
discourse are limited to these nonsensical shout fests that we see
on cable news and on talk radio, and that to an enormous degree
have come to dominate print media as well, then this form of
Deweyied democracy becomes possible, and all we get is the
knowledge that's passed down to us by our betters. Our "betters"
who have access to the airwaves, and the internet, and television,
and newspaper columns, and as we all know, that form of knowledge
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has been enormously degraded over the past few decades. If you
take a look at the number of the amount of space that Scott Peter-
son, and Michael Jackson, and Brad, whoever, and I always forget if
it's Jen or J-Lo that Brad-you know what I mean. You see that
we're being robbed, either through either model of democracy
that you want to choose. I mean, it's hopeless. If you're a person
with a job and a family it's hopeless. I do it for a living, so I get to
spend all day trying to figure out what I think is true, and most
things I have no idea. I just pick a few things where I think I know
what I'm doing. We're robbed of substance in the Littman model,
so that the knowledge that we feel we need to be competent citi-
zens is not offered to us, and we're certainly impoverished by the
Deweyied model of a culture of communication and conversation.
And so under either model, democracy is kind of farcical so long as
these avenues are choked off by this incredibly limited number of
gatekeepers.
Now, that's a slight twist on the marketplace of democracy ar-
gument, but it's the obvious argument. Only six people is bad. We
need more ideas in the marketplace. Any tenth grader can tell you
that's a problem. What I try and bring to the party besides
Lippmann and Dewey is some of the way of the culture, and how
the media operates, and how this culture is affected by the concen-
tration of so many different companies and so many different
interests being conglomerated under the same roof, aside from the
larger democratic argument, which again, I don't want you to for-
get, it's probably the most important argument, but it's also the
most obvious. If you think about it. If you remember that list. I
probably should have waited before I read that list. But if you think
about that big list I just read you of those sixty or so companies that
were under Warner Brothers rubric when they merged with Time
Warner, you have to remember that every single one of those com-
panies has potential conflict of interest for every single one of
those other companies. So if Time magazine wants to write about
any one of those companies, or CNN wants to report on any one of
those companies, or anyone at Time magazine, or anyone at CNN,
or any of those publications wants to report on something happen-
ing at any one of those other companies they have to think about:
How is this going to affect my job, my boss. How are the corpora-
tions going to look at this. How is it going to filter down to my level
once that happens? And, I can't do the math, but because there's
some sort of regression analysis, you've got to multiply everything
by everything else. I think. But it's almost infinite the level of po-
tential conflicts of interest because it's not just the companies that
[VOL. 39:2
Media Regulation at the Turn of the Millennium
are underneath your roof, it's all of your competitors as well. If you
report on a competitor of one your companies overly favorable
that's going to affect your company. It's going to make somebody
mad. And all of these people have girlfriends, and wives, and mis-
tresses, and boyfriends, and children, and you've got to keep all of
this in your mind. Remember the '96 election-Bob Dole's mis-
tress was trying to get coverage, and she was calling up news
organizations and trying to get coverage, and nobody would cover
her. And the argument was, "Well, it was thirty years ago." I mean,
this was, you know, I guess before we knew about Monica, because
it's '96-yeah. So we knew about Gennifer Flowers. We didn't know
about Monica. And the argument was, "Well, it's thirty years ago, it
has no bearing on contemporary issues, and anyway, Dole's going
to lose. If he were going to win, then it would matter. But since he's
going to lose anyway why don't we just let it go?" A very top editor
at Time and I were having lunch and we were discussing the issues,
and in fact he had a funny line. He said, "Would you print it?" And
I said, "Yeah, I'd print it. You know, it's not my fault that this has
become an issue. I don't make the rules, but these kinds of things
can become an issue." And he said, "Well, I'm the editor of Time. I
do make the rules, and I'm not going to print it." But he said,
"This is an easy call this not printing this." He goes, "I got a really
tough call, which is that Nancy Friday has written another book,
and I need to pick a reviewer for it."
Now, for those of you who don't know, Nancy Friday is a very
fancy sex writer. I remember buying it when I was, like, nineteen.
Her first book was called The Secret Garden, or Inside the Secret Garden.
It was about women's sexual fantasies, very educational. But her
second book was all about her own sex life. It was also about how
great her husband was at performing oral sex. And her husband
was Norman Pearlstein, the CEO of Time Inc. The number one
man at Time at the time. And you couldn't ignore Nancy Friday's
book, because that would be an insult to it. Yet you couldn't very
well give it too flowery a review because it was obvious that you
were reviewing everyone in the business knew who her husband
was. And yet you had to make her husband and her happy in some
way without giving them too good a review. It was a very compli-
cated political task. That's the kind of example where there are
maybe one hundred people in the world who understand this is-
sue, and it's kind of a trivial because who cares what kind of review
this book gets in Time?
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But in fact, it's illustrative of all of the kinds of decisions that are
involved, because the managing editor of Time magazine really
shouldn't have to take his decisions anywhere. He runs Time
magazine. And yet there are, as I said in that list, about sixty differ-
ent companies that have to ask themselves this kind of question
every time they set anything down to paper. And that's the most
trivial level, but there are some of these questions that involve mil-
lions of dollars if they're done wrong. Every once in a while the
public gets a whiff of what these look like, and it's kind of like one
of those Japanese monsters where they're so big, and the movie so
low budget that they only show them as tails swishing around and
knocking over buildings. And they expect you to imagine what the
rest of the beast looks like. The part that you see visibly in the me-
dia is only the tail, and the beast is really a lot bigger and scarier,
and does a lot more damage. But one time I remember I saw that
tail was when Disney took over ABC. I guess this was also in 1996,
and on Good Morning America, which is ABC's morning show. Char-
lie Gibson interviewed Thomas Murphy, who is the Chairman of
Cap City's ABC, and Michael Eisner. Charlie Gibson, give him
credit, he said to these guys, he said, "Where's the little guy in the
business anymore? Is this just a giant that forces everybody else
out?" And then Murphy, who was Gibson's new boss, said this on
the air-it's almost unbelievable-"Charlie, let me ask you a ques-
tion. "Wouldn't you be proud to be associated with Disney?" I'm
quite serious about this. On the air he read him his orders. Eisner
was later quoted saying he didn't think that ABC should cover Dis-
ney at all. So you've got one of the six not covering this enormous
corporation. It's certainly not covering it honestly. My friend, Mi-
chael Kinsley, did the world a favor when he announced-so that
you wouldn't be able to mistake it-that when Slate was started and
Microsoft funded it he made the announcement, "Slate will never
give Microsoft the skeptical scrutiny it requires as a powerful insti-
tution in American society, any more than Time will sufficiently
scrutinize Time Warner," which by the way Time doesn't admit to.
No institution can reasonably be expected to audit itself. The stan-
dard to insist on is that the sins be sins of omission, not distortion.
There will be no major investigations of Microsoft in sight.
Now, that matters when you're down to six companies. I mean, it
matters more and more when you're down to six companies. Be-
cause who can afford to do the investigations of Microsoft? It's very,
very hard to investigate media companies, because they're very
savvy. They are media companies, so they're very savvy about how
to present themselves to the media. I just had this incident where I
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felt myself to be slandered by the Boston Globe in a way that I don't
need to go into now. But because I am a media columnist if you
slander me I'm going to make a lot of trouble for you. So I wrote
ten or so altercation entries. I got the ombudsman involved and I
got another media columnist to write about it, and then I wrote my
Nation column about it. I called up the editorial page at the Boston
Globe, or I emailed her, and I said, "I'm the columnist for The Na-
tion, and I'm writing about how this obviously false [inaudible] got
on your editorial page, which your ombudsman has already said is
[inaudible] ." And she replied that she wasn't going to talk about it,
because it was an internal editorial operation, and she couldn't be
expected to discuss that. And I said, "But if everybody said that
there would be no Boston Globe. I mean, that's what we do for a liv-
ing. We find out, you know. You expect everyone in the world to
talk to you, and then you won't talk to anybody else. She didn't
have an answer for that, and I didn't get an email back to that. But
that's exactly what media companies think. They believe that they
themselves should be immune to all public scrutiny, and the net
result of this is that we have these enormously powerful forces.
Again, they're not only powerful in an economic sense, as they ob-
viously are, but they're powerful because these are the six
companies that determine the content of our democracy, and they
refuse to submit themselves to any form of scrutiny, and they're
very good at avoiding it.
One-third of local TV news directors surveyed by the project on
Sherman 2000 admitted that they had been pressured to avoid
negative stories about advertisers or do positive ones. Well, that's
just advertisers. Another 40 percent said that they didn't need to be
pressured. That they just submitted themselves to self censorship,
and you know, that if you add those two things up they get cen-
sored after they self-censor themselves. Then an awful lot of the
story is not appearing; is not open for us to discuss. And you know,
we don't know what that is, but you can see the results of some of
this in the coverage of the Gulf War I think. I mean, you can't ever
prove this kind of thing, but you can look at how that war was cov-
ered, how NBC, MSNBC got rid of Phil Donohue, which was its
highest rated show, just as the war began. And there was a memo
that was published saying this was a very bad image for NBC News
to be presenting at a time when the country's demanding a patri-
otic face, and we're going to war, and soldiers are going to be
dying. And at the same time that the war was taking place these
companies were putting themselves before the FCC to get the
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limits on ownership lifted so that they could expand/increase their
levels of concentration in various localities. I'm sure you'll hear a
lot more about that during the rest of the conference. And you
know, they can say that it's inconceivable that these two issues ever
crossed their mind on the same day. But how could they avoid it?
How can you not when your livelihood, when your success, when
the impression you create amongst your peers is how successful you
are at increasing the stock price of your company-when that's
really the only way that you're judged by your superiors-when the
very people who are making the decision about whether or not
you'll be able to do that are the same people who have an enor-
mous interest in seeing you broadcast a story a certain way. It seems
to me, I can't point to you and say, "I know, you know, that Michael
Eisner told me to go easy. That ABC was going to go easy on the
war and not let any of his people ask any tough questions of Paul
Wolfowitz or Dick Cheney." But it's difficult to imagine that every-
body didn't understand it. That you even need to say that. That
these two things are somehow separable. Now, every once in a
while we get an issue where it's quite stark. Where the self interest,
the corporate self interest of other media corporations is specifi-
cally demonstrated in such a way that it's d** near impossible to
argue that what's coming first are those corporate self interests
rather than the ideal that we like to think of as the public interest.
A few examples come to mind that I think are illustrative of this
problem, and it's kind of depressing to bring it up, because you
hear about this kind of problem, and it makes you feel kind of
helpless as to how to address the larger issue that it implies. But I'll
give you three quick examples. I don't want to spend too much
time on it. In 1996 as part of the Telecommunications Act rewrite,
Bob Dole, of all people, wanted to be the good guy before he re-
signed as Senate Majority Leader, and he wanted to auction off the
rights to the broadcast spectrum, which were estimated-nobody
really knows, but they were estimated to be worth $30-between
$30 and $70 billion dollars that are, you know, belong to the tax-
payer. And Dole got-he actually was quite-he was surprisingly
dogged about wanting to do this, because he really got no support
from any powerful interests in his party or any other party. And he
was taken aside right before he became the Republican nominee
and, as I said, withdrew his position as Senate Minority-wait a
minute-is it Majority or Minority leader-Minority then-anyway,
and they said, "Bob, you have to run for president. Who do you
think is going to be broadcasting your campaign? How do you ex-
pect to communicate with the country? You know, are you going to
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p** off the very people who are going to be carrying your mes-
sage?" And I guess he didn't have to think about it all that long,
because the broadcast rights were just given away, and the taxpayer
got absolutely nothing for it. I'm more-I mean, that story is told.
You can't really document the reason that Dole decided to reverse
himself finally. The way he would say it is that he never gave up on
his principles, he just wanted to be able to finish the Senate's busi-
ness and have a record of accomplishment to run on, and you
know, I'm sure that was part of it too. Nothing is ever true-and
there's never any one reason for anything in my experience. But if
you take a look at the legislation in the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, which is the reason that independent radio was destroyed, be-
cause it lifted, again, the limits on radio ownership, and also did a
lot on cross ownership, and it was a big battle, an enormous battle
between the broadcast and the cable industries, which again, I'm
not an expert on the inner workings of these things. You'll hear
more about them from people who know a great deal more about
it than I do. But I am an expert on the coverage of these things,
and it's very easy to be an expert on the coverage of the 1996 Tele-
communications Act, because there was none. The words
"Telecommunications Act of 1996" were never uttered on the CBS
Evening News, the NBC Evening News or the ABC Evening News.
There was not a single segment on the Telecommunications Act of
1996 on any one of the network magazine shows. The only time the
words were ever said were once on Nightline, so you have the entire
basis of our media world determined in that act, and that act was-
I mean, all the decisions that the FCC made down the road were
based on the laws written in 1996. And again, the reason that there
are no good radio now except satellite radio is because of the pro-
visions laid out in that act, and it went completely uncovered in the
television media.
Now, the people in television media will say, I mean, I've asked
actually the anchors about this and they say, "Well, this is a MEGO
story." MEGO is short for my eyes glaze over. They don't know how
to make it interesting. And you know, they're under such pressure
it's kind of a vicious cycle. They're under so much pressure to keep
viewers that everything has to be exciting, and so if they cover things
that are important then it becomes boring and people don't watch.
And so what's the point of giving people their spinach if they're not
going to eat it, and all they're going to do is go get fat on the pud-
ding that somebody else is serving? I mean, it's a hard question to
answer in the regime that we're living in, but nevertheless, it just
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coincidentally happened to coincide perfectly with the interests of
their corporate masters who didn't want any of this reported and
didn't-the last thing they wanted was a truly democratic debate
on the nature of our-the ownership of our communication sys-
tem, because you saw the results when we finally got one in 2003
and 2004, and people came to understand what was at stake, the
Congress was unable to do what it wanted to do. And the FCC
ownership laws were revered in Congress, and the court battles are
still taking place. So it's hard to believe that the fact that it was bor-
ing was the only reason that it was never reported.
I'll give you one more example, it's more recent, when the
McCain-Feingold laws were passed, and this is one of the toughest
battles. It's one of the only times really in recent years that the side
with less money beat the side with more money. And it was really-
somebody needs to do a doctoral thesis on how that battle was
won. But you know, there was one provision, only one provision
from the agreed upon comprised legislation that was stripped from
the legislation in the final vote. You know what that was? That was
the legislation that instructed the television stations to sell candi-
dates commercial time at their lowest prices available. Okay? That
wasn't-I didn't see that reported anywhere either, nowhere.
Now, if you think about it an awful lot of what's wrong with our
political system, like I said, there's no one answer to any problem,
but an awful lot of what's wrong with our political system is how
expensive it is to run for public office. It only allows a certain kind
of person to run for public office, and it forces that person to
spend most of their time raising money, in addition to which it
constricts the kinds of votes they're allowed to make. You know,
you can't-every time you vote it's sort of like being one of-part
of these media companies. Every time you make a vote you have to
think about who you're offending, and what that offense will mean
for the money you need to raise to buy the commercial time to run
next time. Our last election cost a billion dollars, the 2004 election
is estimated at a cost of a billion dollars. That money had to be
raised. So what's at the root of that cost is the cost of television
time. That's the vast majority of what it costs to run an election
campaign. So it's no exaggeration to say that candidates spend
most of their time raising money, and most of their time when they
vote worrying about what those votes are going to have for the im-
plication of raising money so that they can continue to keep their
jobs. I always-you know, whenever I talk to liberal groups they al-
ways say to me, "Aren't these politicians awful? None of them are
willing to vote on their principles rather than their interest." And I
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say, "That's silly. This is their career. They're politicians. They're
not going to vote themselves out of their own careers. It's up to you
to make it in their career interest to vote the way you want them to
vote. That's what-that's how democracy is supposed to work." But
there's a bottleneck in the system when it comes to money. Because
if it's not about votes, it's only about money, then you've got an-
other dysfunctional aspect, crucial dysfunctional aspect of the
democracy. And this dysfunctional aspect derives from the need to
advertise on television. And that was the one provision that was not
addressed. It's the most important provision, but it was the one
provision that was stripped from the bill, and nowhere at all was it
reported. And when the four network heads were brought before
Congress and kind of slapped around for misreporting the 2000
election, you know, that night this issue didn't come up at all. No-
body raised it. You know, it was-it's the central issue in these guys'
lives. I mean, the 2000 election was over with. It was badly done. I
don't like it. But the central issue facing them was the fact that they
were going to have to start-they were already raising money, a lot
of them were already in debt, you know, poor John Glenn, is still
raising money to pay off his debt from when he ran for president. I
don't even remember when that was anymore. I mean, really, it's a
terrible problem. And it all derives from this one aspect that the
system can't deal with, and we can't even discuss it, because this
problem of the interests of those conglomerates won't allow us to.
It can only be discussed on the margins. I can't write about it all I
want in The Nation, and to be fair, a lot of these issues get discussed
on the right as well as the left. The coalition that came together to
defeat Michael Powell's FCC's attempt to raise these limits even
further was a left/right coalition, and in my guess, it was probably
more of a right/left coalition. In other words, my guess is that the
NRA's participation in it and the Christian Coalition's participation
in it meant more to a lot of senators than did the Sierra Club or
Friends of the Earth. I don't know that; that's just my guess. Cer-
tainly the fact thatJesse Helms was on board says that to me.
So should I finish up here? How long am I supposed to speak?
Okay. Yeah, now, I looked at the group of experts you're having
tomorrow, and like I said, the stuff I understand is largely about
content. So I was going to say a few things about this battle over the
FCC limits, and what you can expect from the new FCC chair, Mr.
Martin. But I'm not going to do that, because I think if you want to
ask me about it I can give you an answer. It's a pretty good answer.
But you can probably get a better answer if you wait till tomorrow.
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But I want to stick to this issue of content, because you know, the
words "liberal media," most people think they're one word now-
liberalmedia. By the way, here's one thing, if nothing else you learn
useful comes out of my talk, the word media is a plural noun. Does
everybody know that? It's a plural noun. The media are not the
media is. It sounds funny, but it's true. And it's also very important,
because the media are such a vast herd of unruly beasts that no
matter what you say about the media it's going to be true about
one tiny little part of the media. And so, you know, Dan Rather
made a mistake. You can read this anywhere. You'll read it in the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post and you hear it on O'Reilly.
Dan Rather made a mistake about Bush's draft record, and this
proves that the media is liberal and biased against Republicans.
Well no, it doesn't prove anything. It proves something about the
practices of this producer, this group of producers who worked
with Dan Rather on this particular story. But to say that something
about CBS is necessarily true of The Nation, or the New York Times,
or Time magazine, or the Weekly Standard, or the weekly Star, these
are all legitimate members of the media.
So as I said, when you think about the media, and when you talk
about the media you have to speak very specifically about which
media you mean. So it's complicated, because media is still the
plural of medium. And we're not talking about media in terms of
media. We're talking about which actor within the media you
mean. And the reason I make such a big deal out of this is because,
look, I live on the upper west side of Manhattan, and a lot of my
friends work in the media, and everybody I know who works in the
media has basically liberal social views, and doesn't have particu-
larly liberal economic views. Their views are somewhat to the right
of the rest of the nation on economics, and somewhat to the left of
the nation on social issues. Certainly issues that are crucial to the
religious right. They are well to the left of the religious right. Eve-
rybody I know basically thinks a woman has a right to an abortion,
and that gays should be allowed to get married, that you don't
teach evolution to children as if it's true. That kind of thing.
There's no sympathy for any of that stuff. But on economic issues
where reporters are, as I said, they don't send their children to
public schools by and large. They don't rely on social security or
Medicare or Medicaid. Their jobs can't be outsourced. On those
issues there is very little push back from any mass organization, and
particularly from their corporation to question their views. I mean,
these views are dogma within the corporations they work for, and
they don't get in trouble if their biases somehow slip through.
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There's no one really to make trouble for them. Lately we've got-
ten a few liberal organizations who see that as their job, but they're
very small, disorganized, compared to conservative organizations.
Whereas on the issues where they believe themselves to have a lib-
eral bias, social issues, on the one hand they're aware of it, on the
other hand the corporations for whom they labor are extremely
wary of offending their audience. I mean, you can see that, with
lately this craziness about obscenity where the argument of the
right seems to be that the media should be entirely deregulated
except when it comes to saying dirty words and showing body parts.
In that case it's almost like you have a Commissioner to decree
what's all right and what's not all right. And so, on the one hand,
you've got a set of biases that everyone's aware of. Everyone is
keeping in the back of their mind that the corporate heads are
keeping an eye on and ready to pounce on, and if somehow it gets
past all these people then there are these enormous conservative
organizations who exist for no other reason except catch this kind
of bias being demonstrated. You know that on this FCC stuff liter-
ally over ninety-eight-over ninety-nine percent of the complaints
about obscenity were generated by a single organization-
[inaudible] parent resource something. And so, these people have,
millions of dollars and they just monitor the media to catch liberals
and to make trouble for them. And now that they've got the FCC
leveling these enormous fines it's not just a nuisance trouble. It's
real trouble. It's millions of dollars worth of trouble.
So even if the problem were that reporters were liberally biased,
that problem doesn't necessarily translate into liberally biased news
on the basis of how reporters see themselves reporting their job,
a) they want to be professionals and objective, b) their bosses are
worried about it, c) if somehow their bosses miss it you've got this
enormous conservative structure ready to pounce, which has the
quality of focusing the mind. But more importantly, it's not report-
ers who determine what gets reported in the news. It's editors and
producers and owners. I got a quote here from Tom Johnson, who
was the president of CNN and the publisher of the Los Angeles
Times, and he says, "It's not reporters or editors, but the owners of
the media who decide the quality of news produced by or televised
by their news departments. It is they who most often select, hire,
fire and promote the editors and publishers, top general manag-
ers, news directors and managing editors, the journalists who run
the newsroom. Owners determine newsroom budgets and the tiny
amount of time and space allotted to the news versus advertising.
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They set the standard of quality and the quality. They set the stan-
dard and quality of the people they choose and the news policies
they embrace. Owners decide how much profit should be pro-
duced from their media properties. Owners decide what quality
levels they are willing to support, or how well or poorly they pay
their journalists." And you know, on the one hand, a) think about
who the owners are. In the year that AOL and Time Warner com-
bined, which was one of the least successful mergers in all of
human history, Gerald Levin and Steve Case, who made the deci-
sion, took home $241 million dollars between them in bonuses.
That same year Michael Eisner pulled down $73 million dollars.
That was their one year. That was what they earned in one year.
Now, ask yourself if these people are the kinds of people who are
going to be sending forth aggressive investigators of financial and
political malfeasance charged with, as the old saying goes, afflicting
the comfortable and comforting the afflicted?
My friend, Harry Evans, who actually I should say is rather com-
fortable himself, points out that the problem with media
organizations that are owned by these kinds of companies is no
longer whether or not how to stay in business but whether or not
they're even going to stay in journalism. In other words, so little of
what gets produced as "news" qualifies as journalism anymore. It's
pre-packaged entertainment. It's promotional, and you can under-
stand why, and you can understand all of the pressures are about
avoiding anything difficult or controversial. When Michael Eisner
refused to release Fahrenheit 9/11 the reason that was given by
Disney initially-they pulled back when they were criticized for
this-but the reason that he wouldn't allow this independent arm
of Disney, Miramax, to produce it was that Disney World or Disney-
land-whichever one is in Florida-had some issues before Jeb
Bush. That it would hurt the company to get the Bush family mad
at them at a time when, these issues were before them. That was
the legitimate answer they gave. That was like the respectable an-
swer they gave. Again, they pulled back from it. That was what
Disney was saying in the beginning.
Now, you're supposed to end these kinds of talks on optimistic
notes. I will say that when I first published What Liberal Media? and
I went out on tour for it right before the war began in 2003, it was a
very depressing tour because I would give this talk, and I would
actually give a more depressing talk than this one. I would tell you
how long the average person sits in front of the freerepublic.com
website, which is a really crazy right wing website, which by the way
I give a clue-I give a quiz, but I'm at the end of my talk, so I'll
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move more quickly, is five hours and twenty minutes. And people
would hear that and they would just want to give up. If these right
wing nuts are sitting in front of these websites for five hours and
twenty minutes emailing networks and hassling, writing letters to
the editor, and hassling their congressmen, then the battle is just
lost, you know, because liberals at least have lives.
But here's the part that's not so depressing. I wrote three books
in eighteen months, or I published three books. One of them I
spent eleven years on, which was my dissertation book, When Presi-
dents Lie. So it doesn't really count. But I went on three book tours.
The point is I went on three book tours in eighteen months. By the
third book tour it was like a different world than the first book
tour. Now, it's true that it wasn't quite different enough. But when I
went out in the fall of 2004, and I went to speak in Florida in Oc-
tober 2004 and I spoke to 400 people in the Ritz Carleton of all
places in Sarasota, Florida, and there were representative
of [inaudible], and there were representatives of Move On, and
there were all these bloggers there. There were all these institu-
tions that had been created to try and bring some diversity of
viewpoint to the discourse that two years earlier had been entirely
100 percent dominated by these few voices, which turned out to be
largely conservative voices. Like I said, it wasn't enough, but it was
kind of a different world. Now, I still admit that there's something
very odd about the fact-nobody seems to think this is a big deal
but me-but 59 million people voted for Bush approximately; 57
million people voted for Kerry. Now, in fact, more people in Amer-
ica-nobody ever notices-more people in America voted for
Democratic congressional candidates than voted for Republican
candidates. So Democrats got more of the Congressional votes
than Republican votes. And yet not only do the republicans control
all three branches of government, they control every single opin-
ion slot in the broadcast media. There's no liberal pundit that has
his or her own show on television where an enormous amount of
conservatives have their own-when CNN wanted to have kind of a
fair fight on Crossfire before they gave it a mercy killing, they
couldn't-they had to go to two political operatives to fight the two
journalists that they had hired. They had to. There were no Robert
Novaks or Tucker Carlsons on the left at all. They had to go to
Carville and Begala, who were pros, because the system had not
allowed any liberals to rise even to that level. And if you notice this
is a kind of a phenomenon that's unarguable, but interesting. That
every time a liberal politician goes into the media that liberal
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politician's job is to hide their liberal views. They have to become
down the line-unidentifiable. They have to become politically
neutered. Whereas when conservatives go into the media their job
is be conservative. So you've got one side ready for a fight and the
other side turning the other cheek. Well, the difference in the
world today is that there is another side. That is, it's far behind. It's
thirty years and hundreds of billions of dollars behind. But it's
there, and it makes a big difference. It makes a difference in part
because it could win. I mean, it wins small battles and it could win
big battles. But more importantly, it makes people feel like they're
not alone in the world anymore, which is one of the reasons I
wrote with liberal media. To let people know that they weren't go-
ing crazy. That all this talk of the liberal media was nonsensical in a
lot of ways, and politically understandable.
And so that's my optimistic statement for today. Yes, it's still
Goliath, you know, and not even David, it's just like duh. But the
battle has been joined, and the first step to solving your problem is
admitting that you're having a problem. And that admittance
finally was made sometime between 2000 and 2002. It's people who
see the world this way, and I don't mean to speak [inaudible] see
the world this way are not alone in the way that they were before,
and therefore they don't feel as impotent, and so I just like living
in that world better than I like the previous world, even though
that other book sold a lot better than the next two. Okay, that's all.
Thank you.
RYAN CALO: They just told me that they agreed to take some
questions. We have ten, fifteen minutes, and the way they'd like to
work this would be for you to raise your hand and wait for the mi-
crophone they give to you both because it'll be easier to hear you,
but also because we're recording this event for posterity and we'd
like you to have you on record. So if you have a question, first of all
raise your hand, and Mr. Alterman will select whose question we'd
like to take, okay? So are there any questions?
ERIC ALTERMAN: Sir?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Your last comments about being opti-
mistic, I'm wondering if maybe we can have a different perspective
about this joining of the battle. Do you think it might be possible
to actually cooperate in the way that you pointed out, that it was a
left/right coalition or a right/left coalition on that last media is-
sue? Might that have more potential for success than actually trying
to fight against who we know is already in power?
ERIC ALTERMAN: If it's talking about this issue, then yes, abso-
lutely. It's much more of an insider/outsider question than a
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left/right issue. The people who have the power want to protect
their power. I do think that the conservatives have a number of ad-
vantages in terms of corporate behavior. The corporate mindset
being more sympathetic to conservative values than liberal values.
But I also think these guys can call it flat and they can call it round,
like, they would have all liberal hosts if they thought that's where
the money was. In that sense, there's hope that the right kind of
political and commercial pressure can open up this discourse, and
they can see that-because the old model is collapsing, the old
model of one market with, you know, one sort of God figure speak-
ing to 40 million people at night, at once, or forty percent of the
audience at once, that that is collapsing, and that liberals can de-
mand their fair share of that market in conjunction with
conservatives demanding that fair share of the market. And again,
you can look at the way-you can look at the country and say it's
evenly divided between center left and center right, or you look at
the way people identify themselves, thirty-one percent of Americans
say that they're conservative, twenty-one percent of Americans say
that they're liberals. If you use the word "progressive" it goes up a
little bit more. I still like the word liberal. So twenty percent is a
significant number of people. It's twenty percent of 280 million
people is a lot of people, and they're entirely without representa-
tion in the discourse. It's to some degree our own fault for that
being allowed to take place. As I said, I do think a lot of these cor-
porations who just happen to make money from liberals as
conservatives, but the conservatives have been so much better at
organizing themselves and demanding their piece of the pie that
liberals have been left with nothing. And now that liberals under-
stand the problem they have lots of opportunities. And the
argument is not inconsistent with the same argument that conser-
vatives make about their pare of the pie. And as long as they see
themselves as aggrieved, then this coalition's possible. What I worry
about is they're going to wise up and see that they already own eve-
rything, and then they just will-you know, no, let's not touch
anything, because it's very easy to win these battles by inertia,
which is what the administration is doing now.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When Ben Bagdikian first published his
book and looked at fifty large capitalist corporations running the
media there was a pattern of coverage that you observed, and now
we've got down to six. Wouldn't you agree that the pattern of cov-
erage was pretty much the same when there were fifty, and now
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that there are six, so that maybe you're barking up the wrong tree
by counting the number of corporations?
ERIC ALTERMAN: No. I wouldn't agree. I wouldn't even begin
to agree. So why would you say that it's...
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When there were fifty corporations, all
of which were focusing on their central issue of protecting their
ownership of the airwaves, and then they combine into a couple of
corporations, they're still focusing on their protection of the own-
ership of the airwaves.
ERIC ALTERMAN: Yes, well this gets us back to the other great
debate in the history of American political philosophy, which is the
Federalist Papers, it's just really Madison's federalist tenet. If you
have fifty different factions fighting over the public interest, then
it's much more likely that you'll get a more expansive definition of
what constitutes the public interest, because the factions will need
to combine in all kinds of different ways, then none of them will be
able to exercise the kinds of power that prevents certain issues or
certain point of views that are significant from being heard and
being acted upon if in fact that's where power lies in the system.
But six can do it pretty easily. If fifty can't do it, six can easily do it.
And that's the fundamental difference. I also think that there's
good things and there's bad things about the changes that have
taken place in the media, but I do think that one reason the so
called liberal media argument has been so effective is that I do
think in the '50s and '60s the elite media were more liberal than
most people, and now they're more conservative. But because the
conservatives are able to seize on this imagery and repeat it over,
and over and over, they've given power to it merely through repeti-
tion, merely through insisting on its truth, and people keep
hearing it over time and don't think about it. But I do think it had
some truth back then. I do think that in terms of civil rights and in
terms of economics, economics versus classical economics, the me-
dia were to the left. The elite media in New York and Washington
were to the left of the rest of the country, and I think that's where a
lot of the power comes from.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If there were a Telecommunications Act
of 1983 do you really think it would have been thoroughly covered
by the media because there happened to be a few more corporate
owners?
ERIC ALTERMAN: Well, if I said yes you wouldn't be able to dis-
approve it. I don't like to give snap answers to things I haven't
thought about. But I can't imagine it would be worse. That issue
might not be any better. But a lot of it's...
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: I wonder if you think there are any First
Amendment implications from your insights? Is there any way that
the First Amendment protection of the press should be altered in
light of all of these considerations?
ERIC ALTERMAN: Well, I'm not a lawyer, so I'm reluctant to get
into that field. I mean, I'm among those who very much regrets the
loss of the fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine was a bit prob-
lematic in practice because it assumed that there were only two
sides to every issue, and there are multiple sides to most issues. I
remember when I was young and Barry Commoner was running
for President, he would run commercials that would always say
"b**" in them, because you weren't allowed to censor political ad-
vertising by law in those days. That was the only way he could get
your attention, if he cursed. So all of his commercials had the word
"b**" in them, because he wasn't covered by the fairness doctrine,
because it only applied to either Republicans or Democrats. So it
was problematic. But it was a much, much better situation than the
one we have. And I actually have been asked to testify by the judici-
ary committee and minority staff about efforts to try and revive
that. But again, who were you fighting when you're reviving the
fairness doctrine? You're fighting the media industry that's making
such a killing from the current situation which is dominated by
one side. So in the real world, I don't really see how it's going to
happen. I think the First Amendment issues become trickiest when
you start. I mean, that's what those media CEOs all did when they
were brought before Congress to defend their terrible coverage of
the 2000 election was wrap themselves in the First Amendment and
say, "How dare the government tell us what to do? We're free and
independent." Which is true. That it's worrisome to have a gov-
ernment telling the media how to report on the one hand. On the
other hand, if there is no countervailing pressure to the media
corporations, where is it going to come from if not from the gov-
ernment? Who's big enough to fight it? I mean, I have, like, four
different media columns, and I was able to be like a gnat on the
behind of the Boston Globe when they destroyed my reputation and
my opinion before half a million readers. Most people have noth-
ing, you know? And there's no way to force the media. If the media
wants to screw you in some way, there's absolutely no recourse for
just about anyone. So if you're going to admit that these compa-
nies wield an enormous amount of power, and that this power is
wielded in such a way that is has fundamental import for the way
our democracy is-the health of our democracy-then unless
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you're willing to use the government I'd have to ask you what else
is imaginable. How else can you imagine addressing the problem?
Like I say, I don't like that solution, but I don't have a better one.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Would you mind giving us your opinion
about blogs and whether or not blogs would fill sort of a role that
might not otherwise be filled if we didn't have a concentrated me-
dia like we do?
ERIC ALTERMAN: Sure. I like blogs, because every time you
give a talk to some committed audience someone always raises
their hand and says, "What can we in this room do about this terri-
ble problem?" And I used to say nothing, but now I say, "Start a
blog." So it gives me an answer. Blogs are great, and they also suck.
They're great because they are a form of democratic communica-
tion that is outside the structure of these six companies and all the
other companies that act like these six companies, and they allow
information to be passed in a Deweyied fashion. That's wonderful.
The second reason they're great is because they allow for the in-
troduction of information into the same system that the system
would otherwise resist. So the system as it's practiced, and the peo-
ple who are now telling you where your shoe hurts, where your
foot hurts from your shoe were fine with Trent Lott saying, "Strom
Thurmond would have been terrific if he'd won in 1953 and the
country was still segregated by race." The journalists produced by
the system had no problem with that, and there wasn't really any
new information introduced by [inaudible] or Josh Marshall ex-
cept to just repeat it over and over, and say, "No, it's not fine." And
the next thing you know Lott's out of a job. It's forced the system
to deal with information that the system would have preferred not
to deal with. So those are the two things that blogs are good for.
The thing that blogs are bad for is that they have even less amount
of quality control or gatekeeper function than the traditional me-
dia, and it's nearly impossible for people to determine good
information from bad information, because they're busy, and they
don't know that drudge aspires to be eighty percent accurate, as-
pires to be eighty percent accurate. That he would print anything,
you know. That most blogs that don't have any sense ofjournalistic
responsibility. When I talked before about journalists knowing
their own prejudice and seeking to offset those prejudices as a mat-
ter of their understanding of their professional obligation. I think
that's a good thing. In this case it doesn't happen to work for my
own prejudice, but I think that's a good thing. That's like the most
unbloglike thing you can do, and so an awful lot of c** gets intro-
duced into the system, that the system has not handled to dismiss
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or distinguish between, and there has definitely been a net lower-
ing of the standards of what kinds of information is broadcast in
the major media since that has come directly through blogs. All of
those stories about John Kerry allegedly having an affair with an
intern were all introduced by blogs. There was no truth to it at all,
but it occupied the media for a long time. So that, in many ways
blogs accelerate the worst aspects of journalism, and that concerns
me. But basically I think they're great, and they're great because
they let people feel like they're in the game. They let people feel
like they have a voice, and that's a terrible problem with our de-
mocracy. That people feel not only that they have no voice, but
that they have no one to talk to, and blogs solve that problem.
They will never replace journalism. Journalism's too expensive and
it requires too many different skills that bloggers would need to
work full time at to acquire, and would need to have resources to
acquire. You can have a blogger in Baghdad who's giving you in-
formation that can turn out to be useful, but to set up a bureau in
Baghdad, to cover every story that is deemed important, costs mil-
lions. It costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. It costs thousands
of dollars a month. It's a real skill. It's a professional skill. So the
idea that blogs can replace journalism is nonsense. But the idea
that blogs can help keep journalism honest is a good one. It's just
that journalists need to have a stronger sense of professional re-
sponsibility than they've shown of late, and all of the pressures
unfortunately are pushing them in the other direction.
SUSAN DOUGLAS: This will be the last question.
ERIC ALTERMAN: Just for the record I'd like to say that no
women in fact raised their hand, so don't yell at me later. Okay.
We're going to extend it with two questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This has been a wonderful talk with ex-
tremely important and interesting points, but then it feels very
postmodern to go online and see that your blog is hosted at
MSNBC, which is part of the big six. And I'm just wondering how
you sort of make sense of that? I mean, if we want to resist the idea
that you're some sort of token liberal for them which I do want to
resist, then are we forced to draw the conclusion that maybe if
there are liberals who make cogent and compelling and readable
arguments they will find a market, even among this big six, despite,
our sort of presumptions that the marketplace is going to force
them out? Do you stand as a refutation of some of your own
points?
WINTER 2006]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
ERIC ALTERMAN: I can't really answer the question as to why
MSNBC chose me to be their only professional blogger. It's good
for me, you know? It's a fun way to make a living. It's odd to me. It
doesn't make really a lot of sense to me that it happened. But I
would add that I am a blogger. I don't have my own show on televi-
sion. No one's ever remotely considered for a minute giving me my
own show on television. When I was in college I used to ask, like,
Cornel West this question: Why, if everything you say is true how do
you explain yourself? And he would say that the system produces
little spaces for people who have energy to demonstrate the gener-
osity of the system. You know? It's kind of a neo-Marxist argument.
I don't need to explain it in neo-Marxist terms. I understand my
job. I've never been politically censored on MSNBC, ever. And I
benefit from the editing I get. I'm grateful for it. But I understand
what's sayable and what's not sayable on MSNBC, and I don't say
what's not sayable, because I'm invested in my career. I'm invested
in the ability to keep talking. So if I were Noam Chomsky I
wouldn't have this job, because I wouldn't be doing that, or I
wouldn't understand, or I'd be above caring about such things. But
you know, I'm not a refutation, because I play by the rules. Okay?
Now, maybe I get to expand the rules a little bit by understanding
what they are. And there was a period of time where I was the New
York Times op-ed pages favorite liberal. They would always call me
up whenever they thought some liberal outrage had taken place,
and they would say, "Write it up," and we would fight over just how
far I could take the argument. I wrote an article once; it was when I
was just beginning. It was twelve years ago. I was beginning my
book on presidential lying, and George. The other George Bush
was president, and I wrote an article about presidential lying, and I
identified one of Bush's lies, and they said, "This is all very good,
but you can't call the president a liar. It's the rule of the New York
Times." And I said, "But this is a piece about how Presidents exploit
the fact that the media can't call them liars." And they'd say,
"That's a very impressive argument to me, Eric, and I promise to
tell all of my friends about it, and you can tell all of your friends
about it, but the fact is either a million people are going to read
you tomorrow or you can make copies of this and send it out to
your friends." And a million people read me the next day without
that argument, and I don't think that's the worse thing in the
world. I understand. I mean, it's too bad, but I understand the
world I live in. So I don't think I'm a refutation of what I say. I
think I have made some sort of peace with the system, and the sys-
tem has made some sort of peace with me. And the fact that I am
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quite moderate on a lot of issues and conservative on other issues
demonstrates the limit of that system.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much for your talk. It's
been very insightful. I thought about one of the comments that
you made that you thought the administration was benefiting from
inertia. And I question that only because last week in the Times they
covered the amount of coverage or infomercials being passed on as
legitimate news pieces by the administration has risen immensely.
And I think it's twice the amount that had ever been covered by
likewise in the Clinton administration, and I wonder if you would
comment on that at all?
ERIC ALTERMAN: You asked me to comment on the invest-
ment by this administration in phony news?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
ERIC ALTERMAN: Yeah. I see that this story of all of the tax-
payer funded money that's going into fake news releases that are
being broadcast by a lot of local TV stations as part and parcel of
the Jeff Gannon story and as part and parcel of the Armstrong Wil-
liams story-and the Maggie Gallagher story, and as part and
parcel of the really thirty to forty year effort that the conservatives
.. I think these people are really conservative. I think it's an insult
to conservatism to call that the far right in this country has
launched to de-legitimate the act of journalism, to de-legitimate
the act of holding powerful forces accountable for what they do in
society. So, it doesn't surprise me that these things are taking place.
Now, the main problem with this effort, and like I said, this is an-
other part of the tail, that all we see is the tail is that the media are
enormously reluctant to recognize it as such. That Fox News is an
assault on the values of news as defined by the journalists who work
for CNN and the other networks. But they don't see it that way.
They just see it as the newest thing in competition, that they have
to emulate. That they need part of their audience.
There were two reasons I wrote What Liberal Media?. The first
one was so that liberals wouldn't think they were going crazy. But
the second one was to defend journalists, honest journalism.
Whether it be liberal, or conservative or nothing, against these
forces that are seeking to undermine it by calling it liberal bias
when in fact all it is is trying to get answers from people who don't
want to give them to you, because they're in positions of power.
And there are so many ways in which this is going on now. There's
so many different aspects to this attack on honest journalism that
it's almost impossible to keep up with it. That is the genius of this
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administration, that they've launched their war on so many fronts
that you can't even believe it. You know, you can't. the New York
Times can't cover them even if the New York Times were so inclined,
because there's just too much. That's why I keep having to publish
books. So it doesn't surprise me. You know, I got in a fight with
some blogger because I read an article in the New York Times that
raised the question as to whether or not some of these Iraqi blogs
might be phony blogs that are put up by the administration for
propaganda purposes, and this blogger said, "That's the most ri-
diculous thing in the world. I said, "The CIA, an organization that
admits to overthrowing governments, to torturing people, to assas-
sination policies and to having its own newspapers is going to say,
'No, no, we're too moral to have a blog.'" A phony blog? Well, the
fact is, is that all of these efforts are part of the right wing effort in
this country to assert its [inaudible] over the forces that it thinks
are in its way. Some of these forces are genuinely liberal, but some
of these forces are merely about democratic accountability. And
this effort, this enormous investment, I mean, the administration
rejected the ruling of the GAO, that said these were legal. They
refuse to be held accountable in typically democratic ways, and the
most important instrument of holding them accountable in our
history has been the press, and so they're attempting to de-
legitimate the press through all of these different avenues. It's as-
tonishing to me that the media won't wake up and see this effort
for what it is, because you can't. Again, you can't fight something
unless you recognize it as a battle, and this particular battle has not
been joined. So thank you for raising that. Everybody go out and
fight that battle too. Thank you.
[VOL. 39:2
Media Regulation at the Turn of the Millennium
PANEL I
A PERFECT STORM: THE BATTLE OVER
MEDIA CONCENTRATION
RYAN CALO: Hello and welcome. For those of you who don't
know me, my name is Ryan Calo, along with Elizabeth Wei. We've
organized this event. This is an event that means quite a bit to us.
For those of you that saw the keynote last night, I at least thought it
was a great success. It was a very interesting talk, at times controver-
sial, and it really was a nice lead into today's events. I'd like to
thank everybody for coming here. This is a great turnout and we
have a wonderful room. And just so everyone knows, this is being
put on as a sort of co-production between the Journal of Law Reform
at the University of Michigan and the Department of Communica-
tion Studies, who have been just an invaluable resource to Liz and
I. So I would like to start off then by introducing our dean, Dean
Evan Caminker, who is going to say a few words of welcome, and
thank you very much for coming.
DEAN EVAN CAMINKER: Good morning. I just wanted to issue
a couple of warm words of welcome on behalf of the Law School,
the Journal of Law Reform and the University of Michigan, Depart-
ment of Communication Studies. I think this is going to be an
incredibly exciting conference. We obviously know this is focusing
on one of the most important questions of democratic governance,
namely the ways in which an independent and vibrant and free
press, and more recently, a broader range of media activities, can
actually serve to make sure that our governmental system remains
known to the people and accountable to the people. That is, of
course, a subject that we've been talking about for two hundred
years in this country. More recently we've started to focus on the
question at the heart of this conference, which is not just the ways
in which a free press can help maintain a democratic government,
but the ways in which it is quite important for that free press or
range of media activities itself to be accountable and democratic.
We are focusing more and more these days on the question of
whether or not the makeup of the people who constitute the me-
dia and the breadth of interests represented both at the ownership
levels and at the participatory levels, whether or not we need to
worry as much there about the democratization of the media as we
do about the role that the media has in democratic government. I
would like to invite another thought, which is to start thinking
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about how does a particular issue of law play itself out across the
globe? And I think it is interesting that, as this and other recent
administrations have focused a great deal on trying to bring de-
mocracy to more and more governments around the world, there
hasn't been that much attention paid, at least that I have seen, to
the role that a developing press and media might play in those
other countries. We talk a lot about elections, for example, but we
don't necessarily talk all that much about the support that private
media enterprise might actually play in new democracies in the
same way it has played in our democracy for the last couple of
hundred years. So I hope that some of the panelists today, or some
of you in the audience, might spend a little bit of time thinking not
just about how this issue plays out here at home, but also abroad.
And I invite you to stay for all of the festivities today. I think we are
going to have an incredibly wonderful and rich conversation, and
again, I thank you very much for coming to Michigan Law School,
and let's get on with the show.
Thank you.
RYAN CALO: I'm going to introduce the first panel, and I think
that the moderator, Professor Van Houweling, is going to talk a
little more about its substance. I'd like to first say that she's been a
great help to us. She was a really wonderful resource at the begin-
ning when we were sort of casting about for how to frame this
event, and who to invite. She's just been absolutely wonderful, also,
in helping with the funding proposal. I just want to thank her per-
sonally before I introduce her. In any event, Professor Molly Van
Houweling joined the University of Michigan faculty in 2002 as an
Assistant Professor after serving as a research fellow at Stanford
Law School's Center for Internet and Society, and as president of
Creative Comments, a non-profit faciliting sharing of intellectual
property. Professor Van Houweling has also served as a Senior Ad-
visor to the President and Board of Directors of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the company that
oversees the Internet domain system, and as a research fellow at
the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law
School. Professor Van Houweling received a B.A. in political sci-
ence from the University of Michigan, and J.D. from Harvard Law
School. She clerked for Judge Michael Bowden of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, and Justice David Souter of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Professor Van Houweling's
teaching and research interests include intellectual property, law
and technology, property and constitutional law. This year she is
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visiting at the University of California Berkeley Boalt Hall. With
that I'd like to start panel one. Thank you very much.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: Thanks, Ryan, and
thanks to all of you for coming. Since I have been away in Califor-
nia this year I'm especially delighted to see so many of my former
students in the audience, and it's nice to be back in Ann Arbor.
Our first panel will focus on regulatory approaches to media own-
ership and consolidation. As you may know, the FCC has recently
moved to relax some of its traditional rules governing ownership.
That move has met with alarm from some in Congress, from many
members of the public, and from some courts as well. We will put
this debate and other recent developments in context this morning
by hearing about the history of media regulation. We will hear a
defense of the FCC's recent deregulatory moves and a defense of
the public outcry against them. We will also hear how, at the same
time that the FCC is deregulating media ownership, it is regulating
heavily in other areas, including broadcast obscenity and even
copyright. Each of the panelists will speak for about twenty min-
utes, then we'll give them a little time to speak to each other, and
also have time for your questions at the end. We will end by noon if
not sooner to give all of us plenty of time for a lunch break. We will
start with Professor Russell Neuman, who is the John Derby Evans
Professor of Media Technology in the Department of Communica-
tions Studies here at the University of Michigan and also a research
professor at our Institute for Social Research. He recently served as
Senior Policy Analyst in the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy. His recent books include The Gordian Knot: Po-
litical Gridlock on the Information Highway, and Affective Intelligence.
Professor Neuman has also taught at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, Harvard, Yale, and he was one of the founding faculty
members of the MIT Media Lab. His Ph.D. is from the University
of California at Berkeley; his undergraduate degree is from Cornell
University. With that, let's get started with Professor Neuman.
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: Good morning. I have twenty minutes,
and the title of my little presentation is "Ten Things You Should
Know About the Media Concentration Controversy." So I've got
two minutes each. My strategy this morning is to try to be provoca-
tive, so I'll throw out a lot of things. I won't be able to defend them
fully, but I'm assured that my colleagues on the panel and mem-
bers of the audience will be able to both critique and, on occasion,
support some of these arguments.
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NUMBER ONE-THE LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF MEDIA CONCENTRA-
TION IS CURIOUSLY SHORTSIGHTED AND HOPELESSLY ROMANTIC. I
think we heard it in Eric's remarks last night, and I raised the ques-
tion. You don't really think that there's any difference between
1983, when there were fifty media corporations dominating the
airwaves and now there are six. And he argued, oh no, it was much
better then. And I think that there is this romantic notion of media
diversity-that was what we listened to when we were kids and lis-
tened to the radio and watched TV, and I think that it is romantic. I
don't think there is any data to indicate that in fact there was more
diversity. I would have to assume given channel diversity, in fact,
there was less diversity of views, ideas and cultural experimentation
in the 1950s when there were three dominating TV channels
rather than now.
There is something I think that we can do historically, and that is
to go back to the 1920s when we really didn't know what radio was.
We thought it was ship-to-shore communications, and in fact, the
early days of radio were dominated by amateurs broadcasting more
or less anything they wanted, usually something on their Victrola in
the garage. There was spectacular diversity and conflicting signals,
and it was a very interesting time. And what happened between 1922
and 1928 is the corporations got together, divided up the airwaves,
generated networks, and you saw a consolidation, a homogenization.
So if you want to understand the dynamics of corporate capitalism
and the diversity of voices in the marketplace of ideas don't go back
and romanticize about government regulation in the 1950s. Go
back to try to understand what happened in the 1920s and how
some of the rich diversity we had originally in amateur broadcast-
ing might be brought back to life-and, by numbers 8, 9 and 10,
I'll get back to that issue.
The history of the media gives us some models for regulation,
and I wanted to draw your attention to three traditions of regula-
tions for three different technologies. The first is the tradition of
common carriage. You can say anything you want on your tele-
phone. There's no tradition of AT&T saying, "Wait a minute. That
word or that idea isn't permitted on the telephone," because
common carriage says, "Well, we're going to regulate access to be-
ing in the business of telecommunications, but given that one
structural constraint, content is not regulated at all." The second
media tradition of regulation is the broadcast regulation, and it's
not just a free speech tradition. Because of the limitation of spec-
trum and the fact that only a few voices can fit into the public
electromagnetic spectrum, there is a public trustee concept. And
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it's the public trustee concept that we romanticize about where we
had things like equal time rules and fairness doctrines. And my
view differs from a number of my colleagues concerning the liberal
critique of media concentration. I don't believe the fairness doc-
trine and equal time rule worked very well. I don't think we have a
lot of evidence that there was a great deal of political diversity on
the air, and to try to go back to the '50s I think is understandable,
romantic, but not appropriate, or at least not optimal.
Finally, there's the free press tradition, ironically based on the
notion that anybody who wanted to print a newspaper or pamphlet
could and could compete with others. In every major metropolitan
area there are more radio and television stations than there are
newspapers, so the irony is what is a constraint of access to the
marketplace is the economics of the newspaper business, not the
spectrum. So the unregulated tradition of First Amendment free
speech is ironically applied to the media that is the least diverse, at
least in ownership and in the number of voices in any given mar-
ketplace.
NUMBER TWO-THE CONSERVATIVE DEFENSE OF MEDIA CONCEN-
TRATION IS BESIDE THE POINT. By that, I mean that the bottom line
is diversity. If you listen to the conservative defense of media con-
centration they say, "Well, the issue isn't diversity. The issue is
profitability." Now, of course, they will say such things, as it is sim-
ply in their economic interest to wrap themselves in the First
Amendment. But the bottom line is the bottom line. And, I think,
those that would draw attention to the issue of diversity of voices
should look at the economics of the media business and start to
enter the debate on the real grounds that the defenders of concen-
tration are basing their thinking, which is the market economics of
diversity and the demand for diversity.
The conservative position is, "Well, let the marketplace decide,"
and that's beside the point because we know markets structured in
different ways will generate very different patterns of diversity of
viewpoint.
POINT NUMBER THREE-THE MEDIA BIAS DEBATE IS INEVITABLE,
and I will add, unending. It is basic. It is a basic fact of human per-
ceptual psychology that someone of a liberal political persuasion
looking at the media will say, "My gosh, how conservative it is." And
in fact, someone of a conservative political persuasion will look at
the media and say, "Obvious liberal bias." And you can count them,
numerous books on both sides, and people who want to think that
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the liberal media are liberal are buying books that say, "Gosh, these
reporters are liberal." And indeed, that's the fact of life.
It is a fact that the reportorial and journalistic culture recruits
selectively those of a liberal political persuasion. And it is also a fact
that the owners of the media are inordinately conservative in their
political viewpoint. So what we have is a very interesting dynamic
within the structure of the industry between the ownership and the
traditionally independent professional staff of editors and report-
ers. But don't expect the media bias debate to go away or to
change anybody's point of view.
POINT NUMBER FOUR-GROWING MEDIA CONCENTRATION IS A
FACT. The number cited in Bagdikian's evolving series of books tell
a story. There are now fewer media conglomerates owning more
media outlets than before. Let's try to understand why. Why are the
media putting increasing pressure, economic, political and back-
room pressure, on the Congress and on the FCC to liberalize the
ownership caps and the cross ownership, and move away from the
cross ownership prohibitions? The answer is because what was a
very comfortable oligopoly-a few radio stations, a few television
stations, a few networks-has been shifted by means of the digital
revolution to a much more open, wild west, competitive market-
place. So there is a lot more competition, and the natural response
of an oligopolist to competition is to buy up every damn competi-
tor they can find. And that's what happened to the telephone
industry when the patents ran out in the 1890s for AT&T, and
AT&T had to compete with other telephone companies. And there
were literally in some towns four different phone companies, and
you would have to have four different phones on your desk, be-
cause the phone companies didn't interconnect, and if you wanted
to talk to somebody you needed to call in the right phone business.
And between 1893 and 1913 Theodore Vail and his colleagues at
AT&T bought up every competitor they could, and itjust got to be
too much. So that's when the Kingsbury Commitment was signed,
and we shifted to not competitive telecommunications, but a regu-
lated common carriage basis. So understand the way in which these
issues are perceived by the owners, and deal with the psychology of
the loss of oligopoly. If you want to try to deal with the net effect
that isn't of much interest to the capitalist, which is the underlying
richness and diversity of voices in our marketplace.
POINT NUMBER FIvE-THERE IS A CRITICAL WEAKNESS IN THE
ANTITRUST REGULATORY TRADITION. The critical weakness is it's
very hard to define what a market is in the domain of ideas. How
do you measure diversity of ideas as you would diversity of owner-
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ship? How do you understand when there would be a meaningful
substitution of some other content or some other voice for the
voice you've got? If you take the ownership cap-and I think we'll
spend a fair amount of time today talking about the ownership
cap-in the television domain it's based on a percentage of house-
holds in the United States, which isn't even close to being a
meaningful measurement of the number of voices that would be
available to any one individual. The original attempt of the FCC to
protect localism and diversity was based on a market. That is the
number of the radio stations an individual would be able to receive
locally. And so, if somebody owned a radio station in one town, it's
simply not competing with the radio stations or newspapers in an-
other town 2,000 miles away, so such a regulatory regime was
meaningful. But our current focus is less and less on the geo-
graphically defined marketplace. That's being shifted by the
Internet and other media. Satellite broadcasting changed the
whole definition of what a market would be. Maybe that will inad-
vertently and eventually bring a new relevance to this question of
the ownership cap with the localism of broadcasting isn't as practi-
cally important in terms of limiting or defining the marketplace.
NUMBER SIX-RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP ON
CONTENT CONCENTRATION IS VERY CLEAR. The answer is that own-
ership is unrelated to media content diversity. Let me quote the very
first words of Mara Einstein's book Media Diversity published last
year. These are the very first words of her book,
"Consolidation of the media industry has been the focus of
scholars and regulators for decades. The prevailing wisdom is
that the more concentrated media industry the less diverse
the communications landscape." Intuitively this seems to
make sense. Few voices should mean fewer opinions, few
opinions means less diversity. But when you look at the data
across a variety of media, however, that is just not the case. In
study after study scholars have determined that there is no
proven causality between media ownership patterning and
programming content.
The classic study in this tradition is a measure of musical diver-
sity where somebody has gotten some definition of what is middle
of the road rock and roll as opposed to adult contemporary rock
and roll, and there are correlations between media ownership,
chain ownership and private stations to see if there is a difference
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depending on what control variables you find. Usually there's no
difference. Gabriel Rossman at Princeton has done the most recent
work in this area, and he found a very small, tiny, but statistically
significant correlation where there was less programmatic and
thematic diversity for chain owned radio stations. The other studies
that have been done of chain ownership and the quality of local
news coverage in newspapers, and their chain owned newspapers
tended to have a higher level and a higher quality of local cover-
age, perhaps because they had the economic deeper pockets to
support their local stations.
It'll be interesting to see if people are going to say, "Now, let's
not let Viacom divide in two, because it must have been better the
old way, so one Viacom must be better than two." It'll be interest-
ing to see what the reaction is to the notion that because of market
demands Viacom has decided that it wants to divide itself into two.
It's also the case that we've seen three stations recently shift from
large markets, including San Jose, Houston and Washington, D.C.,
and shift from playing one other version of rock and roll to Span-
ish language programming. So that was an interesting shift, by the
way, all motivated by the market demand for increased Latino
market-citizens in the market. Interestingly, all three stations are
owned by Clear Channel, so it wasn't a case that chain ownership
led to yet one more rock and roll station.
NUMBER SEVEN-IF NOT OWNERSHIP, WHERE SHOULD WE BE FO-
CUSING OUR ATTENTION IF WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT DIVERSITY?
I'd like to suggest four things to focus our attention on. First do
everything we can technically and structurally to reduce produc-
tion costs, because if you want diversity, then you want to make it
easier for people, and communities, and smaller companies to
produce video, text and audio, so the technology is working to
support that, I think strongly. Second, is reduce the spectrum bot-
tleneck and the distribution costs bottleneck. The Internet is a
massive and wonderful response to that. Third, the biggest diffi-
culty in getting diversity out there is audience awareness of diverse
voices. There are all kinds of interesting things on the Internet that
nobody knows about, and many people should. So the psychology,
and the economics and the fashion elements of drawing people's
attention to the wonderful diversity that's available on the web
deals with a kind of a psychology that ought to attract our attention
as much as media regulation. And finally fourth, if you want to see
a diversity in content don't say, "We want seven different capitalist
companies instead of six owning the media." Look for some other
basis structurally, like the Pacifica Foundation, which is independ-
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ent of educational or public broadcasting, and tries to generate
content that's responsive to the community that supports the radio
stations directly.
NUMBER EIGHT-LOOK TO THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES; THEREIN
LIES THE ANSWER FOR MEANINGFULLY INCREASING DIVERSITY.
Those of you that saw the Wall Street Journal on Thursday may have
noted that one radio station went from a play list of forty records,
which they played over and over again, to a play list of 1,400 re-
cords. Now, I'm sure they are all still in the same tradition of
whatever it is, adult contemporary or urban rock and roll, or what-
ever they named it. And why did they do that? Competing with the
iPod. It was public statement that people's iPod put all these dif-
ferent songs right next to each other because of the random
shuffle element of the iPod, and so radio has to compete with the
iPod, and that led in this is one case to some diversity.
NUMBER NINE-IF YOU WANT TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE, LOOK TO
SATELLITE RADIO AND THE MULTI-CHANNEL SERVICES. They pack-
age all sorts of interesting and diverse content, because at the
margin, to get you to subscribe they want to add one more element
of diverse programming "at the margin." And one more rock and
roll record isn't going to do it. But some Portuguese or some Chi-
nese or some diverse programming will make a difference at the
market to somebody else then who will say, "Well, that's enough
different stuff, so I will subscribe to that multi-channel provider,"
so Sirius and XM radio, interesting model.
FINALLY, NUMBER TEN-LOOK TO THE PREMIUM CONTENT SER-
VICE PROVIDERS. Who is it in the television domain that's been
doing the most experimental, risky and award winning stuff? The
answer is, well, HBO-owned by a major media conglomerate,
Time Warner. Why would HBO be more experimental than the
networks? And the answer is they sell by the month, not by the
Nielsen hourly rating. Their economics is based on monthly churn
not hourly viewing. So, at the margin, once they've satisfied you
with a couple of blockbuster movies, they want to show you some-
thing you can't see anywhere else. So there's a real structural
capitalist base reinforcement of diversity that keeps HBO on the
edge, and more HBO type programming media I think would have
ten times the effect on diversity than shifting the number of con-
glomerate owners from six to seven or eight.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: It is interesting that we
are having this conference as the Supreme Court is getting ready
to consider the issue of peer-to-peer file sharing in the Grokster
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case, which is interpreted by some to be a technology that could be
useful for people who want to challenge bigger media companies. I
hope, as a copyright scholar, that maybe we will have a chance to
talk about that intersection. But first our next speaker is Michael
Baumann, the Senior Vice President at Economists Incorporated, a
research and consulting firm in Washington, D.C., where his con-
sulting experience includes antitrust, mass media regulation and
the calculation of economic damages. He has extensive experience
analyzing the radio broadcast television and cable television indus-
tries, and his research has been submitted in numerous regulatory
proceedings before the Department ofJustice and the FCC. He has
previously served as an economist in the antitrust division of the
U.S. Department of Justice. His Bachelor of Science degree in eco-
nomics and mathematics is from MIT, and his Ph.D. in economics
is from Harvard University. Michael?
MICHAEL G. BAUMANN: Thank you. Good morning. I feel a
little nervous up here being probably the only economist amidst
what seems to be predominantly a group of lawyers. If you can
imagine how a fox in a henhouse feels, well, I feel just the oppo-
site. I'd like to discuss the FCC media ownership rules, and I want
to consider what would happen if the media ownership rules were
relaxed or eliminated. One should expect this to result in contin-
ued restructuring of media ownership, consolidation. One should
also expect such a change to improve efficiencies of broadcast sta-
tion operation, and to maintain or even enhance content diversity.
One should not expect such relaxation to threaten competition in
either the economic marketplace or the marketplace of ideas. Re-
liance on existing antitrust enforcement standards will protect the
public from both the creation of market power and any undue re-
duction in diversity. This is because the application of the merger
standards will stop acquisitions on economic grounds long before a
significant reduction in diversity is threatened. This is true in part
because the marketplace for ideas is broader than the markets the
government uses for evaluating the competitive effects of mergers.
Let me first briefly discuss DOJ's approach to merger analysis,
and how it applies to media competition, and then examine how
this analysis applies to issues such as diversity and localism that the
FCC's concerned about. Among economists there's a general pre-
sumption that in a competitive marketplace the self-interested
actions of individuals and firms will lead to socially desirable out-
comes in terms of the amount of goods and services produced.
However, competition can be threatened if economic activity is
concentrated into the hands of a few owners, a small number of
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firms. The antitrust laws are designed to stop mergers and acquisi-
tions that result in undue concentration. The Justice Department
has developed a standard methodology to identify changes in own-
ership that can potentially reduce competition. Their horizontal
merger guidelines are widely used in analyzing mergers, as well as
other competition issues.
At the risk of oversimplification, let me summarize the process
the agency goes through when evaluating the competitive impact
of a merger. The core of merger analysis is market definition. You
define a relevant market by identifying the overlapping products of
the merging firms, and by identifying those products that are close
substitutes. In simple terms, a relevant market for antitrust pur-
poses is something that can be monopolized. It's the set of
products such that if a single firm controlled their output, that
firm could profitably raise price. In the media business what is be-
ing sold, i.e. the product, is access to an audience. The audience
being comprised of viewers, listeners or readers. For example, a
radio station sells access to its listeners to an advertiser.
To date the Department ofJustice has defined the relevant mar-
ket for advertising, and therefore for media, very narrowly. For
instance, DOJ has determined the relevant market for radio adver-
tising is just radio advertising. Other forms of advertising, such as
television, cable or newspaper are not considered by the Depart-
ment to be in the relevant market. Similarly, it has defined
newspaper advertising as a relevant market, and while it has re-
viewed very few television transactions, it likely considers television
advertising as a relevant market.
Having identified the relevant market, the next step is to assess
the concentration of ownership in that market. Concentration is
usually measured using an index based on market shares attribut-
able to each owner, often using revenue shares. In evaluating the
radio mergers, however, the Department of Justice also looked at
share of a particular format, rock and roll; share of a particular
demographic, men eighteen to thirty-nine; and share of strong FM
signals. Hence, the Department's analysis of media mergers has
focused on individual media advertising, and even on very narrow
segments within those advertising media. Based on the results of
their analysis, which includes factors other than just concentration,
such as ease of entry and reduction in costs, the agency decides
whether a proposed merger is likely to result in a significant de-
crease in competition. If so, the agency seeks to oppose or modify
the proposed merger. Following this approach, the Department of
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Justice opposed transactions that would not have violated the exist-
ing radio ownership rules. Similar antitrust enforcement can be
expected if there is relaxation of other media ownership rules. For
example, modifying or eliminating the local television ownership
rule would not mean that DOJ would simply allow any two televi-
sion stations in any market area to merge.
Now, there are three reasons usually put forward in support of
the FCC's media ownership rules. First, to protect competition.
Second, to preserve diversity. Third, to promote localism. Let me
address each of those areas. The first reason given for the owner-
ship rules is that they protect competition. In my view, the FCC
rules are not needed for this function. Consider the television du-
opoly rule, which limits the number of television stations you can
own in a market, or the television newspaper cross-ownership ban.
It is possible, particularly in smaller markets with few media outlets,
that competition would be significantly reduced if two television
stations that now have different owners merged. Competition
might also be reduced in specific markets if a television station
merged with a newspaper. But these are precisely the issues of
ownership concentration that the antitrust agencies routinely deal
with in enforcing the antitrust laws. There's no need for a separate
set of competition standards for the media, in particular, there is
no need for these one size fits all restrictions such as the television
duopoly rule or the cross-ownership ban.
Moreover, the rules on media ownership need not be more
stringent than for other industries. From an economic perspective,
there are roughly two reasons why firms merge. First, to increase
their market power, or second, to lower their costs or increase their
quality. Growth that lies within the merger standards is unlikely to
confer market power, and disallowing such growth may impinge on
economic efficiency. The old radio ownership rules provide a good
example of this. The rules imposed an inefficiently small form of
organization on the radio industry. The vast number of radio sta-
tion transactions that occurred following relaxation of the rules,
and the fact that most of the proposed transactions were below the
levels that raise antitrust concerns, indicate there were substantial
economies to be achieved by the consolidation of radio stations
within a market.
Consolidation leads to savings in personnel, equipment and fa-
cilities. In addition, consolidation allowed for the possibility of an
owner to achieve broader unduplicated reach by offering more
diverse formats. By increasing the reach of the radio station groups
and reducing the transaction costs of buying radio the owners
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hoped to increase radio's share of advertising revenue. Similarly,
television duopolies have helped increase the amount of local news
and public affairs programming, helped to keep some television
stations on the air, aided stations in financial distress and helped
launch new stations.
Finally, I want to consider how the commission's protection of
competition evolved following the relaxation of the radio owner-
ship rules in 1996. Initially, the commission followed the revised
ownership rules and granted some license transfers only to see the
Department of Justice later challenge those acquisitions. While the
one size fits all ownership rules do not create competitive concerns
in some markets, they did in others. In response, the Commission
altered its review process, at first waiting for clearance from the
Department of Justice, and eventually working with the Depart-
ment of Justice to establish a screening process based on the
framework the Department of Justice had used. Indeed, the end
result was that the FCC was duplicating the efforts of the DOJ. So
the existing antitrust checks on competitiveness are sufficient, and
separate ownership rules are not needed to protect competition.
The second claimed reason for the FCC's media ownership rules
is to promote diversity. The chief focus of the media ownership
rules is outlet diversity, that is, the number of different owners of
media outlets. However, the FCC's real goal seems to be viewpoint
diversity, or differences in points of view. Outlet diversity is used as
a proxy for measuring viewpoint diversity. At times the Commis-
sion's also been concerned with content diversity, that is, the type
of programming available, and the ownership rules can also impact
that.
Let me first address viewpoint diversity. An analysis similar to
that applied to economic competition can be applied to viewpoint
diversity. In this case the product is an idea, so it is useful to liter-
ally think of a marketplace of ideas. The first step in the analysis is
to determine the relevant market. That is, with respect to members
of the potential audience for a given message-the consumers of
the idea-what alternatives are available to them? What media can
link speakers with audiences? It is extremely unlikely that any such
market would be limited to a single medium. All media that expose
consumers to viewpoints should be included when measuring di-
versity. These include broadcast television, cable television, radio,
newspapers, the Internet, books, magazines and other forms of
communication. For this reason, diversity markets are broader
than antitrust markets.
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The next step is assigning shares to each participant in the mar-
ket. In the marketplace of ideas, what matters is the number of
available information outlets, not the current popularity of an idea
or the technology of transmission. In competition analysis, audi-
ence or revenue share measures outcomes, not availability. An
analysis based on audience size may yield a very high concentration
simply because society's tastes produced that result. Popular mes-
sages by definition will have larger audiences. But ex post shares say
nothing about ex ante availability. When determining the level of
diversity, should a radio station with a few hundred listeners count
less than a radio station with a few thousand? I think the answer is
no, because each source is significant. The rational way to measure
share is to give each available source of ideas equal weight. It is
availability, not usage, that counts. Unpopular ideas are the essence
of diversity, and the less popular ideas of today may have the great-
est importance tomorrow. Discounting media that are available to
all, but because of consumer preferences garner smaller audiences,
understates the level of diversity.
This is not a novel way to measure shares. The merger guide-
lines contemplate circumstances where revenue shares are
misleading, and the Department imputes an equal share to each
competitor. For example, this is done in a bidding situation where
several firms may be vying for a bidder's business, and the competi-
tive importance of the firm may not be related to how many bids
they've won before. Similarly, a media outlet's ultimate importance
may not depend on how many consumers currently listen to it.
In summary, the relevant market for ideas is broader than the eco-
nomic markets the government uses for analyzing economic
competition, and shares of the market are more equally distributed
among the participants. It follows that the relevant market for ideas
is less concentrated than the relevant market for economic analysis.
For that reason, antitrust merger enforcement in the economic
markets for media will tend to restrain ownership concentration
long before it becomes a threat to competition in the marketplace
for ideas.
Consider next the effect of ownership rules on content diversity.
There is no assurance that increased outlet diversity increases con-
tent diversity. The characteristics of media make it difficult to
presume that with a given number of stations content diversity will
be greatest if all stations are separately owned. Half a century ago
Peter Steiner made the point that some audiences would be better
served by a monopolist than by competitors. Consider why this may
be the case. If you have two single channel competitors they might
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both seek to attract the same audience, whereas a firm in control
of the two channels may program one to reach that audience and
the second to reach a different audience. There's no general ex-
pectation that media mergers will result in an inefficiently narrow
range of content.
It may be illuminating to examine what happened to content di-
versity following the relaxation of the radio ownership rules. In
1992, the FCC relaxed the rules allowing a firm to own two AM and
two FM stations in a market instead of just one. What was the im-
pact? According to a study by Katz Radio Group, there was growth
in niche programming formats. When owners were limited to one
station, each station in the market had to maintain significant au-
dience share in order to survive. The result is that many stations
sounded alike, each trying to appeal to the mass audience. Owning
two stations allowed owners to program complementary formats
since overhead expenses could be shared. A recent FCC study of
changes in music diversity following the 1996 Telecommunications
Act found that within a market diversity increased significantly
across stations within the same format and for stations across for-
mats. With regard to television duopolies there are also examples
where they have promoted diversity in programming by allowing
an owner to eliminate programn duplication. So there's no pre-
sumption, therefore, that the media ownership rules help promote
content diversity.
The third reason given for the FCC media ownership rules is lo-
calism. The concept behind localism is for stations to provide
programming, including news and public affairs programming,
that serves the needs and interests of their community. But media
outlets already have strong economic incentives to respond to the
needs of the local community. Greater responsiveness can lead to a
larger audience, which in turn can generate larger advertising
revenue. Local ownership is not required to achieve local respon-
siveness. Indeed, if local ownership were necessary, the FCC's
ownership rules are very inefficient tools to bring it about. There is
no reason to think thatjoint ownership of two television stations in
a market would decrease localism. To the contrary, there's evi-
dence that television stations that are jointly owned or operated
are more likely to carry local news and public affairs programming.
Another rule that was mentioned this morning is that national
television ownership cap. This rule does not bear significantly on
any competition issue. Competition among television stations and
other media outlets occurs at a local level. Competition in one local
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market, such as Ann Arbor, is not reduced if one of the stations in
this market is jointly owned with a station in another market, say
Houston or L.A. As with competition, it's difficult to find any con-
nection between diversity concerns and the national television
broadcast cap. What matters to diversity is the range of viewpoints
available to individuals. That range is not diminished when a local
media outlet isjointly owned with another media outlet in another
geographic area. No one has shown that lifting the national televi-
sion ownership cap will lead to less localism, less diversity or less
competition.
In conclusion, competition in media can be preserved using the
antitrust standards without the need for one-size-fits-all restrictions,
like the television duopoly rule, or the cross-ownership rule, or the
national ownership cap. If, in selected markets, ownership concen-
tration were allowed to rise to somewhat higher levels consistent
with competition standards there's no reason to think that the as-
sociated amount of diversity provided by broadcast stations and
other sources would be insufficient. No separate ownership stan-
dard based on diversity or localism is warranted. It's time for the
FCC to abandon all of its media ownership rules. Media competing
for eyeballs and ears will lead owners to promote diversity. Thank
you.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: Our next speaker is
Andrew Jay Schwartzman, the president and CEO of the Media Ac-
cess Project, MAP. MAP is a non-profit public interest law firm that
has led efforts to oppose major media mergers, to preserve policies
promoting media diversity, and to ensure that broad and afford-
able public access to advanced telecommunications networks and
the Internet is possible. Mr. Schwartzman has appeared on behalf
of MAP before Congress, the FCC and the courts. In part in recog-
nition of his recent work in the courts, Scientific American
honored him as one of the nation's fifty top leaders in technology
for 2004. He teaches at Johns Hopkins University and has numer-
ous other academic and professional affiliations. He's also a widely
published author and commentator on media issues. He graduated
from the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School, and I expect that we might hear, based on his
experiences, a different point of view on the FCC's media owner-
ship rules.
ANDREW JAY SCHWARTZMAN: I would hope so. Russ has cov-
ered some wonderful stuff, which I agree in part and disagree in
part. It would take me twenty minutes to address them, so I won't
do that here.
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Dr. Baumann has rather usefully and straightforwardly pre-
sented perspectives that I can address in about thirty seconds.
Since it's germane to what I'm planning to say, so I will do that.
And I should warn everybody, I'm not a scholar. I don't do a lot of
scholarly stuff. I'm an advocate, and what I'm going to say this
morning-because this is an academic forum-most of the time I
speak at academic forum I don't get very scholarly. This is as schol-
arly as I'm ever going to get, and it's not very scholarly. Bear with
me, because it's going to seem to go off in an odd direction. But
let's try anyway.
I've been struck by the conundrum posed by the kind of analysis
that Michael Baumann has presented, particularly in the context of
litigating in the D.C. Circuit, which is the court that matters most
to the FCC, because it has exclusive jurisdiction over many of the
FCC's cases, and by tradition and otherwise, winds up with a lot of
the rest.
Those of us who were involved-and this was a team effort-in
the thus far successful appeal of the FCC's media ownership rules
were able to get it into the Third Circuit, where we unquestionably
got a very different result than we would have gotten in the D.C.
Circuit. That case, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, is now pending
before the Supreme Court on certiorari. Our opposition is due April
1st. The Solicitor General has not filed a certiorari petition, al-
though he did filed a conditional cross-petition. It is expected he
will file a full born opposition on April 1st. As a statistical matter,
without support of the United States, it is overwhelmingly unlikely
the Supreme Court will grant the certiorari petitions. If so, this case
will be one of FCC Chairman Martin's first major challenges-
dealing with the remand from the Third Circuit.
The conundrum is that traditional economic analysis, which is
so focused on market structure, does not measure public opinion,
something which is important in a democratic system. Indeed, one
of the interesting things about the FCC's media ownership pro-
ceeding was the open disdain that FCC Chairman Powell had for
public input. It didn't matter to him. His Media Bureau chief, who
very much reflected the same perspective, famously told a high
ranking contingent from organized labor who came in to talk to
him about it (including the Newspaper Guild, AFTRA, SAG and
the Department for Professional Employees of the AFL-CIO), that
"I want facts, I want studies. I don't want any foot stomping. I want
real information."
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Well, if you're a labor leader, what you do for a living is foot
stomp, and foot stomping matters. It's an expression of part of our
democratic process. One man's foot stamping is another person's
First Amendment right of assembly and petitioning the govern-
ment for redress.
The disconnect is that The Administrative Procedure Act and
the D.C. Circuit's jurisprudence, which focuses on the kind of
analysis that you've just heard, doesn't have a lot of room for pub-
lic opinion or, if you want to use the term, foot stomping.
That has always struck me as a conundrum: you measure the
marketplace of ideas through the economic proxies that we just
heard about, and you talk about the marketplace. But in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, you don't measure public opinion.
What I'm now going to discuss is how the Third Circuit man-
aged to take public opinion into account, at least a little bit, in the
process of granting a stay in the Prometheus case.
Now, to be sure, public opinion is reflected in the democratic
process through the legislative process. People elect and lobby
members of Congress. And Congress has looked at broadcast own-
ership. In particular, the national ownership cap, which has been
discussed already today, was the subject of litigation. In 1996, Con-
gress set the cap at 35%. After the FCC voted to lift the cap to 45%,
and while the Prometheus appeal was pending, Congress again took
legislative action, rolling back the cap to 39%.
Why 39%? Well, that's just the point at which it was unnecessary
for Fox and Viacom not to have to divest any TV stations. And
that's also part of the democratic process; if you're Fox and Viacom
you can take care of yourself. But this was a legislative judgment,
and it did represent operation of the lower case "d" democratic
process.
Former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, who was the architect of
broadcast deregulation at the FCC, was very effective in accom-
plishing his mission. He is someone for whom I have much
grudging respect for having accomplished a real revolution in
turning around fifty years of FCC regulation. Fowler-actually it
was his speechwriter-famously said that "The public interest is
what the public is interested in." That is a very good snapshot of
how the marketplace theorists look at these things.
Well, my thirty-second answer is that economists use the best
proxies they can, and if the proxies suck, the economics sucks. The
economic analyses that we heard today measure audiences or,
more specifically, audiences that the advertisers desire to reach.
Neilson and Arbitron market disproportionately undervalued peo-
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pie who are too old, too young, or too poor to be demographically
attractive. As a consequence, traditional econometric analyses do
not accurately measure the needs of those people.
That is a fundamental flaw, because each American citizen has
the same First Amendment rights to receive information, and the
people who are not demographically attractive, if anything, have a
greater need for service. Indeed, at another level, those of us who
are more fortunate have need to insure those people are well-
served, and to make sure that their views and perspectives are re-
flected in the media. After all, the people who wash our clothes,
drive our cabs, bus our tables, clean our toilets and make our beds
know more about our lifestyle than we do about theirs. Society as a
whole will benefit if those views are portrayed in the mass media.
The economists' proxies don't measure these things.
As I have mentioned, FCC Chairman Michael Powell said "I
don't care, I don't want to hear this stuff." He didn't want to have
public hearings even though there was a huge demand for them.
Finally he relented, and had one hearing in Richmond, Virginia.
But, the witnesses, including me, all came from inside the beltway.
We all drove down to Richmond and testified in there, just the way
we usually do in Washington. This was what Michael Powell called a
"field hearing."
Later on, there was another wave of demands for public hear-
ings when the FCC started to develop its so-called "diversity index,"
which became the centerpiece of the June, 2003 decision. This was
a quasi-antitrust formula modeled after the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which the Third Circuit rejected on review.
Two million emails, letters, postcards opposing liberalized
broadcast ownership limits didn't matter to Michael Powell. That
meant we had to go to court. The fact that we successfully obtained
a stay from the court of appeals was really critical, because the liti-
gation wouldn't have mattered otherwise, even if it had been
resolved on an expedited basis. There were so many transactions
lined up waiting to go that by the time the appeal would have been
over, the broadcasting industry would have been completely re-
structured.
This is what happened when we argued the stay before a three-
judge panel. The court raised a very interesting question. The
judges asked counsel for the government about the unusual num-
ber of public comments which were filed. They said "We're looking
at the public interest here and the importance of whether or not to
put these rules into affect. Don't two million comments matter?
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Doesn't that give you some caution in wanting to put these rules
immediately into effect?" The FCC lawyer's answer was no. No,
these comments don't add anything to the record, except that
they're there. A lot of postcards that say, "Don't change the rules,"
doesn't really add meaningful information to the record.
Well, the court granted the stay. It's an unpublished one page
order. It's really not worth looking at, because it doesn't say much,
but for those who care, it can be obtained as 2003 West Law
22052896. The order is quite routine, citing to the Third Circuit's
version of a case very familiar to administrative lawyers, Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 E2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958). What
the Third Circuit held was that the public interest mattered and it
granted our motion for a stay.
Now, this is a lesson for those of us who are practitioners. If you
practice administrative law and if you do this with any kind of vol-
ume, you will find yourself repeatedly citing Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers and its "four factor" test as to whether or not a stay should
be granted.' The full citation, however, is Virginia Petroleum Jobbers
Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958), as modified by Washington
Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Most of the circuits, including the Third, have adopted the
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test. However, the Third Circuit had never
had occasion to consider Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Com-
mission v. Holiday Tours.
There are very few published cases on these issues because most
decisions are quickly prepared one paragraph orders. That makes
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, which was issued in 1958, all the more im-
portant. It was an interesting panel, too. In addition to Wilbur K
Miller, who was known for rarely joining any other judges' opin-
ions, it included Judge David L. Bazelon and Warren Burger, who
were at the time leaders of the opposing factions on the D.C. Cir-
cuit
In 1977 along came Washington Area Transit Commission, which I
confess I haven't really gone back and looked at in twenty years.
However, the court asked about it during oral argument in our
case. I racked my brains and was able to remember the holding,
but this was lucky because it is the kind of thing you routinely cite,
but you don't really look at very often. Chief Judge Scirica, a
Reagan appointee, and Judge Ambro, who's a Clinton appointee,
1. See Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
("(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its
appeal? ... (2) Has the petitioner shown that without such relief, it will be irreparably in-
jured? ... (3) Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the
proceedings? ... (4) Where lies the public interest ?").
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were very interested in the case and wanted to discuss it at some
length. And, while it's not reflected in this one page order, this was
really a critical part of their analysis.
The Washington Area Transit Commission decision was written by
Harold Leventhal, who was revered in administrative law circles,
and surely one of the great jurists of the D.C. Circuit. J. Skelly
Wright, another legendary figure, and Roger Robb, perhaps less
well known, but a very important judge. (Not irrelevantly, I might
point out for this group that it was Roger Robb who unsuccessfully
argued the Red Lion case before the Supreme Court on behalf of
the broadcasters.) The decision begins by "We start with the famil-
iar test in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers v. Federal Power Commission...."
So, you can see that by 1977 they were already saying, "Oh, the fa-
miliar Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test." What they said was, "The test is
likely to succeed on the merits," which is typically the major point,
"harm to the parties, balance of the equities and the public inter-
est."
What Judge Leventhal did was to say in effect, "Boy, this is a
complicated case. We've got 14,000 pages of record. Sometimes
when there is such a big record, you can't really figure out the like-
lihood of success on the merits in a hurry." So what is supposedly
the most important factor. But in this case Judge Leventhal said,
"The harm to the public interest is so great that when we balance
these four factors the public interest and the irrevocable harm is
overwhelmingly in favor of a stay. In such a case we don't really
have to reach a finding on every one of those four measures." On
that basis, Judge Leventhal said, "We don't need to find a great
likelihood of success on the merits, we just need to see that it's a
plausible argument." And that's what the Third Circuit did. It
adopted Washington Area Transit Commission in granting the stay,
saying, "We don't have enough time to assess the likelihood of suc-
cess the rules are going to be effective in four days, but we can see
the harm to the public measured by two million people who think
it matters."
I would add that the bipartisan coalition concerned about these
rules reflected less than one percent of American society, but those
two million people are a large proportion of those who regularly
exercise their First Amendment rights. They are the ones who write
Congress, who write their legislatures, who send postcards to the
FCC. In the case of the NRA members, for example, they obviously
care about their purported right to bear arms, so they utilize the
First Amendment, who participated in this exercise.
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Eventually, in ruling on the merits, the Third Circuit reversed
the FCC. In its decision in the Prometheus case, 373 F.2d at 411, the
court reprimanded the FCC for not adequately taking into account
expressions of public concern and hearing what it is the public had
to say, and directed them on remand to make sure that they did so.
So here we have a circumstance where the traditional D.C. Cir-
cuit oriented measure says economists and facts are the only things
that matter. "None of this foot stomping" ought to matter in an
inherently democratic process. And the Third Circuit said, "No,
wait a minute, it does matter," and told the FCC on remand, "Fig-
ure out how to take these concerns into account. The metrics need
to be re-examined." Now I could talk about the metrics later, and
talk about some of the things Russ said, but it's a very interesting
exercise and it poses a very interesting conundrum for us about
how to accommodate public participation in the increasingly com-
plex issues that we have today dealing with the federal
administrative process, and how we accommodate the democratic
process in that. As I said, that's about as scholarly as I get, but I
hope it's a useful contribution to the day.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: Our final speaker is
Professor Jonathan Weinberg, Professor of Law at Wayne State
University Law School, where he teaches and writes about commu-
nications law and Internet law and policy. He has also been a
scholar in residence at the FCC, a Fulbright scholar at the Univer-
sity of Tokyo, a professor in residence at the United States Justice
Department, and a visiting scholar at Cardozo Law School. Before
entering teaching he was a law clerk to both Justice Thurgood
Marshall at the U.S. Supreme Court and then Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg on the D.C. Circuit.
JONATHAN WEINBERG: Well, thank you. I've been incredibly
impressed by how well everyone so far has given talks that were ex-
actly twenty minutes long. I don't know if I'm going to be able to
do that. So if I run over I'm apologizing now in advance. You've
got a conference here that's about regulation and concentration of
private power. What is the FCC doing, and what does it need to do
in this area? What the folks who organized the conference are con-
cerned about is withdrawal from regulation: The D.C. Circuit's
eagerness for, and the FCC's cooperation, with the proposition that
the agency should decline to take action against instances of cross
ownership that would have been proscribed by earlier versions of
the law. And for what it's worth, now, I'm one of those who in gen-
eral favors reasonably robust concentration rules.
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You can see the FCC stepping back from regulation in a bunch
of key areas these days, often prodded by court decisions. The ex-
ample that is most obvious to me is the agency's essential
elimination of the unbundling and the interconnection require-
ments under Section 251 of the Communications Act, that folks
had once relied on as the basis for telecom competition in the lo-
cal loop. At the same time, it's worth making the point that the
FCC is not withdrawing from regulation across the board. In other
areas it's affirmatively regulating. Andy said he was going off in an
odd direction. I'm going to go off in an odder direction by telling
you a little about a completely different communications law issue,
which is the FCC rulemaking on the broadcast flag that took place
not too long ago. The FCC is invoking regulation there, I'd argue,
not to combat concentrations of private power but indeed in aid of
them. After I tell you a little about that, I want to talk a little about
FCC regulation of cable TV, and then the nature of Red Lion and
how Democrats and Republicans each disserve the public interest
in their own way, and in the end I promise to tie it all back to me-
dia concentration.
So let me tell you about the broadcast flag. This requirement is a
response to the entertainment industry's fears about the private
copying and re-dissemination of programming it disseminates via
digital broadcast television. Now, if you've got a regular analog TV
set and a VCR today, you can make analog copies of the program-
ming you receive. You can walk those copies next door and lend
them to your neighbor. As a practical matter, there is nothing
stopping you from selling them on eBay, and the world continues
spinning on its axis. A lot of us figure that is a right given to us by
God and the Sony Betamax case. You can indeed, make, a whole lot
of copies if you have a dual deck VCR, but doing that by hand is
awkward and time consuming. If you really want to make a lot of
copies, you would want to digitize the analog stream by hooking
your VCR up to a digital video camera or similar device. At that
point, what you've got is a really, really, really, really big digital file
that you can burn onto a DVD. It would be seriously hard to trans-
fer that over the Internet, because it's so big. It would take forever,
but you could do that too. And that's today's status quo.
Hollywood's been expressing a lot of concern about the same
category of activities when it comes to digital TV. When a con-
sumer gets a digital television stream, Hollywood explains, the
signal's already digitized, so it's less trouble for a consumer with an
appropriate device to make a copy of the file and redistribute it
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over the internet or whatever. In fact, a file corresponding to a full
digital TV broadcast is still as really, really, really, really big as I was
saying a moment ago, so it's not clear how much redistribution
could get done. Nonetheless, the content community-the major
studios-have explained that the prospect of folks making copies
of digital television programming is Very Bad, and I want you to
hear those capital letters. Viacom, which owns CBS among other
properties, told the FCC at one point that CBS would refuse to
make any programming available in high-definition form unless a
way were found and put in place to prevent consumers from doing
any of that stuff.
This struck the FCC as a really quite serious problem. The back-
ground to that is that the FCC began the digital television
transition a few years ago. The FCC gave every TV broadcaster an
extra six megahertz of spectrum. The idea was that broadcasters
would begin duplicating their analog programming in digital high-
definition using the new spectrum, and we would all buy new high-
definition TV sets receiving that digital signal and displaying shiny
new pictures for us, and, in short order, the old analog stream
would become entirely unnecessary and the broadcasters could
give it back to the federal government, which would auction it and
make scads of money. That was the plan. It hit several snags. One
snag was that it became clear pretty soon that broadcasters might
consider it a lot more efficient and profitable to do something with
the new spectrum other than blowing it all on a single shiny new
high definition picture-which, for reasons I won't get into right
now, cast doubt on the agency's whole approach. More concretely
it became clear that few of us in the consuming public were jump-
ing up to buy new digital TVs. And unless we-me, you and
everyone in this room-buy digital TVs then those new digital sig-
nals that the agency is making broadcasters emit are just going to
be an expensive curiosity, and the analog spectrum is never going
to get returned because the consuming public's going to continue
to rely on it. Don't worry though. The money from selling it off is
still in the Bush budget.
Against this backdrop, the studio's threat to refuse to make pro-
gramming available for digital transmission was serious. It was in
fact, an empty threat: Viacom made the statement I just quoted to
you about the 2003-2004 season. It said, "We will not provide any
high definition programming in the fall of 2003 unless the broad-
cast flag scheme is in place." Before you know it, the fall of 2003
rolled around, and we didn't have a broadcast flag scheme in
place, and CBS continued providing all of its scripted prime time
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programming in high definition, just as it had been doing for sev-
eral years. It did so notwithstanding that there was nothing
stopping consumers from copying digital programming. But the
FCC took the threat seriously. It continues to take it seriously. The
result was the broadcast flag rulemaking.
Okay, what is this rule? The broadcast flag rule attempts to en-
sure that content providers will continue to provide programming
for digital TV, free of the fear of consumers doing stuff with it that
the providers don't like. Here's how it works: Content creators in-
clude a marker, or "flag," on their digital broadcast streams.
Cooperating computer and consumer electronics manufacturers
build devices-TVs, digital VCRs, personal video records, DVD re-
corders, computer tuner cards, cell phones, iPods, what have you-
that recognize the flag, and refuse to release the flagged file
through a digital output to any medium or device that isn't "com-
pliant"-that is, that will not itself refuse to release the file to a
noncompliant device or medium. This means, in essence, that a
consumer using such a device may be able to make a soft copy of a
TV program on the digital VCR-or, say, a personal computer-but
the VCR or computer won't be able to write the program to a disk,
and the consumer will be limited in her ability to get the program
onto any other machine.
But you see, there's a snag here. I said cooperating computer or
consumer electronics manufacturers. What if we have one that
doesn't cooperate? What if the consumer uses a TV set or com-
puter that doesn't follow these rules, and can do things that aren't
in this set? That's where the FCC provided the last piece of the
puzzle. The last part of the puzzle is that under the broadcast flag
rules, it's illegal-that is to say, against the law-to manufacture or
sell any piece of hardware-the television, computer, PC tuner
card, whatever-that doesn't follow the rules I've just described. So
we have these ongoing proceedings where Tivo says to the FCC,
"Look, we've got technology we want to put in our personal video
recorders. Are we allowed?" And the FCC says yes or no.
I find this a distressing ruling as a policy matter in part because
of some of the ways it parallels the issues in Grokster, the peer-to-
peer file sharing case currently before the Supreme Court. In both
cases, you can see the content industry seeking bans on the sale of
certain technology, because that technology is thought to present
insufficient safeguards against people using it to copy or redistribute
works protected by copyright. That is bad industrial policy, and it's
bad free speech policy. It's not a good thing to have the government
WINTER 2006]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
banning what's by its nature legitimate and useful technology for
fear of the uses to which it might be put, forcing consumer elec-
tronics design-indeed, forcing computer design-into a
particular box and limiting speech modes that might have been
based on other as-yet-undeveloped-and-now-never-will-be technol-
ogy. That's nonetheless what the agency has done at the behest of a
particular industry segment, in an effort to protect existing busi-
ness models and perpetuate the dominance of the established
market players.
The broadcast flag rule, in fact, is almost certainly going to be
struck down by the D.C. Circuit-not because of any of the policy
concerns I just raised, but because it's got dubious legal basis. That
is, it is by no means clear that the agency's got statutory authority
to enact the rule. This is a little tricky: It's undisputed that there is
no provision in the Communications Act giving the FCC authority
to regulate consumer electronics in this matter. If we were dealing
with another statute, that would be pretty much the end of the
story. If there is no grant of authority, there is no grant of authority.
An agency can't regulate in the absence of a statutory grant of au-
thority.
It turns out, though, that when it comes to the Communications
Act there's precedent for the proposition that the agency can regu-
late even without a statutory grant of authority, so long as the
object of the regulation can be said to fall within the category of
interstate communication in a broad sense. I don't want to go into
this in too much detail now; the legal theory is called "ancillary ju-
risdiction." The broadcast flag case really helps demonstrate the
problematic nature of Communications Act ancillary jurisdiction,
and two members of a three member D.C. Circuit panel made it
pretty clear during oral argument that they didn't think this was
going to fly.
The FCC didn't invent ancillary jurisdiction, though, in the
broadcast flag proceeding. That concept goes back to the FCC's
early regulation of cable. Back in the day when cable was first in-
troduced, the agency was concerned about cable's impact on
broadcast television. It restricted cable systems from importing
non-local broadcast signals; it was concerned that cable might
threaten the "healthy maintenance of TV broadcast service in the
area," and thus the public interest. And so it issued rules saying,
'You can't bring in signals from across the country in the following
circumstances." It issued those rules without any actual statutory
authority to do so, and the Supreme Court upheld that in the
Southwestern Cable case on an "ancillary jurisdiction" theory. When
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cable operators moved from importing distant broadcast signals to
introducing new channels carrying sports and feature films, the
Commission saw that as a threat to broadcasting as well. We're talk-
ing about HBO now. And the Commission moved to forbid that.
The important thing to remember about the agency's early regu-
lation of cable is that it was almost entirely wrong-headed: It was a
1960s version of the broadcast flag, protecting existing business
models from new technological challenge. In both cases, there as
in this one, the agency needed to rely on ancillary jurisdiction-
that is, regulation without any actual statutory basis-because it was
responding to new technological developments, and those devel-
opments tended to have not a lot to do with the categories in the
old statute. But in both categories, I'd submit, the country would
have been better off with the agency saying, "we don't have statu-
tory authority" and waiting for Congress to reach a negotiated
solution.
So you might conclude that so far I've painted for you what
looks like a pretty clear dichotomy. Inordinate concentration of
private media power, bad; diversity, good; robust-well, some-
concentration limitations, good; broadcast flag and old-fashioned
cable regulation, bad. It lines up pretty neatly.
And yet, here is where things get a little more complicated. Be-
cause that early cable regulation (bad, I said) actually was closely
tied into early concentration regulation (good, I've suggested),
they both came out of a particular understanding of what broad-
cast regulation was about. Traditional broadcast regulation reflects
a set of attitudes that are real different from those prevailing in
traditional First Amendment law. Core First Amendment law, I'd
submit, reflects a set of philosophical preconditions. By its nature,
it tends to reject concerns that material inequality, or unequal bar-
gaining power, or private concentrations of wealth, are going to
render the marketplace of ideas unfair or unfree. That stems from
its individualist and rationalist premises, its rejection of govern-
ment regulation except in really sharply bound and exceptional
cases. Traditional broadcast regulation, on the other hand, from
the outset reflected a basic fear that inequality of private power
and resources could undermine citizens' free interaction. That is
the fear of "unlimited private censorship" you see manifested in Red
Lion-the fear that a few private licensees could "monopolize"
broadcast discourse, making impossible-these are all quotes from
Red Lion-an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas." And traditional
broadcast law, therefore, directed the government to regulate
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private broadcasters, through the "public interest" standard, as if
they were freed from the economic marketplace and indeed from
individualist motivations. Red Lion told broadcasters they weren't
classic first amendment speakers at all. They were proxies. They
were fiduciaries, presenting "those views and values which are repre-
sentative of the community."
The premise of early communications regulation, in other
words, was that broadcasters were shielded from the marketplace,
supervised by the FCC, governed by the public interest standard, in
a world of their own there. The concentration rules were part of
that; you'll note that the concentration rules, prior to 1996, were
based solely on the public interest standard. They weren't men-
tioned in the statute otherwise. There were a lot of advantages to
that overall approach to broadcast regulation. The most obvious is
that that approach recognized, as traditional First Amendment
thinking doesn't, the meaningful effects of concentrations of private
power on the thinking process of the community. But there were
also a whole lot of disadvantages. It became clear over time, in my
view anyway, that the public interest standard was incoherent; that
there was no way to give that standard meaningful content in a
manner that didn't impose unacceptable government control over
speakers. It's really, really hard-I'd argue, impossible-to cause a
public interest obligation to make sense in a First Amendment
world where it's beyond the power of government to say that this
speech is better than that speech (which is the basic premise of
First Amendment law everywhere else). Even if an ideal govern-
ment agency could make it make sense, the FCC demonstrated
time and time again that the actual FCC couldn't.
Now let's come back to the cable rules. The Commission's initial
clampdown on cable was necessary, at least in part, to preserve the
Commission's vision of the nation's being served by a network of
local broadcast speakers, each serving the public interest and act-
ing as a proxy for its community, shielded from economic pressure
that would impede it from carrying out those roles. The new tech-
nology of cable threatened to upset old business models and make
a hash of localism, and so the Commission had to save the broad-
cast status quo-and thus the "public interest"-from the
encroaching forces of economics and technology. (Broadcasters,
after all, were obliged by statute to serve the public interest, and
cablecasters weren't-so the Commission couldn't let them be in
charge). But that was a Bad Thing. Commission's status-quo, pub-
lic-interest-dedicated walled garden was small and stunted. Cable
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was in the wings waiting to provide tremendous diversity, and the
FCC was standing in the way.
Okay, so where does this all get us? It suggests that there are
three ways for the FCC to approach the public interest-what it's
supposed to be doing in these concentration rules.
Number one: It can approach it naively, as a search for the pub-
lic interest. I'm short on time, so I'll just reject that as, well, naive.
Number two: It can identify the public interest with that of pre-
dominant market players, in what I'll call the Republican style-
that is to say, the theory that whatever is good for the communica-
tions equivalent of General Motors is good for America. The
broadcast flag provides the example here. The broadcast flag
rulemaking, after all, is not the modern analog of the old cable
rules. It's not there to protect the current system from forces that
would undermine the public interest standard. Rather, in a world
where the philosophy is one of capitalistic competition, it rejects
the economics of creative destruction in favor of support for the
folks who have a lot of money, and lobbyists and juice.
Third approach: It can identify the public interest with that of a
predominant market players, in the Democratic style-following
the theory that government supervision of the broadcast world, in
aid of causing its members to serve the public interest, requires
protecting it from anything that would disrupt current market
models and give power to folks who aren't statutorily required to
serve the public interest. That's the old cable model.
Something notable about concentration regulation is that, over
its history, it has shared both of those last two failings. At the outset,
existing players in the broadcast world were small-there was no
Clear Channel-and the Commission did its best to keep things
that way, in the service of its old vision of the public interest. Today,
the FCC's concentration approach has swung more nearly to the
other pole. The demise of the public interest standard has meant a
loss of support for all aspects of the old fashioned model for
broadcast regulation and a swing closer to the traditional First
Amendment rules, under which regulating concentration in the
name of diversity is suspect from the get go. You couldn't do it, af-
ter all, in the non-broadcast world. Folks like Harold Furchtgott-
Roth tell us that it's not rigorous. And so today you see Congress
and the FCC quicker to identify the public interest in the Republi-
can manner.
The job today for defenders of concentration regulation, in what
I'll call the post-public interest world is constructing a rigorous,
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pragmatic, diversity-based justification for concentration limits in
today's media environment. You might figure that the Commis-
sion's job is to use those justifications in an analysis of public
interest without regard to the needs and desires of dominant mar-
ket players, making neither the Democratic nor the Republican
error. The gentleman has refrained from holding up the stop sign
but I'll just close by saying, I wouldn't count on that.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: I suspect that our pan-
elists have given each other lots to chew on, and I'd like to hear
them do that aloud. Before we have questions and answers from
the audience, I want to start by offering the panelists a chance to
rebut or reflect on anything else that they've heard.
ANDREW JAY SCHWARTZMAN: I very much want to get to the
audience. I certainly could occupy the entire remaining time here
addressing all of these points. Let me just make one or two quick
observations. My first observation is I regret that my friend Robert
Corn-Revere has just walked into the room, and missed the discus-
sion of ancillary jurisdiction that proceeded in the last twenty
minutes. Robert won a case about a year and a half ago involving
ancillary jurisdiction that's kind of the flip side of the broadcast
flag case. It was an FCC effort, however well-meaning, to protect an
otherwise unprotected interest, requiring a video description of
programming for the visually impaired. The court of appeals-
thanks to Robert's persuasion-threw it out, because his client, the
Motion Picture Association, didn't feel like doing it. My larger
point is that, having criticized economists' proxies as being incom-
plete and, therefore, not very good. I will now contradict myself
and observe that much of what we've heard involves the difference
between theory and reality. Democracy and making judgment is a
messy process and an imperfect process. How the FCC measures
diversity, how the FCC measures concentration, how the FCC as-
sesses its ancillary jurisdiction is always going to be imperfect. I say
this as somebody who is often unhappy with what the FCC appeals
its decisions. There is a sound reason to give a lot of discretion to
the agency and give it the benefit of the doubt-give it a little bit of
wiggle room in ancillary jurisdiction to address problems. The
Communications Act is, according to the Supreme Court, "a sup-
ple instrument.,2 That broad authority has enabled the FCC over
time to accommodate new technologies while Congress has a
2. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (quoting FCC v. Potts-
ville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) ("[The public interest] serves as a supple
instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to
carry out its legislative policy.")); see also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) (holding that "public interest" confers broad powers upon the FCC).
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chance to catch up and deal with them. That has on the whole
been a beneficial process, and it's been at the cost of some
abuses-like the broadcast flag. That problem is exacerbated in
today's world of money politics where more and more frequently
the FCC is responding to the people with-as Jonathan refers to
it-the juice, and can lead to some untoward results. But, I do
think that there is a reason to give regulators some latitude and the
benefit of the doubt. Second, and the last point I will make, I agree
with what Molly said. On March 29th there are two cases of import
being argued before the Supreme Court, the Grokster case and the
Brand X case. The Brand X case really addresses one of the things
that Russ took for granted, which I hope we can continue to take
for granted, which is common carrier principles of nondiscrimina-
tion. The Internet is not necessarily going to be the Internet you
know if the FCC succeeds in reversing the Ninth Circuit in the
Brand X case, which is also going to be argued on March 29th. Ca-
ble modem service will be transformed. Cable operators will be
free to block, slow down content based on the deal. If Yahoo makes
a deal with Comcast and you're a Comcast customer they could
block Google completely. More likely, they'll sell Yahoo favorable
caching. So Yahoo will come up a lot faster than Google. It may
even be imperceptible, but you'll find yourself tending towards Ya-
hoo, because it seems to work faster than Google. It's going to
adversely affect localism, startups, entrepreneurs, and indeed, the
innovation which has made the Internet so important for artistic
and political expression, as well as an engine for economic growth
and innovation. So we've got some very important issues ahead of
us where the principles of non-discrimination will become very im-
portant in assuring that First Amendment values will be protected
on the Internet space.
JONATHAN WEINBERG: Let me take a word here to say that I
halfway agree on ancillary jurisdiction. My concern with ancillary
jurisdiction is that it's bad statutory interpretation, and it's got no
textual hook. It makes hash of the statutory structure. That's a
problem. At the same time, though, there are all sorts of situations
right now at the FCC where the agency is at least thinking of doing
things I would like it to do for which it has no statutory authority
and for which it needs ancillary jurisdiction. This comes up in the
whole area of regulation of broadband platforms. There was a case
not too long ago where we had a DSL provider down in North
Carolina-it's a combined telephone company/DSL provider-
that said: "You know, we don't really like our customers using
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Vonage, using voice over IP; that's competing with our service. So
let's just tweak our DSL so that voice over IP is no longer available."
The FCC got them into a room with some rubber hoses and trun-
cheons and two by fours and they agreed not to do that anymore.
But the question is: Does the agency actually have authority to start
wielding those rubber hoses in situations like that? Well, if they do,
it sure looks like it is Title One ancillary jurisdiction authority. I
think I've got a slightly different viewpoint from Andy's on the ex-
act significance of Brand X. But there are certainly calls for the
agency to implement net neutrality rules that would speak to the
ability of the cable company to favor some services or applications
over others in your cable Internet connection. If the agency's got
authority to do that under the current statute, it's only by virtue of
ancillary jurisdiction. So I've got all sorts of strong policy leanings
favoring the agency so long as the agency ends up agreeing with
me on what it ought to do. There is still the problem that no one
appears to have ever given it the authority to do it.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: So for our question and
answer period, we will be recording your questions as well as the
answers. I believe there is a microphone to go around. We would
like you to wait when you raise your hand for the microphone to
get to you. So, while you wait for the microphone I want to start
with a question, mainly I think to Michael and Russell. We have
heard from you two both the claim that use of new technologies
and the Internet in particular could provide the kind of diversity
and competition that we're looking for and do better than regula-
tion of ownership. We have heard now two different claims that the
FCC is itself hampering, or at least not doing enough, to foster the
development of those new technologies through net neutrality.
And the hampering would be the broadcast flag. So do you worry
about that? And do you think that the FCC needs to do a betterjob
of paving the way or at least getting out of the way of the new tech-
nologies that you champion?
MICHAEL G. BAUMANN: Well, from an economist's perspec-
tive I think the less the FCC does the better. A lot of regulation was
in place twenty, thirty, forty, fifty years ago. It was well meaning. It
was designed to promote new technologies at that time, and now
it's just outdated, and it's hindering new technologies of today. So I
think we have to be careful about putting regulations in place that,
while well meant for today's environment, we're not going to get
rid of and we'll be here fifty years from now trying to figure out
how to work with.
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MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: Okay. I think the mi-
crophone has arrived somewhere, David, so go ahead.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just want to say that I'm in complete
agreement with everything that Professor Neuman had to say with
the exception of point six regarding diversity. I don't think the
problem that concerns the people here is really diversity. I don't
think anyone denies that we now are blessed with the ability to see
every football game on Sunday as opposed to just the local one,
and we can definitely see eight celebrity divorces being updated
rather than four. And indeed, we can learn about the ancient May-
ans and the far side of the moon. I think people are more
concerned about the squelch button. I think they're more con-
cerned about what our esteemed keynote speaker was talking
about who, even though he won the George Orwell Award, never
mentioned the term that Orwell basically lived his life around,
which is [inaudible] collectivism. And if you read 1984 what Orwell
was talking about was [inaudible] collectivism, meaning the ten-
dency to all societies, not just ours, history always for eventually
things to converge towards a pyramid, and as you get closer to the
top of the pyramid you get interlocking families, directorates,
whatever it is, and you get the [inaudible] of a society where you
have the leading families and then you have everybody else, and
whether it's an economic leading family or it's hereditary doesn't
really matter. When you get to [inaudible] collectivism, George
Orwell warned, you get the ability for people to push a squelch
button, so then it's not a question of how much we're able to see,
but the few key things that we are prevented from seeing and
learning about. I think that's the core issue, and I'd like to hear the
panelists address that.
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: Well, there's a wonderful irony in read-
ing Orwell today, because Winston Smith confronted this very large
screen, and there was only one channel on the screen, and that
came from the Ministry of Truth, and indeed, we now have large
screen TVs, and the wire leads down the street, but it doesn't go to
the Ministry of Truth. It goes to the cable company corporate
headquarters rather than the government. What we've pointed to
in the new media that I think is a very positive sign is that the ca-
pacity of governments in their own interest to control the flow of
information from outside their borders to their country-the citi-
zenry has been greatly limited. The two principal factors here are
the Internet, which doesn't know where the boundaries are, the
internet protocol sends the message wherever you want and from
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wherever you want without any regard to broadcast spectrum or
some kind of geographic distribution, and the other is satellite,
and it's very clear that satellite broadcasting has had major effects
on opening up ideas and speech in the Arab crescent for example.
So I think the most important thing-where our attention should
go-would be to try to facilitate international broadcasting and the
penetration of not just the Internet, but broadband access to the
Internet, and that every dollar, every hour, every student's atten-
tion to those issues I think would pay us better in terms of diversity
rather than romanticizing about how great it was when the FCC
tried to protect without I think even measurable success diversity
through some kind of equal time or fairness doctrine rulings.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Neuman, I could be mistaken,
but I think I hear you saying something slightly different from what
I heard you say earlier. What you're saying now, as I understand it,
is that there are developing alternative technologies which we
should look to try to gain diversity. What I thought I heard you say
during your talk is that despite concentration of ownership we have
diversity. And you pointed to a variety of musical diversity to show
it. I'm much more concerned with political diversity. I think within
the next minute and a half off the top of my head I could pretty
easily name you ten strident right wing commentators, and I mean
nails on a chalkboard strident right wing commentators, who have
either major network outlets, or major radio syndications. If you
can name me three equally outspoken liberal commentators, I'll
accept your point about the existence of diversity.
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: Again, let me go to the broadcast per-
spective because there may be a thousand liberal or radical or
communist or socialist commentators on the Internet.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And you view those as fungible with
broadcast at the moment?
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: Okay. Not fully yet fungible, but in-
creasingly-who thought that the iPod would represent a force
that would generate musical diversity in radio? I think at the mar-
gin the limitation-and the reason it's not fully fungible yet-is the
question of finding a voice that's there. Now, Air America is this
very interesting experiment, and I listen regularly to Air America,
which is this liberal counter channel to the dominant voice of con-
servative talk radio. And what I listen for most attentively is the
commercial pod break, and I hear public service announcements
on the pod break, and I'm concerned, because that means the ul-
timate survival of Air America-and the first I hope of what will
become many voices that will raise the level of diversity on the air-
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waves-is its commercial success, it's a commercially supported en-
terprise. And so every time I hear somebody selling venetian blinds
or oil changes I'm pleased, because that means that there is at least
enough listenership to make Air America commercially viable. And
the reason that there are ten conservative talk show hosts and not
an equivalent ten liberal talk show hosts has to do with the market-
place. If you could make money selling liberal media the networks
would say, "I don't want that money." At the margin they would.
That's one of the beauties of capitalism. If there was somebody that
could make a network money by criticizing capitalism they'd say,
"I'll take that money," rather than censor it. The tendency of us to
see conspiracies where they subtly and not so subtly will constrain
criticism of their views, I think, is an understandable concern, but
not the reality of the marketplace.
PANEL MEMBER: You know, while we're here, Air America ra-
dio-they lost their Chicago outlet.
ANDREW JAY SCHWARTZMAN: Yeah. Let me just observe that
confidence that the new technologies and the internet will achieve
everything it can do may be misplaced for reasons we've already
heard, and I've already spoken to. Grokster, Brand X, the broadcast
flag all represent instances where constraints are being brought on
the capability of the new technologies to fulfill all of their promise.
And it is not preordained that information is free and that the
technology and disruptive technologies will prevail. We're going to
figure that out in the next year or so in the cases I've just cited, but
there will be other instances as well. Digital rights management
continues to threaten the capability of the technologies, and if Mi-
crosoft prevails with WMA as opposed to the iPod technology, and
over time Microsoft tends to win, we won't have that same capabil-
ity. So that's my cautionary note.
JONATHAN WEINBERG: Let me chime in with two points re-
lated to that. One relates to being tremendously excited about the
prospects of the Internet for the system of communication. That
point, which Andy just reminded me of, is that we lost a huge,
huge opportunity with the webcast copyright license terms. We
really had going there wonderful burgeoning competition to music
over the radio; it just got shut down in the twinkling of an eye by
both the terms and the amounts of the copyright licenses that were
imposed in the wake of Copyright Royalty Tribunal ruins. The sec-
ond point is that this discussion really does raise the question of
why in the world are we worried about broadcast concentration
rules? A lot of us still seem to be looking at broadcast markets as if
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there were no newspapers in the world, there was no Internet,
there's none of the rest of it. That's something that the FCC
stepped away from in the last rule making. Indeed you might ask,
why should we care about broadcast diversity as such, when they're
just one information source? And the short answer is because
they're bigger: because broadcast outlets in terms of audience
reach are really, really big, and there is nothing else out there like
them. If that weren't true, there would be no basis for treating
broadcast outlets as anything in particular that we had to worry
about. Russ was, extolling the programming on HBO. HBO's won-
derful, and it's got nationwide reach. But HBO's numbers are
little. HBO simply does not have the audience compared to, say,
NBC, and that's not going to change anytime soon. Broadcast net-
works are big. They're more of the market than anyone else out
there, and that's, I think, the reason we're all this room still paying
attention.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: We have about five
more minutes and a few more questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Russell, like the first question, I agree
with much of what you said, not all. I certainly liked your sugges-
tions of things to be concerned with, though I would have added
ownership concentration among them. But the interest in other
structural forms of ownership, I think, if we really want a diverse
world of communications we should be putting a lot more empha-
sis on that. But like the first speaker, the thing that concerns me
most was your sixth point, the idea of ownership not having any-
thing to do with diversity. In the early '90s I reviewed about fifty
studies looking to see whether or not chain ownership or owner-
ship conglomerates had an impact, and many of the studies found
nothing but to the extent that there was an overall finding in the
fifty studies I looked at, it was clear that ownership concentration
reduced quality that was bad for the public. I note that since that
time there's been a number of studies, some of them by a professor
at your competing school, Washington State, Steven Lacy-the
most recent one, 2003. I have his 1996 one with me because I was
reading it on the plane. But his 2003 suggests that public owner-
ship relates to two things, increased profit margins and decreased
number of journalists hired by the paper. And other studies have
shown pretty clearly that as the number of journalists you hire de-
clines the quality of the paper declines. So then moving over into
the broadcast area, Columbia Project for Excellence in Journalism
studied broadcast stations and had ownership being directly re-
lated to the quality of news provided with by far the best news
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being provided where the owner was in what it defined as a small
group, which means that the owner owned from one to three sta-
tions and progressively got worse as the numbers increased. So
though I'm not-in fact, this afternoon I'll argue that this isn't the
right issue, but to the extent that one is concerned with quality, it's
not exactly clear what diversity means with quality, that ownership
may matter considerably. And so, I was a little bit concerned with
your suggestion that all the studies show that there's no relation-
ship.
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: I stand corrected. There is some con-
troversy in the literature, there are some findings. I cited one
where there was a small positive correlation. It's the most recent
I've seen. It's not yet published. It was done by a scholar at Prince-
ton University, and after all these controls there was a slight
positive correlation.
PANEL MEMBER: There's also a guy at Michigan State that, I
think, found more. This was in the music context [inaudible] that
the play list-not the diversity of formats, but the play list diver-
sity-now this notion of going from forty to 1400-but where
there's more concentration the play list diversity went down.
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: There is increasingly cross media com-
petition-radio competes with satellite radio, radio competes with
Internet radio, radio competes with iPod, radio competes with
downloading packaged things from the Internet. That's going to
put financial pressure on radio, and they may fire diskjockeys, and
they may fire journalists. So, I'm concerned about that, but I would
be reluctant to say that the FCC should be in the business of dictat-
ing how many journalists every radio station or every newspaper
ought to have. Don't try to protect diversity by some kind of nu-
meric regulation of the quality or quantity of news.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But if ownership regulation would do
that and we get the jobs we want, wouldn't that be a good argu-
ment to have ownership regulation?
W. RUSSELL NEUMAN: My primary argument is that at the
margin the correlations that Rossman and others have found are
so small that you can spend a million dollars trying to change it
from six corporate owners to seven, and that the net effect of that
is going to be one one hundredth of an iPod effect or an Internet
effect, and I think although it is justifiable, it is not a high payoff. I
think putting all your energy into the Grokster case, or the Brand X
case, or starting a new channel on the Internet called the Foot
Stompers Channel with Andy as the lead coordinator would be a
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much better path forward than trying again to take us back to the
'50s and say, "What we really need is an equal time or fairness
rule."
PANEL MEMBER: I'll take five minutes at lunch to tell Russ why
I don't entirely agree with what he just said.
MICHAEL G. BAUMANN: If I could respond briefly to that, the
studies that look at the quality of news are very subjective. You have
people, academics, sitting around looking at this program and say-
ing, "Is this good? Is this bad? Is it what I want to see?"
PANEL MEMBER: That's what the problem was, that they
weren't subjective. They look at measures of resources put into it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The really right measure is a subjective
one, and all these students of social scientists didn't know how to
measure the right [inaudible].
MICHAEL G. BAUMANN: Well, I thought the Project for Excel-
lence looks at the types of stories that were being carried, and
whether they were good or not. But that aside, we looked at that
study that was submitted in the ownership hearings, and you're
right, if you look at the numbers they show smaller ownership
groups have more quality as they measure it. If you look a little
deeper you find that the difference is not significant, that if you
take account of randomness in the data from a statistical point of
view it's just not significant. And I think that's following up that you
can find these things.
PANEL MEMBER: They found that as to the cross ownership
where there's only a half dozen but not where there were hundreds
of stations, which was the main part of the study. They dismissed
one part of it on being significantly insignificant. The part that
they didn't talk about in the report was the part that was signifi-
cantly insignificant.
MICHAEL G. BAUMANN I have to go back and look at it again.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: We have one last ques-
tion, and then we'll continue this discussion at lunch.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you all for giving us the benefit of
your comments and expertise. I want to draw from something that
was touched upon by Professor Neuman and another completely
separate issue that was touched upon by Mr. Schwartzman. First of
all, you mentioned just in passing the connection with the defense
industry that the origins of radio had, and I think, not a lot of peo-
ple are aware of the defense industry and defense department
funding of a lot of communication research, which is what you had
mentioned the FCC really wanted to see. And to what extent do
any of you believe that the FCC exists as kind of what's been called
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a weak link between the government and one way communications
technologies to kind of temper the really violent criticism of gov-
ernment that could be enabled by such technologies?
PANEL MEMBER: On the whole allowing for its significant im-
perfections. Again this democracy s*** but it's the best that we've
got. The independent regulatory commission model, which has
some-excuse the expression-in this context, diversity built in,
and some accountability is better and a better model than anything
else I'm aware of, for all of its limitations and all of its excessive
responsiveness to demagoguery in Congress, I can't think of some-
thing better than to have a multi-headed body with limitation and
no more than a bare majority from one political party and some
ability to have dissenters. I can't come up with anything much bet-
ter, and it provides as much opportunity for a firewall than
anything else I can come up with, and it's very imperfect.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Should commissioners then be ap-
pointed by the very administration that media wouldn't be able to
criticize? Shouldn't it be regulated by our enemy's best friend?
PANEL MEMBER: The FCC Commissioners have more inde-
pendence than you're suggesting. And I'm a critic, and I don't like
what's going on, but they have more independence than you're
suggesting, and I can't figure out a way that we're going to get any
more independence than that in this political structure. It's the
best we're going to get.
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: So my assignment was
to get us to lunch on time. And I haven't quite succeeded, but I've
given it a valiant effort. Before we thank our panel, will you two
have logistical announcements before we get up. just meet back
here at 1:30? Okay. So we'll meet back here at 1:30, but before we
leave let's thank our panel.
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PANEL II
MEDIA AND FREE SPEECH: THE RIGHT
BALANCE FOR DEMOCRACY
RYAN CALO: Hello, and welcome back. I have a feeling some
people are going to be trickling in, because we're getting back
from lunch here. But we're going to go ahead and get started so
that we're more or less on track. I've been extraordinarily happy
about the success of this Symposium so far with the keynote and
the first panel. I have to say that this particular panel is very near
and dear to my own heart as a person who really loved First
Amendment law. This panel sort of was primary in sparking the
idea of this symposium based on the influence of the media on
democracy and the role of the First Amendment. And so insofar as
this goes directly to these issues, it is a very important panel, and
I'm glad to see everybody here. I want to thank you again for com-
ing. The moderator for this particular panel is ProfessorJ.B. White.
I've had the pleasure of having class with Professor White. He has a
deep and a complex understanding of many things, including the
First Amendment and has written extensively about it and about in
general legal interpretation. I am extremely excited that he's fram-
ing this particular debate. So in the interest of time I'm going to
turn you over to Panel II, and again, thank you very much for at-
tending.
[Applause]
JAMES BOYD WHITE: Today we're going to hear four distin-
guished speakers talk about different aspects of the relationship
between the media and free speech in a democracy. This is obvi-
ously a timely and important subject. One way to begin to think
about it from the point of view of the First Amendment itself might
be to recognize that most of the ways in which we talk about free
speech in First Amendment courses, and in First Amendment dis-
course more generally, is to imagine individual human speakers-
individual human speakers engaging in the free trade of ideas, or
developing their autonomy, or practicing the kind of conversations
that are essential to a democracy and so forth. This is the kind of
speech which, as Voltaire is supposed to have said-although I
don't know that he really did-that we would die to protect even if
we disagreed with it.
But in fact, just as a matter of social fact, the world of public
speech that we inhabit is nothing like that. It's dominated by mass
media either functioning in what we think of as a journalistic way,
reporting news perhaps accurately or inaccurately, and often
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enough in an unthinking or pusillanimous way, or offering to en-
tertain us, but at the price of our having to endure a lot of
advertising. An important question thus presented: What is the re-
lationship between this kind of speech and the First Amendment?
Is this the kind of speech the First Amendment is meant to pro-
tect? How and why? What of the fact that this kind of speech. may
make other, more desirable forms of speech impossible, or it trivi-
alizes them? The fact that I can walk out of here and say on the
street corner that I think President Bush or President Clinton is a
dastardly traitor is of very little consequence if I have no audience,
as I do not. [Laughter]
Yet efforts to create such an audience, that is to say, for individ-
ual speakers, for example, through the local public interest
broadcasting, are miserable failures that you can tell by the rapidity
while you skim over those stations while you were channel surfing.
So what are we to do? We're about to learn how our distinguished
panelists both define and think about the question of the relation-
ship between the media and the First Amendment.
The way we'll proceed is this: Each speaker will have twenty
minutes with warnings as the time expires; I'm going to enforce
the limit if I have to with brutal rigor-standing up, making noise
and that kind of stuff, because only if we do that will we have time
for questions, which is very important. When we get to the point of
doing questions I will recognize speakers, call on you, cut you off,
rule you out of order and otherwise exemplify a proper attitude
towards your freedom of speech. We have four speakers this morn-
ing, and I'll introduce them one at a time just as they speak. The
first is C. Edwin Baker, who's the Nicholas Gallicchio Professor at
the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. He's taught at many
places, including NYU, Chicago, Cornell, Texas and so forth, was a
staff attorney to the ACLU. He regularly teaches constitutional law,
mass media law and related courses. He's the author of three
books, Media, Markets, and Democracy, Advertising and a Democratic
Press and Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech. Dr. Baker.
C. EDWIN BAKER: Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here.
In thinking about media ownership, whether media is too con-
centrated, whether media concentration is a problem, the reasons
that you're concerned with concentration will necessarily deter-
mine what type of answer one would get. So the question crucially
is what values are involved when one talks about media concentra-
tion. I'll just describe what I consider the three primary reasons to
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be concerned with media concentration. I'll add one additional
practical point and one additional structural consideration.
First, the single most important reason to resist concentration of
media ownership comes from, I think, the meaning of democracy.
True democracy implies as wide as practical dispersal of power
within public discourse. Dispersal of ownership may empirically
produce diverse content. Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't.
But what's crucial is the dispersal of power, of influence within the
public sphere. Not everybody will own a media entity, but you'll
have more groups feeling more represented, more people, and
you'll have more of a sense of it being a popular construction of
democracy the wider the dispersal of ownership exists. This dis-
tributive value I suggest was probably the most significant
background concern, consideration, or motivation that prompted
nearly two million people to write a petition or email the FCC in
opposition to their reducing restrictions on concentration. With-
out more, without considering anything more about empirical
effects other than that the power's been distributed, you have an
adequate reason to impose almost any limit on media mergers, and
any policy designed to increase the number of separate owners of
media entities. The Supreme Court, I believe, has approved essen-
tially the propriety of this value judgment when it held that strict
limits on media cross ownership were appropriate to prevent un-
due concentration of economic power in the communications
realm.
Second-and also bringing in democratic theory--dispersal of
media ownership provides two essential democratic safeguards,
which I think are of inestimable significance. First, concentrated
ownership in any local state or national community provides a pos-
sibility of an individual decision maker exercising enormous,
almost unchecked, undemocratic, potentially irresponsible power
within the public sphere. This power may seldom be exercised. For
instance, exercising it might be contrary to the economic interest
of that owner, but even if it is not, that would not be so important.
A democracy shouldn't risk this type of allocation of power. It's like
with separation of powers in constitutional law. These structural
provisions protect democracy even if they slow things down a bit.
They are a safeguard for democracy, for liberty. One structural way
that a society can protect democracy-that we can prevent some-
thing that I've sometimes described as the Berlusconi effect-is to
have a widespread dispersal of media ownership. Again, this struc-
tural value has been embodied in law. Almost thirty-five years ago
the FCC stated it quite clearly. As it put it, I quote, "A proper objec-
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tive is the maximum diversity of ownership. We are of the view that
sixty different licensees are more desirable than fifty, and even that
fifty-one are more desirable than fifty. It might be the fifty-first li-
censee that would become the communications channel for a
solution to a severe social crisis." So one of the democratic-well,
actually I've now merged them-one of the democratic safeguards
is just preventing undue exercise of power within the public
sphere. The second, suggested by the FCC quote, is that to have
more owners provides more people who potentially can provide a
check, potentially provide the exposes, that are important within a
democratic community. So there's two different types of safe-
guards: a safeguard against concentrated power within the political
order in democracy, and a larger number of watchdogs. This larger
number is almost inherently harder to corrupt and is also more
likely to take the initiative to make that type of expos6 that democ-
racy requires.
The third point I want to note is a much more economic con-
sideration, an economic argument. Economic theory predicts that
media markets will radically fail to provide people the media con-
tent they want. I've talked generally about this in the first third of
my book, Media, Markets, and Democracy, but two economic points
are particularly important here. First, one reason why media enti-
ties fail to provide what people want relates to what economists call
externalities, both positive and negative. When the newspaper,
when the broadcaster, exposes corruption, the people who benefit
from that exposure include people that see the broadcast or read
the paper. But it also includes everybody else in the community
who get a better government, a better functioning society due to
the media having made the expos6. But they don't pay the paper.
The paper or broadcaster doesn't get any revenue from those peo-
ple or from the advertisers who pay to reach the media's audience,
so paper or broadcaster undersupply expensive-to-produce expo-
ses. Other media content creates negative externalities-effects on
people other than the consumers, like the person who gets beat up
after the media shows too much violence that stimulates some vio-
lent prone person to engage in antisocial behavior. Those beat-up
people are subject to negative externalities, which again the mar-
ket does bring to bear on the media's decision making. The market
systematically provides too much negative quality stuff, and too lit-
tle positive quality stuff from the perspective of what people would
be willing to pay if they each had an opportunity to pay for the por-
tion of benefit that she receives. But the people that benefit from
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the media that they don't consume, that they don't purchase, don't
have any effective market mechanism to bring that benefit to bear
on media entities. I suggest that the externalities produced by the
mass media and the mass culture that the media helps construct
are extraordinary in their extent. In fact, in my book I go through
and classify ten or fifteen different types, all of which have varying
magnitudes in varying contexts, some positive and some negative,
but none of which the market brings to bear on media entities.
Sometimes the externality relates to something that media does
that does not produce any story to sell even to its customers. If the
media's reputation for investigative journalism causes corruption
not to occur, deters official or private wrongdoing, then there's no
story to report, nothing to sell to its readers, so they just get only
the boring day-to-day stuff. But that deterrence would be a tre-
mendously important positive externality of a media ready to
engage in investigative reporting.
Second, there's a lot of economic factors relating to the nature
of monopolistic competition that, for our present purposes, I don't
need to discuss here but that create distortions in media markets
that don't apply in many other markets. One, however, is impor-
tant here. A consequence of the nature of media-monopolistic
competition in media markets-is that most media entities have an
extraordinarily high rate of operating profits. Put this point to-
gether with the discussion of externalities. What would a
policymaker want to do in response?
Ideally, if the media's producing high positive externalities de-
pends on journalistic activities that it can cut, what a policy maker
would want is for the media entity to spend some of these potential
profits on journalistic or creative activities that produce high posi-
tive externalities but for which they don't receive compensation or
adequate compensation from the market. Basically society needs
media owners who are willing to accept lower profits on behalf of
things like high quality journalism, high quality creative efforts. So
if there was any way to predict which owners would be that sort and
which would be the sort who will just maximize the bottom line, a
policy maker should seek to get ownership in to the hands of the
first group.
There's a number of reasons to expect that smaller owners, fam-
ily owners, will be much more committed to quality journalism
than corporate owners, publicly owned corporations. First is a so-
ciological prediction. The small owner, the hometown owner, is
more likely to respond to a diverse set of incentives such as the
praise and status they receive from friends and others in their
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community for acting as responsibly and professionally. Also, if an
owner is involved with, or was once involved in the journalistic side
of the enterprise, she'll likely have personal identity tied up with
professional standards that she'll be as interested in maintaining as
in increasing the bottom line. My prediction is that, in contrast, for
conglomerates, especially public corporations, mid- and high-level
executives will have more of their identity tied up with the idea of
producing a high rate of return on investment, be able to take out
higher profits. Moreover, the rewards they receive will be more
based on this achievement. So this public or conglomerate owner-
ship will more systematically lead to taking the money out as profits
rather than "waste it" on journalistic expenditures that produce
good only for the community.
So that is my sociological prediction. There's also a number of
structural forces that will tend to push in the same direction. In a
merger, the buying entity will be presumably the firm that can offer
the most. It can offer the most. It will be the most willing and able
to capitalize on the purchased entity's potential earnings. But once
having paid, once having borrowed the money to pay, the purchas-
ing entity will be locked into being profit maximizing in order to
cover the cost rather than being profit wasteful in a way that pro-
duces good for the community. So both on structural and
sociological grounds I suggest that people are more likely to get
the media that they in fact value, and that's beneficial to society,
from ownership dispersal than from ownership concentration, par-
ticularly ownership concentration that comes through mergers
into public corporations.
The other consideration that I will note, which doesn't itself
really go to the argument for why ownership dispersal is desirable,
is a practical political consideration. In area after area, the laws
best on media policy grounds are very controversial. People with
even similar value systems can disagree about what type of policy is
best. These issues need to be thought about and debated within,
discussed, talked about in a democratic process. To the extent that
a few major media corporations basically control the public sphere,
the type of debate you'll hear will focus on choices that are most
profitable to these already controlling media. Members of Con-
gress and FCC Commissioners will be lead to be responsive
essentially to the economic interests of these few corporations.
Dispersal allows for a more honest development of the political
debates about what media policy is best.
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The final structural point that I want to mention is that the more
deeply dispersed ownership is, the more ownership is by small me-
dia entities as opposed to conglomerates, the less structural
conflicts of interest there will be. If a media outlet is owned by a
company that owns a lot of other properties, it discovers, depend-
ing on who the owner is, that it benefits from putting on the
evening news stories about the new Disney movie, or the new Dis-
ney theme park, or the new General Electric high quality nuclear
reactor, or various other things in which its owner has an economic
interest. Now, I'm not saying that smaller media firms will necessar-
ily provide the best journalism, but they won't have as many
synergistic reasons to undermine the quality of the journalism.
Thus, a structural lack of conflicts of interest is an additional rea-
son for opposing concentration.
Now, it's clear that my story hasn't gotten through to the people
that have been advancing deregulatory policies-the people that
claim that ownership concentration is not a problem within the
existing order or that, to the extent that it is, will be adequately
dealt with by antitrust law. Where did these people go wrong? Well,
often their antitrust analysis is overly simplistic. There's been a lot
of interesting debate within the antitrust community recently
about the notion of First Amendment values as being an important
concern within antitrust law-an article by Stucke and Grunes
raised some interesting points along this line. But there's a more
basic problem. The people who have been advancing deregulatory
positions assume, I think, that the only values at stake are essen-
tially consumers getting commodities that they value consuming.
They have an essentially commodified notion of the value. If you
look back at the concerns I mentioned above, they were essentially
non-commodified values, values related to the quality of democ-
racy, the way democracy operates. Only the third of the three, the
economic point, had anything to do with the provision of com-
modities to people. And that point was about how the market
systematically fails to work within the media sphere to give people
what they want. It related to externalities, benefits or harms that
people do purchase-that is, to values that are not successfully
commodified but which most free market advocates like to ignore.
But the primary concerns involved the need for non-commodified
values to prevail over commodified values. In contrast, I think the
deregulatory advocates mostly focus on only commodified value.
Their assumption is that the sought after value must be diversity in
viewpoint or content, things that audiences can consume, while the
democratic concern is much more about diversity of ownership,
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dispersal of power within the public sphere. This dispersal is not
what people purchase. It is how the system operates, how the soci-
ety is organized.
Second, many of the deregulatory advocates have a misguided
view of the First Amendment. The D.C. Circuit says that any limits
on ownership restrict the media entity's First Amendment rights to
reach as many people as it can. The Supreme Court, when it took
up structural regulation, said as long as it is a reasonable imple-
mentation of communications policy the government can limit
ownership drastically. It can even treat different broadcasters or
different newspapers differently from other broadcasters or other
newspapers. Essentially the difference between the D.C. Circuit
and the Supreme Court is a different conception of what the First
Amendment is about. The D.C. Circuit basically sees the media as
itself the ultimate bottom, the ultimate rights holder. The Supreme
Court has seen, I think quite clearly, that the media are protected
to serve a democratic function, to serve an open, democratic soci-
ety. Although censorship is contrary to the openness of a
democratic society, structural media regulation may or may not
benefit it. There's no good theoretical criteria to know when a
regulation does or when it doesn't. So, for the most part, as long as
the judgments are plausible, Congress should have the power, or
state government should have the power, to choose the structural
regulations they think will serve democracy best. The Supreme
Court has traditionally said that's fine.
The Court's view, I should note, implicitly recognizes something
that it has repeatedly rejected saying overtly. Namely it recognizes
that the press clause and the speech clause are doing different
work in the First Amendment. My own view is that the speech
clause should and often is about a notion of individual liberty. This
goes back to Professor White's introduction when he talked about
the difference it makes who speaks, a difference between an indi-
vidual and an institutional entity, a media business. It is quite clear
that they both have some rights. But the rationale and content of
the rights may differ. The Supreme Court's been all over the map
as to First Amendment theory. I've argued that the marketplace of
ideas dominates in many free speech cases but others quite clearly
rely on a notion of individual liberty. It was individual liberty at
stake when the Supreme Court, for instance, said that a school
child couldn't be forced to salute a flag. Frankfurter's dissent said,
since the children and their parents can talk about their objections
after the salute, there was no interference with the marketplace of
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ideas-if there had been, he would have favored their claim.
Frankfurter didn't see what First Amendment values were at stake.
The Court, though, thought that that child's individual expressive
liberty was crucial. The speech clause often does and should pro-
tect this individual liberty. The press clause, though, is different.
The Court has said this in a variety of opinions and in various ways.
I think Justice Black did it most eloquently in an early antitrust
case, the Associated Press v. United States. Black saw that the value of
the press is primarily to serve our democratic needs for open and
diverse communications. From this view, structural regulation is
fine when it represents the view of Congress that the regulation is
likely to that service-not to censor the press, but to improve its
performance of its democratic functions. The court should and has
upheld such regulation. So that suggests that the press clause is
playing a different role than the speech clause. Often times the two
roles will overlap completely. Both object to censorship, to content
suppression. But in other contexts, they often differ. The notion of
structural regulation of the individual is not really very coherent.
Structural regulation of the media area makes a lot of sense. And it
is done, and is legitimately done under the press clause, in order to
make the media serve democracy better. Thank you. [Applause]
JAMES BOYD WHITE: Our second speaker will be Robert Corn-
Revere, who is a partner in the Washington office of Davis Wright
Tremaine specializing in First Amendment, Internet and com-
munications law. He successfully argued the United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. He's
co-author of a three-volume treatise entitled Modern Communica-
tions Law, published by West, and editor and co-author of the
book, Rationales & Rationalizations, published in 1997. Mr.
Corn-Revere.
ROBERT CORN-REVERE: Thank you. It is a thrill to be invited
to an academic conference. Usually working lawyers like me go to
industry trade shows and similar events and not ivy tower gather-
ings to talk about these great ideas. In addressing today's topic,
most of what I have to say may seem off the wall to you, in that oth-
ers on the panel will address the disease of media concentration to
be cured, if, in fact, there is one. However, I am going to talk more
about the nature of the cure, and, more specifically, the FCC's me-
dia concentration proceeding and its implications both for
administrative law and the First Amendment. Is the cure worse
than the disease? Perhaps somewhere along the line, we can find
out where I went wrong in my analysis.
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Our moderator opened the panel by identifying various kinds of
speech, both good and bad, and asking whether these types of
speech were intended to be protected by the First Amendment.
Professor Baker addressed the question in a somewhat different
way when he said that the benefit of the First Amendment is not
just giving consumers what they want, and that doing so is just
"commodifying" their values. With all due respect, however, I think
these are profoundly incorrect questions to ask when addressing
the First Amendment. The purpose of the First Amendment was to
limit the government's power to decide what values we are sup-
posed to have, whether "commodified" or otherwise. Vesting the
government with the power to regulate speech in order to get the
"values" that you want simply is antithetical to the purpose of the
First Amendment.
In this presentation I will address some of these issues by focus-
ing on the FCC's media ownership proceeding as a case study on
the death of the FCC as an expert agency. The problems of that
proceeding go far beyond the media ownership context, and have
significant First Amendment ramifications in other areas within the
FCC's jurisdiction. Maybe it is a bit dramatic to suggest the "death"
of the FCC as an expert agency. Obviously, it still exists as an inde-
pendent regulatory commission. But I think it pays to go back and
look at what was intended when the independent regulatory com-
mission structure was first established. The first such commission
was the Interstate Commerce Commission established in 1887, and
it formed the template for the agencies to come after it. The next
was the Federal Trade Commission in 1914, followed by a host of
New Deal agencies in the 1930s. The Federal Communications
Commission was created in 1934, as we all know, and it expanded
and consolidated the agency that was created in 1927, the Federal
Radio Commission. The FCC wasn't really different in kind from
the FRC, just different in scope. At around the same time the FCC
was created, Justice Sutherland described the nature of the inde-
pendent regulatory commission as follows:
The Commission is to be nonpartisan, and it must at the very
nature of its duties act with entire impartiality. It is charged
with the enforcement of no policy except for the policy of
the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but
predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Like the
Interstate Commerce Commission its members are called
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upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts
appointed by law and informed by experience.
At about this same time, the Brownwell Commission was advising
President Franklin D. Roosevelt on the nature of the administrative
state, and it described independent regulatory commissions as a
"headless fourth branch of government." The reason for this nega-
tive assessment, of course, was that the "independence" of
independent regulatory commissions necessarily diminished the
scope of executive power (which, at the time of the New Deal, was
at its peak). So the major influences at the time went in opposite
directions; the creation of independent regulatory commissions
took away from executive power, while the Executive Branch was
exercising a great deal more authority because of the national
emergency of the Depression. Not surprisingly, the Brownwell
Commission advised the Roosevelt Administration to convert the
regulatory commissions to executive departments so there would
be more presidential control over policy.
In this respect, independent agencies are distinguishable from
executive departments in that they are designed to facilitate a pol-
icy process that is more non-partisan. In contrast, executive
departments, like the EPA, are designed to implement the Presi-
dent's agenda pursuant to the statutory mandate set forth by
Congress. But independent regulatory commissions operate some-
what differently. They have three essential functions: They have an
adjudicatory role, a duty to implement statutory directives, and a
rulemaking capability that works with both of those other func-
tions. There can be various types of adjudications. The FCC, for
example, may conduct the type of adjudication required to select a
winner among competing applicants for permits or licenses, and it
also has an adjudicatory function in determining if a licensee has
violated Commission rules or statutory directives.
In order to perform their various functions, independent
commissions were designed with the following characteristics: First
and foremost is political independence. This essential quality of
independent commissions is codified in a number of ways.
(1) Independent commissions are bipartisan in their appointment
process. Commissioners are appointed by the President, confirmed
by the Senate, and are required by law to have just a narrow majority
of the controlling party. At the FCC, for example, no more than
three of the five commissioners can be of the dominant political
party. The two remaining commissioners are required by law to be
from the minority party (or no party, although I have yet to see
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that happen). Additional indicia of the intended interest in the
non-partisan nature of regulatory commissions are that Commis-
sioners have fixed, staggered terms and generally can be removed
only for cause, not because they disagree either with the White
House or Congress. (2) The decisionmaking process of independ-
ent agencies is supposed to be collegial and consensual. In this
sense, independent agencies have been compared to federal appel-
late courts. (3) The third defining characteristic of independent
commissions is the reliance on applied expertise in the area of the
agency's assigned jurisdiction. Independent commissions are de-
signed to deal with problems that involve technical issues that
Congress is not well equipped to handle, many of which require
quick action.
Now, that's the theory. I have described the structure of the in-
dependent regulatory commissions and how they are supposed to
function. Obviously, however, the FCC is not above the political
fray. We do live in the world after all. And communications regula-
tions certainly have been among the most hotly debated issues
politically. But Congress was well aware of the political sensitivities
when it established the FRC and the FCC. Indeed, a principal rea-
son Congress established an independent commission to regulate
communications in this country was because Hebert Hoover, the
Secretary of Commerce at the time (who had jurisdiction over ra-
dio), had presidential aspirations. And so, Congress was not going
to entrust control over this new and powerful medium in one very
powerful politician who had an interest in higher office. For that
reason, among others, the commission form of regulation was cho-
sen. Substantively, such concerns are reflected in the political
broadcasting rules. The rules require equal opportunities to use
broadcast facilities when one candidate has been on the air, and
impose other similar requirements. Such rules show a high degree
of awareness by Congress that communications regulation needed
to both be non-political and also to account for the possibility of
political manipulation.
Since the Commission was created, and in its actual operation,
there has been a continuing political tug-of-war between the office
of the President and the legislative branch for power over commu-
nication policy. Presidents typically seek to expand executive
influence by appointing strong chairmen who try to put their
stamp on the agency and to move the focus of power at the agency
in the direction of the executive. Congress, on the other hand,
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tries to retain power through legislation and congressional over-
sight of the agency.
We have seen the appointment of strong FCC chairmen of all
political stripes throughout the history of the agency. In 1980
President Reagan appointed Mark Fowler, a very deregulation-
minded chairman, to be the head of the agency and the FCC
moved in strongly deregulatory direction at that time. I should
note that this was not an entirely new innovation. The Commission
was already moving in a deregulatory direction under President
Carter and his FCC Chairman Charles Ferris. But Mark Fowler's
appointment accelerated that trend. In the mid-1990s, President
Clinton appointed Reed Hundt, another strong chairman, but one
who moved the agency back in more of a regulatory direction.
Congress, on the other hand, sees the FCC entirely as its own
creature. Legendary House Speaker Sam Rayburn famously was
supposed to have told President Kennedy's FCC Chairman Newton
Minow: 'Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of
Congress. You belong to us. Remember that, and you'll get along
all right." That sentiment sums up pretty well how the congres-
sional oversight committees view the FCC. They see it as their
personal property and will, in a variety of ways, exert their influ-
ence and control over the FCC.
On the panel just before this one, Andy Schwartzman was talk-
ing about independent regulatory commissions and said that, for
all of its limitations, the independent commission model probably
is the best structure that he can imagine. I think that remains to be
seen. In theory, the structure of the independent regulatory com-
mission is well-suited to the task at hand-to have an expert agency
engage in collegial and non-partisan deliberations with statutory
protections from political influences. However, there is an impor-
tant question whether the theory can hold up against the
experience of the real world.
This difference between theory and practice with respect to "in-
dependent" regulatory commissions is one of the more significant
lessons to be learned from the FCC's media ownership proceeding.
This proceeding tests the underlying assumption as to whether the
independent regulatory commission, and specifically this inde-
pendent regulatory commission, can perform the functions for
which it was designed. A number of aspects of this proceeding il-
lustrate how the independent commission structure has begun to
fray. First, just to set the stage, the FCC did not decide on its own to
start dismantling or to change its media ownership rules. That pro-
ceeding was required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
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which directed the Commission to conduct biannual reviews and
to eliminate those that were no longer necessary in the public in-
terest, with a special focus on the ownership rules. The FCC had
followed the prescribed process, and was reversed twice by the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled
that the FCC had not justified its decision to retain certain broad-
cast ownership rules.
In response to those decisions the FCC embarked on a further
rulemaking proceeding, and here is where things started to go
tragically wrong. One of the decisions that Chairman Powell made
was to conduct this rulemaking as an omnibus proceeding. That is,
instead of having a separate proceeding on each of the respective
ownership rules, he decided that it would be more rational to
combine them, and to examine the common elements of the vari-
ous ownership rules and to analyze them as a group. Now, purely as
a matter of efficiency, that choice made a lot of sense. Chairman
Powell is a very smart commissioner, a very smart lawyer. He had
significant experience in this area, and it is hard to fault him on
the logic of trying to analyze the media ownership issues in a single
proceeding. His approach was consistent with the theory of the
FCC as an expert body designed to address these issues collegially.
Unfortunately, in the real world, combining the media owner-
ship issues into an omnibus proceeding also created a political
backlash that resulted in a very contentious proceeding before the
FCC. One of the ways this battle was fought was by Democratic
commissioners, led by Commissioner Copps, who decided that it
was necessary to host "field hearings" around the country and in-
vite the public in to talk about its perceptions regarding the effects
of media concentration. In one sense, it is hard to disagree with
such an approach-if you are a member of Congress. This, after
all, is the job that Congress is designed to do: To hear from con-
stituents, to factor public sentiment into its decisions about
legislation, to control what the FCC does, and to make decisions
based on such political considerations.
On the other hand, for an expert agency that is trying to analyze
the economics, the policy implications, and the First Amendment
consequences of a change in media ownership policies, conducting
a series of "focus groups" might not be the best way to get informa-
tion on the issues. I testified at one of these hearings in February
2003, and was struck by the unreality of the situation. I arrived late
because my plane was delayed, and as I came in to the hearing
room, the audience was already there. As the proceedings were
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beginning, I began to realize that the format might not be quite
the right setting for the type of constitutional analysis that I had
been asked to present. For example, I noticed as I made my way to
the witness table that the entire front row of spectators was made
up of people who were wearing television set face masks to exhibit
their displeasure with the FCC proceeding. To me, this did not
represent the kind of rational deliberation that an expert agency is
designed for. So the field hearings were in reality a series of "pep
rallies" around the country, designed for the specific purpose of
marshalling political support for a given position. As a conse-
quence, the process inside the agency became intensely partisan
and directed at a particular result rather than providing a means to
fully analyze the issues.
Another aspect of the anti-media concentration effort was the
development of massive e-mail campaigns that produced tons of
identical e-mails coming into the FCC. I read in one account that,
in the last couple of weeks before the vote, 750,000 e-mails were
delivered to the Commission. During the previous panel, Andy
Schwartzman said that about two million emails were sent to the
FCC during the entire course of the proceeding, and he suggested
that this was a good thing. He said that this fact helped the court of
appeals decide the direction that the FCC should go with respect
to its ownership rules. Andy said that the e-mail campaign had a
direct impact on the litigation in that the United States Court of
Appeals with the Third Circuit was willing to grant a stay of the
rules, in part because of the public reaction.
I look at these same facts and reach an opposite conclusion: The
way the media ownership proceeding was conducted along with its
outcome, and the impact of orchestrated spain campaigns on liti-
gation, explains why it is getting very difficult for the FCC to
function as an expert -agency. The Commission is becoming a far
more openly partisan body. Obviously, you cannot remove politics
from the things we do on planet Earth. But the agency's modus
operandi is becoming more expressly partisan-more like a politi-
cal campaign than an exercise in administrative policymaking. This
development has deeply divided the collegial decision-making
process. There have been numerous reports from inside the
Commission of how it is becoming more difficult for the Commis-
sioners' offices to get along or really talk to each other. This has
even affected staff communication. As I understand it, this has
never happened before-and I speak as a former legal advisor.
Neutral adjudication is impossible where decisions are made by
political referenda and by counting e-mails. As a matter of fact, if
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all you are doing as a policy-maker is simply counting e-mails, you
are no longer an expert agency. I'm sorry-you are an abacus; you
are a voting booth-but you are not an expert agency. This point is
even more clear to those who read any of those e-mails. Believe me,
spend some time looking at those one-line complaints and state-
ments of policy positions that flood the Commission. Everyone is
entitled to their opinion; there is no question about that. But what
role should such e-mail campaigns play in policymaking by an ex-
pert body?
What is the effect of these trends on the First Amendment and
on the future of communications regulation? The FCC is the
agency that regulates the institutional communications press. Con-
sequently, it has a tremendous amount of power over the press.
Unfortunately, as the non-expert process followed in the media
concentration proceeding becomes a model for future agency ac-
tion, the FCC is responding to pressure groups that want to
regulate speech. In the indecency context, for example, the FCC is
simply processing e-mails and assuming the tally is an indication of
great public outrage, thus causing it to actively censor speech. The
Commission explains that it must act in this area because it re-
ceived a million complaints over the last year. However, a Freedom
of Information Act request that I filed revealed that of those rnil-
lion indecency complaints in 2004, 99.9% of them came from one
organization, the Parents Television Council. 99.86% of the com-
plains in 2003 came from that same organization. So it is hard to
say that counting e-mails is particularly relevant to the work of an
expert agency.
These same tactics are affecting the legislative process as well as
the Commission's statutory responsibilities. For example, a bill was
introduced recently that would extend indecency regulation to sat-
ellite and cable television. In this bill, one of the initial factual
findings is that in 2004, Americans filed over one million com-
plaints with the Federal Communications Commission about
indecent programming. This number was presented as a "factual
finding" of our Congress. Another provision in this bill says that
after the FCC assesses a probable fine (called a Notice of Apparent
Liability), there must be a public hearing before the Commission
makes a final decision on the proposed forfeiture. Presumably, the
purpose of such a hearing is to determine whether or not the pen-
alty should be increased. In short, the method of decisionmaking
pioneered in the media ownership proceedings, and that is anti-
thetical to the structure of expert agencies, is now being imported
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into other areas of communications law. The trend is not limited to
questions involving policymaking, but is proposed for adjudication
as well, in a way that that directly implicates the censorship provi-
sions of the Communications Act. For that reason, I think media
ownership proceeding is a model for how the FCC should not oper-
ate, and why it represents the death of the Commission as an
expert agency.
[Applause]
JAMES BOYD WHITE: Thank you very much. Our next speaker
is Michael Good, who is currently Professor of Political Science at
California State University East Bay where he's served as Dean of
the College of Arts, Letters and Social Sciences until recently. He
began his career as journalist and editor for the Kettering-Oakwood
Times newspaper in Kettering, Ohio, and later served both as Pro-
fessor and Chairof the Department of Political Science and
Government at Ohio Wesleyan University. Professor Good.
MICHAEL E. GOOD: Thank you, Professor White. I'm a politi-
cal theorist, and I think I'm the only political theorist here who is
not also a lawyer, because I've heard a lot of political theory here.
So I feel compelled and justified to escape from the immediately
relevant, and talk about some more general topics. I want to talk
about three myths, and I don't mean myths in the sense that they
are true or false or some other fictional representation. Myths, in
the sense I am using the term, are narratives that we've come to
agree as an understanding for the past. In addition to understand-
ing the past, myths also use the past to explain and to justify the
present. Accordingly, the three myths that I will talk about are, I
think, relevant to the discussion here today. The three myths are
the common agreement and understanding, the explanation and
the justification of their present are: Democracy; a free press or
freedom of the press, and here I would include a more broad ref-
erence to freedom of expression in general; and finally Capitalism.
[Inaudible] There is a tradition that Leo Strauss, a political
theorist, introduced to textbook reading students, a democratic
tradition that started back with the Greeks and proceeded in a self-
conscious way among the many western political theorists that have
come to comprise the studied figures. This tradition is not history
but an ideological framework into which some historical works are
squeezed while others are ignored. But even though this tradition
is an invention, it has an impact on the way we think about the po-
litical and ethical world. The Greeks contributed to the concept of
democracy, and where we credit both Plato and Aristotle, princi-
pally, who argue that ajust government is a citizen-centered one, in
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which every human being is rational and capable of understanding
his or her own interests sufficiently well to set goals and employ
strategies to reach them. In Greek society human beings are seen
as essentially developers of their unique talents, skills and poten-
tials so to interfere in any way with their development is unjust.
Now, the framers of our Constitution, although they indeed
used that mythical tradition as a way of explaining and justifying
their commitment to democracy, did not give us that kind of a de-
mocracy. Rather, they gave us a Republic that was founded as a
necessary evil, a limited government, a civil society that we are
compelled to accept, because without government, the state of na-
ture is a war of all against all, where life is solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short-an ill condition not to be endured, to roughly
quote Thomas Hobbes. It is, as the narrative offers, a government
that governs best when it governs least. That is part of our myth,
those two conflicting notions. The first is the myth that govern-
ment focus is on the people. However, when the framers put the
Constitution together the electorate was very different than the
electorate is now. It was white men, and it would have been white
men of property had they been able to agree on a definition of
property so they could include a property qualification for the
franchise. The framers had in mind a much more limited popula-
tion that would be given the franchise, historically a literate and
highly educated population. It included the economic and political
elites of the several states. The Constitution and the accompanying
debate promoting its ratification, were aimed at a narrow audience
of state legislators and the economic and political elites who consti-
tuted the constitutional conventions in the thirteen states. Nine of
those states had to vote for the Constitution in order that it be rati-
fied.
The electorate today is a much wider, more diverse group of
people, which constitutes a very different audience from those his-
torical economic and political elites. Further, the myth, or
narrative, holds that democracy requires a consensus on basic
principles among the people. Research over the last fifty years that
studied the commitment of the American public to democratic
principles has shown us that there is little evidence that any such
consensus exists except at the highest level of generalization. Sev-
eral studies asked respondents if they agree with the principle of
majority rule, minority rights, the freedom of expression, etcetera,
and they, as you might predict, found a 95% consensus at that level
of general inquiry. But a situation was offered that was a specific
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case of each of those general beliefs-there was no consensus at
all. Indeed, many disagreed with an essential ingredient of democ-
racy when it was stated in specific tangible terms. Many of the
researchers were persuaded that a consensus over basic principles
is not necessary to have a democracy. The conclusion left unexam-
ined is, "lacking a consensus on democratic principles makes it is
difficult to claim to be a democracy."
For example, freedom of expression was largely engineered to
guarantee political speech and expression. It referred to the debate
that was going on between the federalists and the anti-federalists.
In their minds was the tension between the people who wanted to
retain the rights of the states to govern themselves and the neces-
sity of the central government to exert control over the states in
order to keep the necessary peace, order and stability. Their goal
was to provide a perfect environment to promote the economic
development of a nation that had, at that time, unlimited re-
sources, unlimited potential. Moreover, limited government
enabled elites to go forward with that development with little if any
government regulations, therefore enabling them to accumulate
all of the wealth they could. Free to try anything, in the context of
unrestrained marketplace competition, elites could produce the
best product most efficiently for the best price. Without govern-
ment regulation the new nation would be unique in the world with
a strong and stable economy and an important competitive advan-
tage in the race for international prestige and power. So it was
effective in that sense.
But in terms of freedom of expression, it was not a question of
whether you would let a communist speak at the public school.
Rather, it would ask you to listen to him and think about what he
said and evaluate it in terms of self interest and the interests of the
country. And those are the kinds of involvement in the market-
place of ideas that you need to have an effective democracy. People
need to hear and to consider all matters of opinion. So the ques-
tion is how much of this myth is just an idealization of the past, an
idealization of history, and how much of it is an explanation and
justification for the present that has little to do with history.
The second myth that I want to talk about is the myth of the free
press. We talk a lot about diversity in the media. The question is
not whether there is diversity or not, but what is the diversity about,
how much diversity is there in the things that are really important.
And so we talk about diversity in music, which fine, that's great.
We've talked about diversity in drama. Look at television and see
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where you find a diversity of anything that's really fundamentally
important to the health of a democratic government.
The diversity of political opinion, represented in and by the me-
dia, is the diversity of opinions about trivial issues, and those issues
are not issues that are likely to have any great impact on the distri-
bution of economic and political power, both of which are largely
ignored. So fundamental questions about the way in which power
and wealth are distributed, and the consequences of the way in
which we distribute resources, essential resources, in this country
are never on the media's agenda because they are kept off the
Government's agenda. Rather the media, together with the gov-
ernment and the corporations, eager to cooperate, have been able
to define the contentious political issues and issues, the resolution
of which really has very little effect, if any, on the economic and
political interests of elites. For example how relevant are the issues
of gay marriage or choices about medical procedures to the con-
duct of a democratic system? Curiously, those are two of the issues
that were pivotal in the outcome of recent elections.
The second narrative fiction is that the competition guarantees
objective, accurate and relevant reporting. The competition in-
sures that a free press will have an adversarial relationship with the
government, and therefore, hold the government accountable to
the people. There is competition. We've talked about competition,
but it is competition to deliver a certain content that has very little,
if anything, to do with fundamental questions of democratic politi-
cal values. The overwhelming objection on the part of many
liberals-and I certainly consider myself one-of the concentra-
tion of media ownership in the hands of six corporations has been
discussed here more than once. How is the domination of six me-
dia conglomerates different than competition among fifty? Well,
six is different than fifty because six can fit in a Lexus. They can all
go to lunch at the same time. They can all talk to each other and
share ideas regarding interests common to all and still maintain
competition in the area of circulation and its electronic surrogates.
I'm suggesting there is a type of conspiracy. Six corporations have
interests they hold common, just as the eighty had. But with six it is
possible, and perhaps easy, to cooperate in the management of
those common interests and at the same produce the illusion of
competition, but criticizing one another once in a while.
Objectivity is a myth both in the content of media and in its
guarantee by free competition. Having been a journalist, it is not
how objective you are, it is what you're objective about. It is not
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how the story is covered; it is what stories are covered, and the way
in which they're covered. You know, the crime rate in this country
has gone down every year for the last twenty years, but when you
ask people they say it is gone up every year for the last twenty years.
It is important to know that the crime rate has declined rather
than increased because those perceptions have policy implications.
The most recent example, of course, is that still after all of the dis-
cussion about it, nearly two-thirds of the people in the United
States are convinced that Saddam Hussein was responsible for the
events of 9/11 when even the administration has said, "Well, no, he
really wasn't."
However, the media is keenly sensitive to certain political and
economic issues. It is sensitive to markets based upon profits. It
doesn't really play a role in informing citizens in a democracy to
make rational decisions that are in their best interests. Rather, it
informs them in such a way to make decisions that are consistent
with the interests of corporate government and media elites. And it
has been very consistent in doing that since its autonomy was guar-
anteed by the ratification of the Constitution.
One model of the media, suggested by Thomas Landon
Thorson, holds that it is the DNA of political culture. The media
passes on culture from generation to generation, and the accuracy
of the DNA is responsible for the survival of the democratic cul-
ture. I would argue that if you use DNA as a model of the media,
you would find that it has been very effective in passing along a
kind of political culture that has allowed the development of busi-
ness to continue at a wealth-producing rate, and even at an
increasing rate, throughout the history of the republic.
The third myth is that capitalism-and this is part of the other
two myths-is the best way of ensuring the most efficient, the best
bargain and the best quality because of free, unregulated, unre-
strained competition. The degree to which government refuses to
regulate business, the better business is, the more efficient business
is, so there should be no limits placed upon one's ability to acquire
economic success through accumulated wealth. Those assumptions
are inconsistent with the traditional historically based theory of
democracy that holds rational individuals must not be deterred in
the development of their individual skills, potentials and creative
talents. It held that consumption was something that was instru-
mental in achieving that essential character of each human being.
But under the current capitalist model, consumption itself is essen-
tial, and the development of talents, skills and creativity is merely
instrumental in the production and consumption of wealth. In
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other words, Capitalist Man develops his talents and skills and ca-
pacities because they allow him to accumulate wealth rather than
the opposite.
The end to the Soviet Union, and the purported end to nominal
Communist governments elsewhere, creates the unfounded con-
clusion that their transition to Capitalism is inevitable. But
Capitalism is not, as the media would have you believe, the guy
who sells noodles in front of his house in Ho Chi Minh City. He's
not a Capitalist. He's a subsistence urbanite, who competes with
everybody else on the street who sells noodles. But we look at that
and conclude that the end of Communism is Capitalism. That's not
capitalism. That's just a guy selling noodles.
Our fictional narrative now tells us that we need to get rid of
regulation. But the regulations that help and that aid corporations
and aid the media, are good things. The ways in which the gov-
ernment subsidizes private enterprise, as it did early in the 1800s
when Congress appropriated thirty thousand dollars to develop the
telegraph because Samuel Morse couldn't accumulate sufficient
private funds to build a telegraph line between Washington and
Baltimore, is not the focus of the deregulation debate. Congress
subsidized a private company because it understood the impor-
tance of communication even though its development was not at
the outset profitable. However, regulation as it protects the con-
sumer, rather than reward the producer, is a widely recognized evil,
recognized even by those who need protection the most and incen-
tives to produce the least.
So it is important to see that these three myths are woven to-
gether in the contemporary cultural narrative even though current
and specific fictional narratives about capitalism and democracy
are incommensurate with one another. The more democracy you
demand, the less capitalism you must accept. The more capitalism
you desire the, the less democracy you will have.
The media is the DNA that preserves the myths, sustaining the
myths of democracy, freedom of expression and Capitalism while
at the same time, sustaining a status quo, replete with internal con-
tradictions, so that traditional economic and political elites can
continue their historical hegemony.
Thank you.
JAMES BOYD WHITE: Thank you very much. Our next speaker
is Martin Redish, who's the Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of
Law and Public Policy at Northwestern. He's the author of Federal
Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power, and of The
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Constitution as Political Structure. His new book, Money Talks: Speech,
Economic Power and the Values of Democracy, will be published by New
York University Press next year.
MARTIN H. REDISH: Thanks, Jim. A point of personal privi-
lege, the people who've set this Symposium up have done a
magnificentjob. [Applause] There's one minor exception. They've
got a five-year-old bio for me. That book came out four years ago. I
do, however, have another book coming out this summer with
Stanford University Press called The Logic of Persecution: Free Speech in
the McCarthy Era. I must say at the outset that I am still very upset by
Professor White's suggestion that perhaps Voltaire never actually
said that he would defend to the death my right to say something
he disagreed with. I've made a lot of career decisions based on the
assumption that he said that. It's a little late to turn back now. But
I'll trudge on. I want to talk about the implications of all that we've
been discussing and some broader aspects of it for the theory of
the so-called fourth estate. The fourth estate theory is a special ra-
tionale for a unique position in the First Amendment framework of
the institutional press. It originally goes back to a statement by
Burke that there are three estates in parliament, but yonder there's
a fourth estate in the gallery. But it's been at its greatest force in
the United States where it's really become almost the fourth
branch theory. And my thesis here is that ironically there are
scholars who have simultaneously overstated the importance of the
fourth estate theory and ignored some of its salutary purposes. To
understand the fourth estate theory you have to put it in a broader
framework of First Amendment theory, and beyond that, the
broader theory of separation of powers. The fourth estate theory
flows out of the kind of theory associated with Vince Blasi, who
many years ago was on this faculty. His checking function, his
pathological view of the First Amendment as he calls it. A kind of
dark, negative view that suggests everybody has to watch his back,
because there's somebody else putting a knife in it. And it reflects a
mistrust for all branches of government, and sees the press, the
institutional press, as performing this broad checking function.
And in many ways it does grow out of the theory of separation of
powers.
I think to explain the theory of separation of powers, I should
give an example of a movie I saw when I was eleven years old. It was
a grade B Zane Grey western titled The Robber's Roost. It was about a
group of outlaws harassing an elderly rancher and his daughter,
and I don't mean just calling them up in the middle of the night
asking them if their refrigerator is running kind of harassment. I
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mean serious cattle rustling, and he was basically defenseless. And
the rancher went to town and he hired another group of equally
disgusting outlaws to check the first group. Now, he didn't trust the
second group either, but he knew that the first group of outlaws
would check the second group. And I stood up and yelled, "This is
separation of powers!" I was an extremely nerdy eleven-year old, I
should add. But this is the theory of the fourth estate that some-
how the institutional press will balance out government. Jean
Shepherd, the comedian, wrote a book many years ago entitled In
God We Trust: All Others Pay Cash, and that really flows out of the
Federalist Papers where they said, "If angels were to govern men we
wouldn't need separation of powers. But everyone is flawed." So
there is this dark, cynical skepticism that rationalizes the fourth
estate theory. The problem with the theory is that the only one ex-
empted from this kind of assumption of skepticism and cynicism is
usually the institutional press. And I think the way to understand it
is to contrast it with the views of some scholars, particularly Profes-
sor Baker. Professor Baker and I are friendly enemies from many,
many years ago. We are the First Amendment equivalent of the
Road Runner and Wile E. Coyote. I'm not sure which of us is
which. We've been doing it for enough years that now we walk after
each other instead of chase. But Professor Baker has long argued
that non-media corporations should have no First Amendment
rights. And the rationale that he gives, and I won't limit it to him-
there are others who've given additional rationales-they're both
Kantian and utilitarian, or instrumental. From a Kantian perspec-
tive, the argument is a corporation is a mindless, robotic, driven,
profit maximizer. It has no choice in what it says. Of course, this
ignores the choice of the individuals to use the corporate form to
self realize in the first place. But that's the assumption.
From an instrumental perspective it is assumed that corporate
centers of power, non-media corporate centers of power, if allowed
unlimited protection to speak, will dominate the market, will
drown out competing views, will give rise to a misimpression about
the strength of the position they're advocating, because of the
money behind it. This is basically what the majority said in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce in I think 1990, give or take a year or
two. Okay. Well, let's accept that for purposes of argument and ap-
ply that kind of thinking to the media corporations. Media
corporations are profit driven. Most of them are publicly held. I'm
not talking just about the concentration problem here, notjust the
big six in the Lexus. I'm talking about pretty much any kind of
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media endeavor is a corporation. It maximizes profits. I know I live
in Chicago and the Tribune Corporation owns the Cubs, and there
are people who call up the sports stations and say, "Why don't they
spend money on better players?" And I call up the sports stations
and say, "Because it would be ultra vires to do that if they are going
to have as many fans anyway, and because of the bars on Clark
Street they are going to have as many fans. So they're not allowed
to spend more money. They have to be profit driven." And that is
also true of media corporations. Professor Baker in one of his
books said, "But they're not particularly talking about a product."
Well, if we leave out the issue of commercial speech and just talk
about non-commercial or political commentary by non-media cor-
porations it's not entirely clear what they're going to say. It will be,
to be sure, profit maximizing, or else they're abusing their share-
holders. But the same is true of the media corporations. The
institutional press is a strategic actor. It is a profit maximizer, and
not inconsistently, it is often an ideologically driven actor. And we
can see that just right from the beginning of the nation, and we
know about the Alien and Sedition Acts-or many of us know-
that Jefferson, when he got into power, used state governments to
suppress the federalist press. Well, if you ever go back and look at
what the federalist press and the republican press were doing, you
could understand why both of them would want to shut them the
heck up. They were nasty. They were strident. They were offensive,
not to suggest, by the way, that there is constitutional authority to
do so. But I can understand the desire, because the press has been
an ideological actor.
Think of the Sinclair situation during the campaign. How does
this affect news coverage? Well, it can obviously affect editorial pol-
icy-policy of columnists. It can affect news coverage both in what
is covered and in the slant of what is covered. There are many stud-
ies by political scientists that show that the first Gulf War, the
antiwar movement, which apparently was in existence, was never
covered by the institutional media, just completely excluded. In
terms of news slanting, this book I'm just publishing about the
McCarthy era-I'm going to give it another plug-if you go back to
the way McCarthy manipulated the press-and the press used
McCarthy-one can see a really ominous control of news coverage
based on the ideology of the press.
So this fourth estate function that we are assuming the press is
performing, and oftentimes does perform effectively, of checking
the government is not always performed. Think of the bullfighter's
o16 that the media did for the assertions of weapons of mass
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destruction. It had to be due to ideologically driven considerations,
total incompetence, or total laziness. There is no other
explanation. More likely the first I would think. The goal then,
recognizing that the institutional media is such a profit and
ideologically driven actor is not to suggest their First Amendment
rights should be reduced as a result. I have long maintained that
the First Amendment is not the preserve of Mother Teresa.
Everyone tries to maximize his or her own interests, and that's the
way it is. But the goal should be to broaden the recognition of
potential speakers. Private corporations, non-media corporations,
are not saints. They are driven much as the institutional media is
driven by their narrow interests.
But remember the theory of separation of powers, what public
choice theorists referred to as pluralist theory. You don't trust any-
one. When you don't trust anyone, you want as many actors as you
possibly can have. Recognizing full First Amendment rights for
non-media corporate speakers, both in terms of what's defined as
commercial speech and for their rights to contribute to political
campaigns, should be recognized as a means of counter-balancing
the numerous times that the institutional media may well be in bed
with the government. Now, I certainly don't mean to suggest that
the problem about the Gulf War news coverage is going to be re-
solved by giving Phillip Morris full First Amendment rights, but the
fact that we now have it documented that it happened in the Gulf
War situation should make us very concerned that it's happened in
numerous other situations, and government is often trying to regu-
late products and services, and the press is not always adequately
explaining competing positions. To recognize the full First
Amendment rights of non-media corporations will add to that bal-
ance.
Think of the Nike case. There have been a lot of assumptions-
very broadly painted assumptions-that the corporate world is in
control of the government, and the corporate world is some mono-
lith. It's not really a monolith. In the case of Nike, where
challenges were made to whether Nike was running virtual slave
sweatshops in Third World countries, much of the media that dis-
cussed it, from Bob Herbert of the New York Times to some of the
California columnists, were extremely negative to Nike. Nike holds
a press conference to say, "No we don't. We don't have sweat-
shops." I don't know whether they do or not. That's really not the
point at the moment. But California had this weird law-I gather
they've changed it-where anybody could sue about anything. So
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somebody named Kasty brought a lawsuit accusing Nike of false
advertising. And the issue was, had Nike engaged in commercial
speech? And under current Supreme Court doctrine, which treats
commercial speech as something of a stepchild, false commercial
speech is automatically excluded. Political speech that is false, on
the other hand, is likely to get the protection of the New York Times
v. Sullivan malice doctrine. The issue was whether Nike's state-
ments were fully protected political speech or were they
commercial speech. The California Supreme Court split 5-4, hold-
ing it was commercial speech and therefore, giving it reduced
protection. The Supreme Court granted cert. There were over
twenty-five amicus briefs filed, including one by me. And think of
the man hours that went into those briefs. Then the Supreme
Court says, "Whoops, on second thought, cert was improvidently
granted." And you couldn't have told us that before? But as a re-
sult, Nike is basically in a debate with columnists like Bob Herbert,
who said, with one hand tied behind its back, Bob Herbert can say
anything about Nike and be protected by the actual malice stan-
dard. Nike responds, it's advertising its product. There is a broad
base of opinion that can come from other centers of power. Now,
what else can we do as a matter of First Amendment law to try to
take into account the fact that the institutional press is often a stra-
tegic actor and often in bed with the government?
Well, the first thing to emphasize is one thing we should not do.
That is to recognize rights of access or government's ability to cre-
ate rights of access to the institutional media, or the ability of
government to, except in limited circumstances that I'll explain in
a minute, control ownership. The irony I find in Professor Baker's
position is that on the one hand he's willing to extend full First
Amendment protection to these media corporations while he's not
to any other corporations. Yet he seems, in his statement today, to
recognize the very dangers I've pointed to and suggests govern-
ment should be able to manipulate what it is we hear and see by
regulating ownership. Well, did you ever hear of the saying, "I'm
from the government and I'm here to help you?" That's the kind
of concern we have to avoid. As my question this morning indi-
cated, I'm not happy with the current situation. I consider the cure
of government involvement to be worse than the disease.
Now, I should close with a kind of point of personal privilege, a
statement about the political implications of all this. If there's one
thing my constitutional law students are supposed to get out of the
class-and often it is all they get out of it-it is that they cannot
view the Constitution as coterminous with their own narrow politi-
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cal views. And to give you an illustration, I'll tell you a story about a
phone call I got last fall from an applicant to Northwestern Law
School. I have never, ever gotten a phone call from an applicant.
And this fellow says to me, "Professor Redish, I have worked for
four years as a consultant to the Republican National Committee,
and I just so adore your work on the constitutionality of campaign
finance regulation. You and I have really identical views, and I
would love to be able to come to Northwestern to work with you."
And I said, "Actually, I worked on the Kerry campaign." And there
was this dead awkward silence for about ten seconds and then I
figured I'd better break it up. And I said, "But there are many on
my faculty you'll feel comfortable with." And then I immediately
called the Dean of Admissions and told him to reject this fellow.
[Laughter]
People somehow get the assumption that I am some kind of
crazy right-winger, and sometimes the people who think this like it,
and it gives me some very, very strange bedfellows. That isn't my
politics. But there are a lot of things politically that I don't like.
That doesn't mean I can use the Constitution as a means for im-
plementing my political agenda. What I also tell my constitutional
law students is, "You have to view normative issues in constitutional
law on two levels. Level two I call your narrow political predilec-
tions." And these are very important issues when we're in a
legislature, when we're in a political campaign. They should not
drive constitutional analysis. This is not to say there are no norma-
tive issues in constitutional law. But they are what I call level one
constitutional issues. They are debates about how best to imple-
ment the process values that adhere in the Constitution. The fact
that I may agree or may disagree with a particular speaker is beside
the point, because as Voltaire once said-well, you know the rest.
Thank you very much.
JAMES BOYD WHITE: Thank you, Marty, and thanks all of you.
You in the audience have no reason to know this, but these four
speakers exhibited a phenomenal self-control: everyone stopped
speaking just at the moment that the green stop sign was held up.
MARTIN H. REDISH: That's because you physically threatened
US.
JAMES BOYD WHITE: That's true. It's an incentive system.
Questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'd just like to thank the panel and all
the organizers. I think this has really been a great, great confer-
ence. One of the themes, Professor Redish, that you raised is this
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notion that corporations and media corporations do not constitute
a monolith. And I guess in response to Professor Good's comment
that they can all fit in a Lexus. The simple fact is anybody who has
a TIAA-CREF account or a Vanguard account, or a Fidelity account
owns shares in those six corporations, and we all can't fit in a
Lexus. And I guess one of the things that it gets me to thinking
about is that government isn't a monolith either, and that picking
up perhaps on Mr. Corn-Revere's comments about the FCC as an
independent agency versus an executive agency versus legislative, I
wonder whether you would comment on how bad really is it to
think about government regulation when we might think about
different institutional arrangements for that kind of government
regulation? And again, you don't have to accept everything that
Bob is saying about the FCC, but might there not be a way in
which-that might regulation of the media through structural
means, I think as Professor Baker would argue, might be part and
parcel of the way in which we think about government not being a
monolith, and therefore not being necessarily a bad thing in the
grand scheme of ordering our communications policy for First
Amendment purposes.
MARTIN H. REDISH: Well, first I think I need to say that now
the government almost is a monolith. I didn't think this is what the
Constitution had in mind when it assured us a republican form of
government. So, I love Professor Baker dearly, and I have great re-
spect for his work. I find his underlying assumptions to be
fundamentally flawed at the core, so anything that grows out of it is
fruit of the poisonous tree. The idea that the government gets to
decide that people need to hear certain things that maybe they're
not hearing now I find very troubling. The government has its own
ability to contribute to public debate. But for the government to in
any way try to manipulate the flow of debate, particularly private
debate, by taking away authority from one speaker and transferring
it to another I consider very ominous.
ROBERT CORN-REVERE: I'd like to make a couple of points
about monoliths, too. First, I should say that I forgot to give my
usual disclaimer when I speak at events like this, and that is I am
representing only my own views, not those of any client. Usually I
say that just so clients don't get blamed for the things that I say. I
also say it because some of the clients that I represent are among
those people who are nefariously named as creating the "problem."
I want to make clear that I am not taking any positions here be-
cause of who my clients are. As Andy Schwartzman can tell you, I
had these views long before I represented anybody.
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I do want to respond to Michael Good's point that media objec-
tivity is a myth because the heads of the six largest media
companies can fit into a Lexus together. Whichever six corporate
heads you want to put on that list, you should be aware that most of
these people wouldn't get into a limo together let alone a Lexus.
All you have to do is watch the delight that they take when they can
report on each other's gaffes. Historically, you can look at the one
network news report that had truck explosions that were "helped
along" in their re-enactments, or you can point to other, more re-
cent examples as well. Networks just love to report on their
competitors' mistakes. Just because they are big companies does
not mean they are a monolith.
As you listen to the various speakers here it is a useful rule of
thumb to count the number of times the word "conglomerate" is
used. Doing so provides a good index of how accepting each
speaker may be to more governmental regulation over communi-
cations. Speaking in terms of monoliths, I think the government is
more monolithic than it has been in the past. I agree with Profes-
sor Redish that the exercise of that governmental power is
extraordinarily dangerous, even when it's described as being "neu-
tral." Structural regulations usually are contrasted with content
controls, and therefore are presumed to be more benign. But gov-
ernmental power is exercised in a way that is not speaker or
viewpoint or content neutral in many cases. For example, thirteen
or fourteen years ago, the Senate in the dark of night put a rider
on an appropriations bill that nobody knew about, including the
President who signed it, that prohibited the FCC from granting
waivers from the cross ownership rules. This rider was directly tar-
geted to Rupert Murdoch because of his editorial policies. You may
think whatever you will of Mr. Murdoch, but when Congress passes
legislation because some members don't like the views of one indi-
vidual, then we are in a very dangerous territory, from a
constitutional standpoint. If you check the Congressional record
from this instance you will find outrageous statements on the floor
of Congress calling Murdoch a "scumbag" and any number of
other things. Such pejorative views motivated this "structural" regu-
lation. Having worked at the FCC I can tell you there is a real
danger in this kind of thing. Such problems abound as you start
talking about using regulations to control "monoliths."
AUDIENCE MEMBER. I think in the same way that news is
about what you choose to report or not report, as well as the slant
that you put on it. Government regulation is the same thing. I
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don't know how we can say that government's not engaged in this
practice. And as I hear all of this discussion today, I've heard a
couple of speakers now and in the earlier session really abdicate
for the idea that the more owners we have or the less concentra-
tion of ownership we have the better. But I haven't really heard
anybody argue that concentration of ownership is actually benefi-
cial for democracy. I hear that still. The closest people get to that is
I think neutral if I'm hearing it correctly. And so I guess I'd ask you
if that's a correct interpretation of what I'm hearing? Does anybody
actually think that concentrating ownership of media is good? And
do some people think that dispersion is good. And who thinks it
should be somewhere in the middle I guess?
C. EDWIN BAKER: There's actually arguments that concentra-
tion would be beneficial. Usually the people that make these
arguments don't really focus on democracy so much as on people's
interests or preferences. The claim they typically make is that con-
centrated ownership can lead to efficiencies that will lead to more
and better media products. And so the public would benefit by
concentrated ownership that produces these products. I've just re-
sponded to a person who's written an article about what he calls
architectural censorship. He claims that almost all of the FCC rules
regulating ownership should be viewed as unconstitutional. He
thinks they're unconstitutional for the instrumentalist reason that
the regulations reduce the quality and quantity of the media prod-
ucts that people receive. Though he's economically trained, I find
his argument very uninformed economically. I also reject his po-
litical conceptions. But such arguments as his are made and are
influential. Some were made in the context of FCC proceedings on
ownership regulation. So it's not an argument that doesn't exist.
Now, whether the argument is any good is a different matter.
I could also talk forever in response to Marty. Let me just make a
couple of nitpicky points. In the Nike case the general assumption
was that if Nike's speech was political, not commercial, that Nike
would get very, very strong First Amendment protection. Actually
when corporate speech is purely, undoubtedly political, at least
under normal classifications, for example when it is related to a
political campaign in the Austin or the McConnell case, the Court
said that the government could completely prohibit it. The corpo-
rate political speech was given arguably less protection than
commercial speech receives. So I doubt the importance of this
categorization, of whether it's about a product or about politics.
Rather, the important matter seems to be who the speaker is. Indi-
[VOL. 39:2
Media Regulation at the Turn of the Millennium
viduals may have a status much different than the typical corpora-
tion.
But then Marty's question rightfully is: Why or how are media
corporations different from other corporations? It seems to me
that we must answer that question. I do think it's a troublesome
question. Most of our criticisms of the media is precisely that it's
too much like other corporations. All they want to do is make
money, and it'll give us horrible content in doing so. But we can
still conclude that the media merits constitutional protection, be-
cause it's absolutely essential for a democratic process. It differs
because the Constitution has a press clause, not a corporation
clause. But after saying it merits protection, we still must figure out
what meriting protection means. And it may very well be that vari-
ous types of structural interventions in the media realm designed
to make it better serve its democratic or societal function aren't
prohibited by the First Amendment the way censorship is prohib-
ited-censorship of the speech content of any individual or media
corporation.
That's certainly been the view of the government since the
founding. In the original debates about the Post Office the ques-
tion was which types of papers should we promote and how should
we promote them? And they adopted structural subsidy policies
reflecting those debates. Throughout our history we've been subsi-
dizing and regulating the media. Oftentimes the regulation
reflected a model that was described this morning as the broadcast
model. Distinguishing that from the press model is, I think, a wild
overstatement. In the Red Lion case, for example, the authority
most crucial to the result, and continually relied upon by the
Court, was a press media case, Associated Press v. United States. That
is, there may be lots of structural regulations that should be per-
mitted in respect to any media.
JAMES BOYD WHITE: I think we have time for one more ques-
tion. Is there one over on this side? Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, and I'd like to thank Mr. Baker for
answering the question-the second one that I wanted to ask, in
general, about how the government's currently subsidizing large
media. So to go to one more specific question to Mr. Corn-Revere.
You said that the question was what role should the public opinion
play in affecting decisions of an independent regulatory commis-
sion. And what I'd like to know is if there is a role that the public
can play or should play in how that commission does its job or how
that commission's job is defined. What channel should the public
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be using for that? I agree that media campaigns directly to them
negatively affect their ability to function as an expert committee.
And I think that's an important point. But what I'd like to know is
what channels should we be using to allow it to stay an independ-
ent expert committee and yet still allow an active citizenry as part
of the process?
ROBERT CORN-REVERE: That is a very good question. I think
there definitely is a role for public input, and I think the proper
role involves working through Congress and contacting congres-
sional leaders. After all, Congress writes the organic statute that
gives the independent commission its mission. Through the elec-
toral process people make their views known to elected
representatives, and those views filter down to the commission
through legislation. And by the way, if you've been reading the pa-
pers about the FCC lately, people aren't shy about contacting
Congress about what they want the FCC to do. If some measure is
adopted as legislation-particularly if it affects either media owner-
ship or content-then the FCC will be bound to implement that
statutory command. An important question then may arise about
whether the new restriction is constitutional, since you're talking
about regulating media companies. Depending on your outlook
you may reach different conclusions in response to that question.
It may be helpful to compare current questions about "struc-
tural" media regulations to postal subsidies during the earlier part
of the 20th Century. Using postal subsidies as a way to regulate the
content of what goes through the mail is well understood now to
be plainly unconstitutional, while, back in the '40s and '50s, that
conclusion was not so obvious. Many communication regulations
that were considered acceptable at one time in our history under
then existing First Amendment jurisprudence may no longer be
considered constitutional. Much of what was taken for granted as
permissible government activity when the Communications Act was
written includes the kinds of regulations that courts no longer ac-
cept.
In the intervening years we have had more case law develop-
ment and more situations where courts have addressed whether or
not the regulation at issue is a proper function of government. For
example, in Professor Baker's description of what the proper role
of communications structural regulation should be, he wants us to
get away from the notion of "commodification"-and that giving
people more of what they want is not an adequate goal under the
First Amendment. Instead, public policy should be directed toward
giving them more of what they need. I suppose this is a question
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worth asking. Many people might wonder why we have this short
little attention span in this country, and why people don't pay at-
tention to political dialogue. It is an easy thing to blame the media
for this phenomenon. But I think if you substituted the term "po-
litical campaign" for "media" in that statement, you probably find
as good an explanation for the problem. But to me it is a bit like
trying to blame McDonald's for the fact that you are getting fat.
Getting back to the theme of my presentation, I agree with Profes-
sor Redish that the cure can be worse than the disease. Am I the
only one in this room that finds it kind of frightening that we
should look to the FCC to determine what we "need" through the
media? That to me is a much more dangerous prospect than any-
thing that media concentration may cause. Since this answer is in
response to the final question for this panel, there is not enough
time to explore the issue, but who today has access to less informa-
tion than they had ten years ago?
C. EDWIN BAKER: I never said that the government should give
us what we need rather than what we want. What I said was that
what people want is something other than just commodities.
Commodities are one of the things people want but there was also
evidence that they want limited ownership. And they have good
reasons for that desire, that judgment. But I didn't say that democ-
ratic governments should give them what they don't want.
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PANEL III
MEDIA AT THE MARGINS
LIZ WEI: Welcome back everyone. We've heard a lot of discus-
sion in the earlier panels about the need for diversity, and
Professor Good asked in the second panel what kind of diversity.
So we hope this last final panel today will expand upon that ques-
tion. And Ryan and I both felt very strongly about the need for this
panel to ensure that the concerns of women and racial minorities
and other historically marginalized groups would be both dis-
cussed and solutions, perhaps, would be suggested. Alicia Davis
Evans will be moderating this panel. She is an Assistant Professor at
the Michigan Law School faculty here. She started in the Fall of
2004, and she teaches Enterprise Organizations and Mergers and
Acquisitions. Her current research includes projects in the securi-
ties regulation area. Before joining the faculty she practiced law at
Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C., where she represented pub-
lic and private companies and private equity firms and mergers
and acquisitions and leveraged buyout transactions. Her experi-
ence also includes five years as an investment banker, first with
Goldman Sachs & Company in New York, and then with Raymond
James & Associates in St. Petersburg, Florida, where she most re-
cently served as Vice President. Evans is a member of the bars of
Florida and the District of Columbia, and Professor Evans earned
her B.S. in Business Administration from Florida A&M University,
her MBA from Harvard Business School, and her J.D. from Yale
Law School. If you could help us welcome her.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Good afternoon. It is my distinct pleas-
ure to welcome you to panel number three, entitled MEDIA AT THE
MARGINS. As Liz mentioned, we've spent the last couple of days
talking about the effects of concentrated media ownership, and
our current panelists are going to speak to us about the effects of
media consolidation on women, people of color and other mar-
ginalized groups. As was the case with our first two panels, each
speaker will speak for approximately twenty minutes, followed by a
question and answer session. And again, please as a reminder, if
you have a question, please raise your hand and I will recognize
you, but please wait for a microphone before you begin to ask your
question since we are transcribing the proceedings today. Dr. Susan
Douglas will serve as the first speaker on our panel. Dr. Susan
Douglas is the Catherine Neafie Kellogg Professor of Communica-
tion Studies at the University of Michigan and serves as the Chair
of her department. Dr. Douglas is also the author of a number of
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books, including The Mommy Myth: The Idealization of Motherhood and
How it has Undermined Women, which she co-authored with Meredith
Michaels, Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination, which
won the Hacker Prize in 2000 for best popular book about tech-
nology and culture, Where the Girls Are: Growing up Female with the
Mass Media, which was chosen as one of the top ten books of 1994
by National Public Radio, Entertainment Weekly and The McLaugh-
lin Group. Dr. Douglas has lectured at colleges and universities all
over the country. She's a frequent media commentator and has
written for a number of leading publications. Dr. Douglas's col-
umn, Back Talk, appears monthly in the publication In These Times.
Please join me in welcoming Dr. Douglas, who will speak to us on
the topic "Women and Minorities in the Age of Consolidation."
SUSAN DOUGLAS: Well, thank you. I am not a lawyer, I'm not a
policy scholar, I'm not even an economist. And so talk about being
a hen in the fox's lair. I'm a media historian and I'm really speak-
ing today primarily as an audience member who was not getting
what she wants from radio, from the broadcast news, from public
affairs programming, and I'm also speaking as a feminist and anti-
racist scholar. What I want to do today is talk about actually the
interrelationship between two crucial regulatory moves: the de-
regulation of ownership limits that began in the 1980s as we've
heard throughout the day under Reagan and Mark Fowler, and
culminated with the 1996 Telecom Act, and the relationship be-
tween that and the abandonment of the fairness doctrine in 1987.
Of course, we know that the deregulation of ownership restrictions
were what allowed for increased consolidation. But it was the
elimination of the fairness doctrine that helped expand an ideo-
logical field that would in fact justify deregulation-excuse me-
that would demonize government oversight of-well, pretty much
everything-including and especially the broadcasting industry
that would celebrate the market as if it was Buddha as the best and
only way to give the people what they want, and thus to either state
or imply that the voices of women, except for the right wing
blondes, and people of color, also except for right-wingers or those
on the payroll of the federal government, were marginal and ir-
relevant. The elimination of the fairness doctrine was absolutely
central to media consolidation in the 1990s and beyond, and to the
slowing or thwarting of any progress women and minorities might
have made in the post network deregulatory era.
Now, I do agree with my colleague, Russ Neuman, who spoke
this morning, that we should not idealize the past or impose a false
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nostalgia on the broadcast system of yore. After all, just to give a
few examples, it was CBS that censored the Smothers Brothers and
threw them off the air. It was CBS that refused to promote the Ed-
ward R. Murrow broadcast that took on Joe McCarthy, so Murrow
and Fred Friendly had to take those ads out in the New York Times
by themselves. It was TV in the 1950s and '60s that kept Black ac-
tors off of TV so their southern affiliates would not be alienated.
And it was TV that gave us Mr. Ed and My Favorite Martian as quality
programming. However, I would argue that regulation has mat-
tered in the past, and it has had, however briefly, a salutary affect
on diversity. And I'll just give two examples: the FCC in the wake of
the 1941 report on chain broadcasting reduced the required
bandwidth distance between AM stations in 1946, and thus allowed
more stations to inhabit adjacent frequencies. Now, what that
meant is that between 1946 and 1951 the number of small stations,
and these were tiny, they were between 200 and 1,000 watts, in-
creased by 500 percent. And much of the music, public affairs and
talk on these stations reflected more local grass roots interests.
Some of them began catering to the Black audience, which was
actually central to the civil rights movement in the 1950s. Now, a
lot of these stations did not cater to the Black audience because
they were altruistic. The Black audience got discovered as a market
in the early 1950s. However, some of these stations were very much
motivated by the move towards civil rights, and we began to hear in
a range of small stations across the country, and even 50,000 watt
stations, Black programming, Black music, Black activism. So this
regulatory move made a difference. Another example of regulation
that promoted diversity was the 1964 non-duplication ruling. For a
very brief history lesson here, FM was developed and demonstrated
in 1935, but for a variety of reasons it was not developed by RCA,
because David Sarnoff wanted to develop television instead of FM.
FM kind of languished until the 1960s. Many stations did have AM
and FM broadcast capabilities, and many of them were broadcast-
ing the exact same thing on their FM outlets as they were on their
AM outlets. And so what the non-duplication ruling did is it man-
dated that in cities of more than 100,000 people, radio stations that
had AM and FM could not duplicate more than fifty percent of
their programming on both stations simultaneously. Now, it's true,
this only affected 337 of the country's commercial FM stations, but
it did promote more enterprising exploitation of FM, and between
1964 and 1967, 500 new commercial FM stations and sixty educa-
tional stations went on the air. The FM explosion of the late '60s
and early '70s led to enormous musical, political and cultural di-
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versity on the air until FM, of course, was discovered by the com-
mercial interests and then went down the sorry slope of
commercialization. So I would argue that regulatory changes do
matter. We have historical examples when they have promoted di-
versity.
So first I just want to give a brief overview of where women and
minorities stand today vis-A-vis media ownership, and then return
to the demise of the fairness doctrine, and why I believe it should
be restored. Let's be clear, women and minorities have never had
an equal place at the table of media ownership or control, not un-
der the old network oligopoly structure, nor under the more
recent structure that combines the proliferation of media outlets
with niche marketing and consolidation of ownership. But having
said that, under the older public trust model, which we're going to
hear about in a minute, and when the news divisions of the net-
works were still financially supported, in part by the entertainment
divisions of the networks, and therefore not so tied to producing
ratings and audiences, the civil rights movement and the women's
movement did get considerable coverage on the network news.
There were a variety of reasons for this, including the drama of the
images, the newness of TV news, the power of these social move-
ments. But I just want to emphasize here that there were some
golden moments that we can look back to with nostalgia, and one
of them is the news media's coverage of the civil rights movement
despite its warts and all. And that coverage was crucial to changing
public opinion in the United States about race relations and race
equity. Most Americans first learned that there was a women's
movement from the mainstream media, including broadcast me-
dia. And I've done a lot of research on this-and take my word for
it, a lot of this coverage was condescending and marginalizing and
patronizing. However, it also provided feminists with a national
podium to press for equal pay for equal work, and to emphasize
that the political is personal. Public opinion showed that by the
mid and late 1970s most Americans had had their views about gen-
der equity transformed, in part because of such media exposure.
So I don't want to idealize a past that was not ideal, and that was
characterized by oligopoly control, but I would argue that things
are worse now, and they are worse, in part, precisely because the
proliferation of media outlets has not led to more diversity as
promised by the media conglomerates. So it's not that the past was
great and filled with diversity. It's that the promise of the new
technologies, and more outlets, and the possibility for more
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diversity has been thwarted, that the promise of the marketplace of
ideas has been trumped by the marketplace of dollars. The prolif-
eration of outlets exploded at exactly the same time that
deregulation took place, and when all of these-a variety of these
outlets, and especially but not exclusively radio stations, got priced
out of a lot of people's price range and just got bought up by the
conglomerates.
Minority ownership is defined as any media outlet in which mi-
norities own more than 50% of the firm's stock or equity interest
and/or actually control the outlet. Now, according to a 2001 report
by the NTIA, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, minorities owned 3.8% of radio and TV stations in
the U.S. and that broke down to owning 4% of commercial radio
stations and 1.9% of commercial TV stations. These figures are ac-
tually more discouraging than they appear, because over half of the
426 minority owned radio stations are AM, which are today lower
power and generate less add revenue than their FM counterparts.
The merger mania of the '80s and beyond drove the prices of FM
stations so high they were not affordable to small female or minor-
ity owned businesses. Only one cable network, Univision, is
classified as minority owned, although 25% is owned by a Venezue-
lan owned company, and 25% by the Mexican entertainment
conglomerate Televisa. In 2002, as we all know, Telemundo was
purchased by GE/NBC. There was one Black owned national cable
channel, BET, but that was bought by Viacom in 2002, and one of
the first things they did was cancel a variety of the news shows, in-
cluding BET Tonight. And even at AOL Time Warner we can point
to the CEO, Richard Parsons, who's African American, but that
would hardly classify AOL Time Warner as minority owned. None
of the top twenty websites are minority owned. In Hollywood, ac-
cording to a 1996 study, 85% of the writers, 93% of the directors,
and 84% of the producers were men. The Screen Actors Guild re-
ported in 2002 that only 22.1% of all roles in 2001 went to
performers of color, which was down from 2000, where the figure
was 22.9%.
Now, compared to the population as a whole in 2001, in which
minorities accounted for nearly 1/3 of the total U.S. population,
and women make up anywhere from 51-53% of the population, we
see that there's just a slight discrepancy here. Maureen Dowd is the
only female among the New York Times stable of nine columnists,
and hardly a feminist I might note, as she's often taken staunchly
antifeminist positions. In 2002, 80% of all New Yorker articles were
written by men, and when we get women there we get somebody
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like Caitlin Flanagan, who celebrates shopping for strollers and
trashes feminism whenever she can. Media content about women
and people of color then is filtered through a few corporate giants
that care, of course, about maximizing profits and not about equal
representation of civil rights. But it's also filtered through a lens
that is increasingly conservative, anti feminist, or anti affirmative
action or all of the above and then some.
So what I want to raise as part of today's discussion about media
consolidation that is crucial to its success and that supports the
trend of marginalizing the voices of women and people of color,
especially in news and public affairs programs, is the demise of the
fairness doctrine. This basic principle that broadcasters had the
obligation to address all sides of a public controversy during the
course of their broadcasting was implied in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1934, initiated in 1949, and made explicit in the Red
Lion case, as we've heard earlier today, in 1969. In practice the doc-
trine was meant to do two things, require stations to cover
controversial issues of public importance and provide differing
points of view about such issues. What the fairness doctrine sought
to prevent was stations broadcasting from a single perspective day
after day without opposing views. Early in his tenure Ronald
Reagan's FCC chair, Mark Fowler, who famously noted that the
television is just like any other appliance, it's like a toaster with pic-
tures, announced his opposition to the fairness doctrine, and that
the FCC had to get out of the content regulation business. The ar-
gument was that the old fairness doctrine was based on the notion
of scarcity, that there was a scarcity of spectrum and a scarcity of
outlets, and therefore you had to ensure diversity of opinions. But
once there was a proliferation of cable and other media outlets the
scarcity argument no longer applied. In 1984, the Supreme Court
ruled in FCC v. League of Women Voters that the scarcity rationale
underlying the fairness doctrine was flawed, and that the doctrine
was limiting the breadth of public debate. And this is certainly one
of the charges that many broadcasters made. In August of '87 the
FCC simply announced that it would no longer enforce the fairness
doctrine. Congress responded in September by passing a bill that
would have reinstated the doctrine. It passed the House by a mar-
gin of 3 to 1, and it passed the Senate by a margin of 2 to 1. Reagan
vetoed it. There has been no fairness doctrine since. Congressional
efforts resumed again in '91 to reinstate the doctrine, but Presi-
dent Bush won, threatened to veto it, and that effort lost steam.
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Critics have argued that the fairness doctrine was confusing to
stations and citizens alike, it was expensive and time consuming to
enforce. But its demise has led to a major rightward sway in public
affairs and news programming and the marginalizing of women's
and minority's voices in the media. There has been a decrease in
the coverage of a variety of issues, but this is especially true for lo-
cal news and local public affairs programming. It is especially those
areas that have suffered. A study by the Benton Foundation found
that 25% of broadcast stations no longer offer any local news or
public affairs programming. The biggest casualty in terms of diver-
sity has been news and public affairs programming on TV and in
talk radio, and then of course, in music on the radio. And again, to
take on my esteemed colleague, Professor Neuman, one station
changing its play list does not counteract Clear Channel owning
anywhere now between 1200 and 1400 radio stations, many of
which broadcasts the same six songs. There is, I would argue, more
diversity in entertainment programming on television than there
was in the oligopoly days. Just look at what's on cable channels.
There's much more diversity in entertainment programming, al-
though their representations of people of color remains abysmal.
It's TV news at the local and national level that are nothing short
of a disaster area, and I think that's really what so many of us are
really deeply concerned about.
In the wake of the demise of the fairness doctrine, one of the
biggest consequences, of course, has been the onslaught of conser-
vative opinion, especially but hardly exclusively on the radio, that
remains unanswered, it remains unchallenged, where Rush Lim-
baugh routinely rails against what he calls feminazis, and where Pat
Robertson can claim, and I quote, "That feminism encourages
women to leave their husbands, kill their children, and practice
witchcraft." This is worse than the 1960s and 1970s. Right wing
evangelical broadcasting has also increased, and they attack their
favorite demons without any fear of contradiction or response. But
Limbaugh, Oliver North, G. Gordon Liddy, Sean Hannity, Michael
Savage and Bill O'Reilly, no friends to women or minorities, get to
hold forth, while opposing viewpoints or opinions from women, es-
pecially feminists, and people of color who are not conservative get
minimal or no airtime. And just to respond to Professor Redish's
questions, again, to my colleague Russ Neuman this morning, you
know, name three liberal-high profile liberal talk show hosts. Well,
let's name the ones who've been fired: Jim Hightower, Phil
Donohue, Charles Grodin, Bill Maher, and Bill Moyers, who had his
show cut in half on NPR. Robert Novak, however, is still at large,
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and Tucker Carlson has gotten a slot on PBS. So there we go. It's
hardly surprising that Limbaugh opposes the fairness doctrine on a
regular basis, and over 80% of talk show hosts are male. There is
no feminist, and very few even just neutral non-condemnatory fe-
male voices to challenge Dr. Laura. In fact, feminist voices have
especially been marginalized as out of touch, shrill, and paradoxi-
cally, irrelevant, yet somehow simultaneously dangerous.
The fairness doctrine only covered broadcast, not cable, and it is
hardly a panacea, and it will not be restored under a Republican
Congress. Why would they do that? They're benefiting enormously
from the demise of the fairness doctrine. But the problem of
minimal ownership and/or control of broadcast outlets by women
and people of color is sustained by the silencing of their voices,
made possible by the demise of the fairness doctrine. Regulation
and ideology have always gone hand in hand, one justifying the
other. So the consolidation of media outlets into fewer and fewer
hands and the exclusion of important and significant voices of op-
position, especially, but not exclusively, for women and people of
color, are important reasons to begin a long-term campaign to re-
instate the fairness doctrine. A survey in 1993 showed that over
60% of respondents supported reinstating the fairness doctrine
and the concept of equal time for opposing views. The past version
of the fairness doctrine may have been too vague, may have given
the FCC too much discretion, and the uncertainty it generated may
have prompted some broadcast outlets to air less commentary
about controversial issues for fear it always had to provide response
time. And as Eric Alterman noted last night, it also reduced con-
troversial issues to two and only two sides, so these were problems.
But we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. These
can be corrected and should to finally bring true diversity to the
airwaves. Thanks.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Thank you, Dr. Douglas. Professor Leo-
nard Baynes will be our second speaker on panel number three.
Professor Baynes is a Professor of Law at St. John's University
School of Law, where he teaches Communications Law, Regulated
Industries, Race and the Law, and Business Organizations. Profes-
sor Baynes, a leading communications law scholar, served as a
scholar-in-residence at the Federal Communications Commission
from 1997 to 2001, and Professor Baynes has written over twenty-
five law review articles on race and racism and the law, corporate
law and communications law and the intersection of the three, in-
cluding articles such as Deregulatory Injustice and Electronic Redlining.
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The Color of Access to Telecommunications, White Out: The Absence and
Stereotyping of People of Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time
Entertainment Programming and the subject of his talk today, Making
the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and Re-Establishing FCC
Affirmative Action for Broadcast Licensing. Please join me in welcom-
ing Professor Baynes.
LEONARD M. BAYNES: Thank you, Alicia, and I'd like to thank
Liz, Ryan and Maureen for inviting me here and for this sympo-
sium. I am proud of the fact that this will be the second time my
work will be published in the Michigan Journal of Law Reform My
article, Life After Adarand, was published in 1999/2000.
Today I want to talk about affirmative action and FCC broadcast
licensing. My talk is loosely based on an article that I have written
entitled Making the Case for a Compelling Government Interest and Re-
Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing. I
have also given another variation of this talk to the FCC's taskforce
on diversity.
The lack of diversity in media ownership has been an issue for
the past forty years. There are still fewer than three percent of
broadcast licenses owned by African Americans, Latinos/as, Asian
Americans and American Indians. In 1995, in response to the
Adarand decision, the FCC eliminated all of its then-existing af-
firmative action programs. During the late 1990s, I worked as a
scholar-in-residence at the FCC researching the legal strategies that
could be pursued to re-institute affirmative action programs at the
FCC. In doing this research, I discovered how the deck was stacked
against re-instituting these programs at the FCC. To establish an
affirmative action program, the government has to prove a compel-
ling governmental interest exists. The compelling governmental
interest can be based on either (1) diversity or (2) proof of past
discrimination by the government actor, or complicity by the gov-
ernment in the discrimination of another.
I will focus my remarks on the past discrimination prong in es-
tablishing a compelling governmental interest, but I have to note
that in the late 1990s, a question existed whether diversity re-
mained a compelling governmental interest. This uncertainty
occurred in 1995, when the Supreme Court decided the case of
Adarand v. Pena. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, raised
the standard of review for federal affirmative action programs to
strict scrutiny and cited past discrimination as a permissible com-
3. Leonard M. Baynes, Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and Re-
Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57 RuTGERS L. REv. 235
(2004).
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pelling governmental interest. She was silent on whether diversity,
under the strict scrutiny test, was a compelling governmental inter-
est. Her silence led many commentators to believe that diversity
was not a compelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court
did not clarify the uncertainty until 2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger,
when it held that diversity was a compelling governmental interest
at least in the context of university admissions. A much stronger
argument now could be made that the FCC could use diversity as
adequate grounds in establishing an affirmative action program.
However, I leave that issue for my colleague on the panel to ad-
dress.
My remarks will focus exclusively on the difficulty of using past
discrimination as a compelling government interest to re-establish
affirmative action policies. The U.S. Supreme Court in Adarand v.
Pena held that if government demonstrates that past discrimination
occurred, it could establish affirmative action programs to remedy
the discrimination. The remedy has to be narrowly tailored.
An examination of the past discriminatory FCC action is rather
unorthodox given that the FCC has historically based most of its
policies, including affirmative action, on diversity. This analysis
creates a paradox requiring the FCC to prove that it discriminated,
when we know that there are many societal disincentives present to
discourage governmental actors from making these findings. No
one wants to be tarred with the moniker "discriminator." The Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence creates a conflict. For those who
actually have been discriminated against, it basically requires them
to get the possibly discriminating governmental body to prove that
it discriminated.
This process undermines the very basis for which strict scrutiny
was designed. In Carolene Products, the Supreme Court justified
strict scrutiny to "smoke out" illegitimate race based classifications
for two reasons: first, there was concern that the race based classifi-
cation was based on an odious stereotype, e.g., Blacks are inferior
or second, the racial classification was based on some sort of proc-
ess defect. For example, in the South in the 1940s and 1950s,
although African Americans comprised large percentages of the
population, Whites refused to form coalitions with African Ameri-
cans. The result was that Blacks were irrationally shut out of the
political process.
This process-defect rationale for strict scrutiny evidences the Su-
preme Court's historic distrust of the political process when it
came to racial minorities. Yet the Supreme Court in the affirmative
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action context relies on these sometimes "broken" governmental
authorities to recognize that it has discriminated and to then rem-
edy the problem. This requirement is wholly inconsistent with
traditional Supreme Court analysis. Pursuant to the Supreme
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence the federal government
has to perform statistical studies to show that discrimination is tak-
ing place in order to implement an affirmative action program.
The evidence has to consist of statistical studies showing under-
utilization of the people of color as related to their availability in
the pool as well as anecdotal studies. The governmental agency,
however, is under no obligation to conduct an investigation or im-
plement any affirmative relief. The most extreme example of the
tension of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence would occur when a
discriminatory governmental agency might be asked to investigate
itself and refuses. How can you trust that it will do anything to
remedy the discrimination? Even if the government administrators
have the best of intentions, they have to find the resources to fund
the studies necessary to determine whether discrimination is taking
place.
In my remarks, I plan to use the FCC efforts to re-establish af-
firmative action programs as a case study to show the complexity
and difficulty of the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurispru-
dence.
This morning, we focused almost exclusively on the FCC's cross
ownership caps and rules. In its cross ownership deregulation or-
der, the FCC failed to adequately address the order's effect on
diversity. According to the Wall Street Journal, affirmative action
and/or racial diversity was the very last thing considered in the
FCC's order. To quote, the Wall Street Journal more specifically
noted: "proposals dealing with cross ownership, minority owner-
ship issues were the last elements to be finalized in the FCC order."
This last-minute focus is worrisome. FCC Commissioner Michael
Copps said in his dissent to the deregulation order, "These [diver-
sity] issues should not be relegated till further notice at some
indeterminate time, because they may never be addressed."
The FCC has previously considered these diversity issues. Pursu-
ant to Section 257(c) of the Communications Act, the FCC is
required to regulate and to report to Congress on the presence of
market entry barriers. During the administration of FCC Chairman
William Kennard, the FCC completed several statistical studies
highlighting the barriers and discrimination that minority-owned
broadcasters faced. These studies were released during the twilight
of the Kennard administration in 2000, but they were never for-
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mally reported to Congress by Chairman Kennard or his predeces-
sor Chairman Michael Powell. To his credit, Chairman Powell
opened a docket, released the studies and appointed a diversity
task force. However, in March 2005, Chairman Powell resigned
from the FCC and nothing has happened on the diversity since.
Commissioner Copps' words that these diversity considerations
should not be relegated to an indeterminate time were prescient as
we see now that the FCC still has failed to address these diversity
issues.
You may ask, "Why has nothing come of these studies and why
has the FCC not remedied this discrimination?" The answer: The
Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence exposes the po-
litical process defect for a governmental agency like the FCC.
Although statistical evidence and anecdotal studies finding dis-
crimination exist it may be very difficult for an agency like the FCC
to actually implement programs to remedy the discrimination. This
process defect is particularly hard for the FCC. The FCC never had
formal findings of its past discrimination. All its previous affirma-
tive action programs were built solely on the diversity analysis, not
past discrimination. It would mean that the FCC has to reconstruct
the theoretical basis for its affirmative action programs.
In Croson v. City of Richmond, the Supreme Court states that the
past discrimination prong can be based on passive participation in
the discrimination of others. The federal government has relied on
this ground in establishing affirmative action programs in other
venues. An example of passive participation would occur when the
government has issued licenses or contracts but uses a private or-
ganization's list of available licensees or contractors to screen
available contractors. If this private organization has discriminatory
practices as to who may be on the list, the federal government may
have passively participated in the discrimination of the private or-
ganization. In the few circuit cases that examine this issue, some
have held that passive participation could also occur when the gov-
ernment infuses tax dollars into a discriminatory environment. By
infusing tax dollars in this environment, the government has basi-
cally fostered the aiding and abetting of discrimination.
The FCC may be charged with passive participation because it
distributes licenses in environments where industry members, the
capital markets, and the advertising industry have discriminated
against minority-owned broadcasters. Let's talk about each type of
discrimination.
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The Kennard administration engaged several different contrac-
tors, many of them accounting firms like KPMG, to examine the
FCC's archived records to see if there were any statistical disparities
in licensing to minority licensees. Interestingly, KPMG found that
between 1970 and 1993, that most FCC licenses were actually
awarded through a singleton process, meaning that if an applicant
was the first one to actually apply for a license, he or she got the
license. The applicant had a hearing but the chances of actually
getting a license are much better if you're the only applicant.
KPMG found that between 1970-1993, 6,178 licenses were awarded
as singletons as compared to only 2,437 by comparative hearings.
This disparity is overwhelming; it is almost two-to-one or almost
three-to-one received their licenses through the singleton process
where no minority affirmative action program existed. The af-
firmative action program existed only in the comparative hearing
process where there was more than one applicant.
KPMG found that of those initial applicants, 74% of non-
minority initial applicants remained the only applicant after they
applied for the license, which meant that they had a superior
chance of actually getting a license. There was no competition. For
minorities who were the initial applicants, they were more often
challenged, and only 35% of the minority initial applicants re-
mained the sole applicant, and were not challenged in a
comparative hearing. KPMG also found that once the comparative
hearing process took place for these individuals who were initially
sole applicants, the rate of actually getting the licenses was pretty
much the same for minorities and non minorities.
When minorities participated in the comparative hearings pro-
ceedings, the communication industry often used the minorities as
"fronts." For example, KPMG found that the number of individuals
who were part of the application process was much higher on aver-
age for minorities than non-minorities (5.9 on average for minority
applications and 4.3 for non-minority applications). In fact, for
those applications that won licenses, there was an even larger
number of individual members on the application for winning mi-
nority applications than for solely non-minority ones. For winning
applications, the number of minorities as part of the application
jumps off the scale (8.3 on average for applications with minorities
and 5 on average for applications without minorities). These num-
bers represent the numerical number of minority members of the
application team, not their actual ownership or control. When we
look at applications where minorities actually have a majority own-
ership interest or control, e.g., 50% owners of the application,
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applications with the larger number of non-minorities in control
had a better chance of receiving the license than applications with
minorities who controlled 51% or more of the equity.
The communications industry was using this affirmative action
program for its own advantage. The FCC affirmative action pro-
gram actually disadvantaged applications with "real" minority
participation. The individuals who were winning were minority in
name only, not people who actually might be able to control the
license or control the content of the licensee.
The FCC's study also examined capital market discrimination. It
engaged the services of Dr. Bradford, who was a University of
Washington former dean and professor, to look at these capital
markets. Dr. Bradford's study showed that minority licensees were
more likely to suffer from capital market discrimination. Capital
market discrimination occurs when minority applicants are less
likely to get the loan than their similarly situated non-minority ap-
plicants, or if the minority applicant gets a loan, he or she pays a
higher interest rate or has some other unfavorable requirement.
Despite the fact that comparative hearings were studied, capital
market discrimination is important because the comparative hear-
ing process was comparable to an auction process. They both
required a great deal of money to get a license. In the comparative
hearing process, there were legal fees and engineering fees. More-
over, the KPMG study found that there was a very strong
correlation between getting a license through comparative hear-
ings and the amount of capital that the applicant had. The more
money or assets the applicant had, the more likely he or she would
receive the license. The comparative hearing process wasn't actu-
ally an auction process, but it operated like one. KPMG found that
there was a stronger correlation between gaining a license and the
amount of assets that any potential licensee had, than there was a
correlation between some of the other factors in the comparative
hearing process.
You may ask, why am I focusing on comparative hearings when
the FCC now awards broadcast licenses by auctions? The FCC ana-
lyzed the comparative hearing process for several reasons: First, the
FCC used this process to distribute licenses for over forty years.
Second, the comparative hearing contained an affirmative action
component for approximately twenty years. Third, the FCC only
started distributing broadcast licenses by auctions in 1999. There-
fore it is only recently that the FCC has used some process other
than comparative hearings to distribute licenses.
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Minority-owned broadcasters confronted advertising discrimina-
tion. The FCC released an advertising study that showed that the
advertising industry had a policy of not buying advertising on mi-
nority-owned and minority-focused radio stations called "No
urban/No Spanish dictates." This policy had a deleterious effect
on minority-owned radio stations because advertising is the life-
blood of broadcasters. It's not that hard to figure out this
preference for more mainstream formats when broadcasters and
advertisers pursue certain demographics, like the 18-34 year olds.
When advertisers decide to make "buys" at certain stations, they
decide not to focus on stations that have a mainly minority audi-
ence.
These advertising dictates are also paradoxical in that the man-
tra of conservatives is that "merit should solely matter." What is
merit in this case? Shouldn't the size of audience matter?" In
places like Washington D.C., Miami, or New York City which in-
clude large minority populations, the minority-focused stations are
the stations with the largest audience. But the advertisers aren't
going after the stations that bring in the largest audience, they in-
stead pursue the stations that have the "right demographics", 18-
34 year olds, whites mostly with high incomes, even though other
stations in those markets have larger audiences in those particular
locations.
Lastly, let's explore the scope of harm to the minority-owned sta-
tions from this discrimination. Because there were so many stations
granted licenses through the singleton process, KPMG concluded
that the overall probability, despite the existence of an affirmative
action program, of winning a license for broadcast applications
with minority ownership was less than it would be for non-minority
applications.
All this taken together-the industry, capital market, and adver-
tising discrimination and the lower probability of minority-owned
broadcasters winning a license even in the presence of affirmative
action programs, raises the remedial issue of re-establishing FCC
affirmative action programs. Yet despite all this evidence, no af-
firmative action programs were re-established. Also most telling was
that all the information and evidence was compiled and presented
under the chairmanship of two African American FCC Chairmen:
William Kennard and Michael Powell. Moreover, one should not
forget that during Chairman Kennard's administration, there were
three FCC Commissioners of color-William Kennard, Michael
Powell, and Gloria Tristani. Despite the presence of all this diver-
sity, no affirmative action proposals were passed. Why? The
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Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence incorporates a
process defect.
Chairman Powell, to his credit in his administration, created a
diversity task force to examine these issues, but Chairman Powell
has resigned from the Commission, and no action has been taken.
This case study demonstrates the difficulty of getting an affirma-
tive action program re-established at the FCC. It shows how the
Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring the establishment of a
compelling governmental interest for affirmative action policies
suffers from a severe process defect that prevents and deters mem-
bers of minority groups from achieving remedial action.
In 2000, then-Chairman Kennard eloquently stated at a forum
releasing the 257(c) studies at the end of his tenure as chair this
process defect problem. He stated: "For twenty-five years in this
country there was pretty much solid bipartisan coalition that sup-
ported affirmative action programs beginning with the Nixon
administration, and that coalition unfortunately has broken down
in recent years. And we are seeing in our policies and our law af-
firmative action being used as a wedge issue to divide us as a
country just at a time when it's so vitally important that people
come together around technology, because technology can be such
a unifying force if everyone can participate."
What we need is a mechanism to increase the number of minor-
ity broadcasters, because as Professor Douglas indicated, the
number of minority owners is still woefully small. The question that
I leave you with, is how to re-establish an affirmative action pro-
gram in a world where there is a very great deal of resistance to
affirmative action? Thank you.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Thank you, Professor Baynes. Our next
speaker will be Professor Sonia Jarvis. Professor Sonia Jarvis cur-
rently serves as the distinguished Lillie & Nathan Ackerman
Visiting Professor of Equality and Justice in America at Baruch Col-
lege's School of Public Affairs at City University of New York.
ProfessorJarvis has been a civil rights activist and attorney based in
Washington for most of her career. She has served as a frequent
media commentator, appearing on a number of leading news pro-
grams, and is also an accomplished scholar whose research and
teaching focus on race, politics and the media. She also has written
several book chapters and papers. Professor Jarvis is currently
completing a book entitled Through a Prism Darkly: The Media's Im-
pact on Race and Politics in America Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
addition to her scholastic work, Professor Jarvis has served in a
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number of administrative positions, including serving as an advisor
on the President's Initiative on Race, where she advised the White
House on race relations and drafted the final report for the Presi-
dent's Initiative on Race. Professor Jarvis currently serves as the
President of the Black Women's Agenda, and Professor Jarvis has
taught a number of undergraduate and graduate courses on race,
media politics and the U.S. Constitution at a variety of leading uni-
versities. Today Professor Jarvis will speak to us on the topic
"Grutter's Diversity Analysis: Using Grutter to Challenge Media Con-
solidation." Please join me in welcoming Professor SoniaJarvis.
SONIA R. JARVIS: Thank you, Alicia. I'm going to try and build
upon the two analyses that have proceeded me on this panel and
not repeat them, even though they're critical to setting up the ar-
gument that I'd like you to consider today and discuss with us
during our question and answer. First of all, I would like to say that
I'm very honored to be here at the University of Michigan Law
School for so many-for a number of reasons, one of course, is
that to have a chance to talk at the institution that had the courage
to stand up and defend affirmative action is something I think
should be applauded, and I'm very happy to be here today.
The second reason is, it gave me an opportunity to see my niece,
who is a freshman here at the University of Michigan-please wave
at the crowd Danielle-because what we're really talking about to-
day is what her generation is going to be facing. We've got a pretty
good sense of what media is about right now, but I think the ques-
tion for this panel and what we've been trying to address is where
do we go going forward? And I want to take a look at the Grutter
opinion to see if there are some clues for us in terms of how to
challenge this media consolidation in a way that could be effective.
The first point I'd like to address is what do we mean by diver-
sity, are we talking about diversity of viewpoints, are we talking
about source diversity, content diversity, work force composition,
affirmative action, exactly what are we addressing? And within the
civil rights jurisprudence we have seen how affirmative action has
transitioned from an explicit race conscious remedy into some-
thing a little fuzzier that we call diversity. We think we know what it
means, but perhaps we should take a little more time and be sure
we know what it means. Beyond that, I think all too often diversity's
been used as a masking term so that we're not being explicit in
terms of how we want to address past racial discrimination and dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.
I would also like to follow on a point that Professor Douglas said,
and that is I'm not interested in going back to the '50s. The '50s
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were not a good time for my people, and I think it wasn't a good
time for the country at large. And I don't think any of us really
want to see a return to explicit state sponsored apartheid, but if we
don't take the time to unravel some of the changes that have been
done over the last several years, accelerated by the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, that maybe what we have is a de facto system,
maybe not a dejure system of apartheid, but we might end up with a
system where women, minorities and other diverse viewpoints con-
tinue to be marginalized.
So how can we start to turn this around and at least engage the
American public in this discussion so it is not simply preaching to
the choir? The choir I think needs to know, but we need to expand
our analysis beyond the choir. Just as a general point I'd like to ask
those of you in the audience, how many of you over the past month
have watched a television program, listened to something on the
radio, maybe watched a cable television sports event or via satellite,
either radio or television? How many in the room, at least once or
twice? Okay. [A large show of hands]. How many of you have
watched a program on public access channels? Okay. Well, this is
an unusual group. Usually it's one or two. They don't even know
they exist, even though they were set aside for the purpose of mak-
ing sure that as cable television took over more of our tube there
would be an opportunity for diverse viewpoints. It just hasn't
worked out that way, and I think as we look towards new ap-
proaches and new remedies, I think it's important that we not get
caught up in the romance of gadgets and new technologies as be-
ing the wave of the future.
Building on the earlier comments, we are seeing that within the
Internet, which is being touted as alternative media, is another way
of getting voices out. I like the Internet, but I also know that every-
one doesn't have access to the Internet, and we keep acting as if
everyone does. We watch as more and more programming migrates
from free television to cable television, and no one says anything.
And then we're supposed to stand by while the right wing contin-
ues its assault on basic principles of tolerance and equality and say
that that's okay, because we don't have a fairness doctrine any-
more. How can we start looking at ways to undo some of the
damage in a constructive fashion?
Well, let's take a look at Justice O'Connor, who as you all know
was the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court. Her re-
sponse to a number of these issues has been interesting over time,
and particularly with respect to how to understand the use of racial
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classifications, racial preferences, whether invidious or benign and
intended to promote affirmative action. I would point you to the
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC decision of 1990, which is probably the
high point of the Supreme Court's willingness to defer to the FCC
and Congress in terms of the FCC's equal opportunity policies.
Within that decision, which was written by Justice Brennan, the
Court focused on an intermediate standard for review of whether
or not these policies were substantially related to the goal of diver-
sifying media ownership.
The reason I point out that opinion is that the dissent by Justice
O'Connor is particularly instructive. Because in that dissent in a
very closely divided 5-to-4 opinion, which we've seen on so many
issues involving race over the past twenty years, she really did set
forth her opinion on how the court should address the govern-
ment's use of any racial classifications. And I think it is clear to say
that the argument she espoused in Metro Broadcasting was later the
majority opinion in Adarand v. Pena, which my colleague just men-
tioned a few minutes ago. The notion that with any type of
remedies directed towards racial discrimination, first you have to
show a past history of discrimination, and any remedy must be nar-
rowly tailored to correct that discrimination. That really, since
1995, had been the prevailing viewpoint towards most affirmative
action or race conscious remedies. And I think it helps to explain
why the Grutter opinion was anxiously awaited by so many different
quarters.
A number of commentators have argued that the Grutter opinion
was so closely tied to higher education and the justifications were
based on the unique role that higher education plays that the
analysis within Grutter really can't be used in other contexts. So it
was a one shot deal. You get twenty-five more years of affirmative
action, and then that's it. I think a more careful reading of Grutter
would lead us in a different direction.
For starters we can look at some of the language that was actu-
ally used by justice O'Connor in the Grutter opinion. I'm not going
to talk about Gratz today, although I do address that in my paper.
But she pointed out a couple of issues key to this discussion. First,
it was her use of the Bakke opinion, specifically Justice Powell's plu-
rality opinion in Bakke, in terms of the importance of diversity
within a student body and within the higher education context.
And she went on to talk about how, in an increasingly global mar-
ketplace, the skills that today's leaders-that's you folks out here in
the audience-can only be developed through an exposure to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. Further, she
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goes on to talk about how places like the University of Michigan
are a training ground for the next generation of our nation's lead-
ers, and that the path to leadership must be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, and
for these reasons the law school has a compelling interest in attain-
ing a diverse student body.
I would argue that all of those arguments apply with even
greater force to the importance of a healthy democracy, that if we
don't allow diverse viewpoints to have an outlet, then we are
squandering the promise that's supposed to be guaranteed within
the U.S. Constitution. When we look beyond just this language
what I found most striking in going back was to see that the analy-
sis as follows by Justice O'Connor in the Grutter opinion is precisely
that used by Justice Brennan in the Metro Broadcasting decision. The
difference was he felt he could only-he felt it was sufficient to
have an intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, and it is
for that reason along with the history of how we have confronted
issues of race throughout society that gives me hope that this case
could be used in very productive ways.
If we go back to the '50s and the Brown opinion, even though
the Court initially felt that it would only be confined to public edu-
cation, and as most of you may recall, the court did not elect to
overturn Plessy v. Ferguson outright, and because the court did not
make that decision it meant that activists and plaintiffs had to chal-
lenge every segment of the apartheid system one by one. First, it
was swimming pools, then it was movie theaters, then it was access
to parks, then it was ... well, it went on until even the Supreme
Court got tired of that piecemeal approach and said, "Okay, after
Cooper v. Aaron, Brown applies to all of this." And after that it took
another seven years before the U.S. Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and made that process of challenging each
element of apartheid within this country not as necessary.
But having done that, we then can look to the role of the media
in this process. I agree with my colleague that the mainstream me-
dia did some good things with respect to civil rights. They had
their cameras there. That was the best thing they did when some of
the southern officials started turning dogs and hoses on children
trying to go to school. The problem was when the movement
moved from the South, where issues were black and white and very
clear, to the North and the Midwest and the West, where some of
the most violent reactions towards school integration were experi-
enced, whether Boston, or Los Angeles, or Denver, those are just a
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few places that come to mind. And, as the movement moved away
from clear black and white issues into more issues of gray and eq-
uity, and who's on first, and who gets the goodies, it became much
more difficult for mainstream media to cover it in a way that I
think moved us forward.
Instead, I think some of the coverage helped spur the backlash
that we're still experiencing as a nation towards a lot of these issues
of race and gender equality. When we look back at the period of
the '60s we should remember the Kerner Commission Report, and
race in that particular report: the last panel also talked about why
we have, you know, had different taskforces and other independent
approaches towards issues of diversity. I just want to remind you
that the Kerner Commission was brought together to explain why
we were having riots in all of our cities, and it was also supposed to
expose whether or not there was conspiracy where you had a num-
ber of people running around the country leading these riots. That
commission, which was not a liberal commission, said that the me-
dia plays a very big role in why we have systems of segregation and
the fact that White Americans don't understand or know what's
going on in the ghetto or in other minority communities.
So it is against that backdrop that we have to examine what has
happened with not only the media over this period of time from
the mid-'60s to today, but it's also important to remember that in-
clusion of minority viewpoints is really only a forty-year old deal.
We're not talking about something that happened since the Alien
and Sedition Acts [of 1798]. It only happened since the Civil
Rights Act moving forward, and that's been in fits and starts. That
has not been a consistent forward movement. We've tried, but as
the Court changed its mind on which remedies were appropriate,
the lower courts shifted their analyses as well, and so to that extent
Grutter has taken us to what I consider a more positive place than
Adarand or Shaw v. Reno. I think it will be interesting to watch how
the lower courts begin to respond to challenges to the media con-
solidation we've been talking about over the past day and a half.
The fact that the FCC and its decisions are so critical to this
process also helps to explain why the fighting over who gets to sit
on the D.C. Circuit has become so intense, and it is not going to go
away since we also know that the D.C. Circuit tends to be the step-
ping stone to the what? The Supreme Court! One of the last
decisions that Judge Clarence Thomas wrote on the D.C. Circuit
was on the issue of whether or not the gender enhancement rules
of the FCC should continue. I don't need to tell you how he ruled.
But whether or not people understand that connection and how
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critical these issues will be going forward is part of, I think, the
challenge of those scholars in this room and activists outside of this
room in terms of taking this issue to the American public.
When they hear about what's going on, just the recent flap over
the ownership change, gives you some indication that Americans
do feel very deeply about this question, regardless of whether they
live in a red state or a blue state. And, I think we need to spend
more time identifying the issues that bring people together and
upon which we do agree since there are enough forces out there
that will spend time trying to pull us apart and emphasize areas of
disagreement.
Now, I'll begin my wrap up since I'm going to stay on time today.
I just wanted to make a couple of other quick points in terms of
imagery and ownership and how we should understand how these
work together. I've been disturbed by the fact that a number of
minority oudets have been gobbled up over the past couple of
years. I don't mind Bob Johnson making a billion dollars. That's
not my point. But I do mind that the show [B.E.T.] that allowed
the expression of the Black community's viewpoints on a number
of current public policies issues has now been silenced, and it has
not been replaced.
I also look at a magazine like Essence, which is supposed to be the
voice of Black women. I'm sorry-I have to calm down-it's now
no longer owned by Black owners. It is owned by Time Warner!
And that may seem like progress to some quarters. I don't think
that it is. I guess what I'd like us to talk about is how can we use this
occasion of looking at media consolidation as also a way of revital-
izing a civil rights approach to these issues of equity, fairness,
access and democracy. Thank you.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Thank you, Professor Jarvis. Our fourth
panelist today is Professor Anthony Varona, who is an Associate
Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law in White Plains,
New York, where he teaches Intellectual Property, Administrative
and Criminal Law and Sexuality, Gender and the Law. Prior to join-
ing the Pace University School of Law faculty, Professor Varona
served as the General Counsel and Legal Director for the Human
Rights Campaign. HRC is the nation's largest gay civil rights organi-
zation. Before HRC, Professor Varona practiced communications
law at the Washington offices of Skadden Arps and Mintz Levin.
Professor Varona began his legal career as an honors program at-
torney for the Federal Communications Commission. Professor
Varona's scholarship has included a number of articles concerning
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media and civil rights law and appearing in a number of leading
publications. He has lectured widely on communications law and
civil rights topics and has appeared as a legal commentator on a
number of well-known television news programs and in a variety of
major daily newspapers and legal periodicals. Today Professor Va-
rona will speak to us on the topic "Out of Thin Air: The Effects of
Media Regulatory Dysfunction on Minorities and the Poor." Please
join me in welcoming Professor Anthony Varona.
ANTHONY E. VARONA: Thank you very much. It's a great
honor to join you over these two days. The benefit of being your
last speaker of the three panels is that I'm able to, on behalf of
everyone who has spoken on all three panels, thank every member
of the Journal of Law Reform, led by Liz and Ryan, for putting to-
gether a fantastic conference. The other benefit to being the last
speaker of the day is to try to sort of synthesize for us what we've
talked about. Not necessarily synthesizing every single thread-
because I can't possibly do that-but to try to have us step back a
little bit and also look forward. Step back to make sure that we un-
derstand what the big picture is-what we've talked about and what
it all means. How did we get to the place in which we now find our-
selves? How did television regulation in particular get to be the
mess that it is right now? And what we can do about it? How can we
fix this dysfunction in media regulation? So I'm going to talk about
three things generally, and I'm going to stay within twenty minutes.
So the first thing I'm going to talk about is just to try to make
sure that we all understand-lawyers and non-lawyers alike-why
it's important for us to fix the media regulatory dysfunction, how
its correction is critically important for all of us, but especially mi-
norities and the poor. By the way, that is what I like best about this
symposium-that it's not just lawyers talking to lawyers, but lawyers
talking to economists, and communications professionals talking to
us, making sure that lawyers and non-lawyers alike understand what
is at stake.
First, it's important for us to understand the consequences of
"the demographically unattractive"-Andy's perfectly descriptive
term-not being able to afford some of the solutions posed by
some of my colleagues on the earlier other panels, i.e., satellite TV,
satellite radio, cable, broadband Internet, etc. Second, it is impor-
tant to get us to better understand what went wrong with television
and radio regulation in particular. And third, to toss around ideas
about what we could do to fix what went wrong.
I derive my comments today from a piece that I just published
with the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology and a re-
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lated article I'm working on now for publication in the Journal of
Law Reform.
So although we've taken television for granted as "a toaster with
pictures" as former FCC Chair Mark Fowler called it, television
since its inception in 1941 has exerted an unparalleled influence in
the shaping of our national identity and being. At its best, televi-
sion, and particularly free over the air TV, has served as a great
equalizer, a bridge between our diverse cultures and classes, a
point of common focus that has enabled new Americans to under-
stand what exactly America is and how we fit within it. This is the
cultural DNA point that Professor Good made so well in the last
panel. This point is a very personal one for me in that when my
parents brought me to the United States at the age of three from
Cuba via Spain, I did not learn English from my parents, because
they did not speak a word of it. And I certainly did not learn Eng-
lish from our Italian-only speaking neighbors to the right, or
Portuguese-only speaking neighbors to the left, in our immigrant
enclave in Newark, New Jersey. I learned how to speak English
from none other than Mr. Rogers, by watching Mr. Rogers' public
television show, which certainly explains my odd fascination with
brightly colored sweaters and hand-puppets. So free over the air
TV at its best has much to offer. TV at its worst is what former FCC
Chairman Newton Minow famously called "a vast wasteland littered
with exploitative programming that does more to pollute than en-
rich our democracy and culture." At its worst, television serves to
marginalize minority voices further by distorting our identities or
rendering us altogether invisible, as shown so well by my colleague
Len Baynes' groundbreaking scholarship in that area.
Those of you new to media law would have gathered from all of
our talks over the last two days that Congress was presciently aware
of the potentially vast power of broadcasting when it reserved for
broadcast licensees a uniquely privileged status among federally
regulated communications entities. In the 1927 Radio Act, and in
the 1934 Communications Act, Congress codified the Broadcast
Public Trustee Doctrine, also known as the Public Interest Stan-
dard, in the recognition that broadcasting held the promise of
fostering a more deliberative democracy by cultivating through
public interest programming a politically informed and engaged
citizenry. Let's be very clear here. Unlike many other FCC license
holders who have had to pay millions of dollars and sometimes, in
the case of PCS and cellular companies, billions of dollars for their
use of public spectrum, TV licensees get to use their licenses for
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free. As public trustees, broadcasters enter into a sort of social con-
tract with the American public. In exchange for the quid of a
television license capable of generating great power and profit,
broadcasters, as public trustees, are expected to deliver the quo of
public interest programming-programming intended to create an
American marketplace of ideas over the airwaves.
How has this doctrine worked over the last seven decades? Not
so well. The reality is that the typical commercial television broad-
caster today airs very little locally oriented public affairs
programming, coverage of local and regional political campaigns,
children's educational TV and other types of programming that
the FCC has deemed public interest fare. In his January 2002 study
of 142 commercial broadcast stations in twenty-four markets, Phil
Napoli concluded that broadcasters aired an average of only 1.1
hours of local public affairs programming per station. Of the close
to 50,000 hours of programming surveyed on the stations studied,
a mere .3% was devoted to local public affairs programming. Simi-
larly, an October 2003 study of forty-five local television stations in
seven media markets found that less than one half of one percent
of the average station's programming schedule was devoted to pub-
lic interest fare. Another study found that in the seven weeks
preceding the November 2002 midterm elections more than half
of the evening news broadcasts aired in the top fifty media markets
included absolutely no coverage of the campaign. In fact, the study
showed that the viewers of those stations were more likely to get
their coverage from the political advertising aired on those stations
than the coverage itself. And even where broadcast stations do de-
cide to devote actually programming to the coverage of campaigns,
that programming has tended to be slanted to the political prefer-
ences of the station's corporate owners, as Eric pointed out so well
last night.
Speaking about politics, many of us know that in the last presi-
dential election we were shocked to learn that the major free over
the air broadcast networks aired very little coverage of the conven-
tions themselves. The total major network affiliate coverage was
three hours for each convention. Let me give you a little snapshot
here. At 8:05 p.m. on January 26th, 2004 the opening night of the
Democratic National Convention, Al Gore, former Vice President
and winner of the popular vote in 2000-I know I'm hanging on to
that, but as the winner of the popular vote in 2000 addressed the
delegates, viewers of commercial television would not have known
that because instead of Gore's speech they were treated to reruns
of the sitcoms My Wife and Kids on ABC, Everybody Loves Raymond
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on CBS and reality programming on the other two nets. While
Gore spoke about the importance of voting and the impact of the
presidential election on the make-up of the federal courts, a topic
that was given very short shrift by all of the broadcast media, Fox
viewers were treated to Trading Spouses, Meet Your New Mommy, a
new reality series. I have other examples of that sort of presidential
convention-preempting programming, including Fear Factor on Fox
while some key speeches were delivered in the Republican Na-
tional Convention, but I won't touch that irony.
So why has the public trustee model failed and why has nothing
been done to fix or replace it? Let's look at five or six reasons why
the public trustee model has not worked. We've already covered a
few of these, so I'll just sort of speed through them. First, what is
the public interest? What is public interest broadcasting? In codify-
ing the public interest doctrine in the 1934 Communications Act,
Congress failed to define what it meant by public trustee and pub-
lic interest fare, and the FCC has not done a very good job of
adding meat to that skeletal framework in the statute. It's not that
it hasn't tried to do so. To the contrary, it has tried repeatedly to
develop a comprehensive definition of public interest program-
ming. There was the Blue Book in 1946, which the FCC ignored
almost immediately upon its issuance in the face of loud protests
by the broadcast industry. There was the 1960 Programming
Statement, in which the FCC came up with a laundry list of differ-
ent types of programs that would satisfy the public trustee doctrine.
It didn't work. The NAB around that time, or in the early '40s
when the NAB was started, started balking and making noises
about how the FCC's attempts to enforce the public interest stan-
dard violated the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. The
FCC caved after every one of its attempts to come up with a coher-
ent and meaningful definition of public interest programming.
Then came the 1980s and the era of the Chicago School sanctifica-
tion of free markets as arbiters of the public interest. The FCC, led
by then Chairman Mark Fowler, decided that the free market
should determine what the public interest is. No wonder, then, that
the FCC decided in 1993 that round-the-clock home shopping sta-
tions were serving the public interest, because as you know, the
public can't have too many five-carat cubic zirconia baubles.
So what is left? What quid are broadcasters paying for the quo of
that very valuable broadcast license? Well, broadcasters have to air
locally responsible public interest programming. The FCC still says
that that is a public trustee standard obligation-programming
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that responds to the issues of concern to the local community. As
we know, the FCC is not enforcing that requirement at all, even
though it's still on the books. Political broadcasting, equal oppor-
tunities, equal time rules, we've talked about those a bit. Eric
mentioned them last night. In the 2000 elections, $600 million dol-
lars in political ad revenues flowed to the broadcasters, even
though the broadcasters were doing such a poor job in covering
the candidates through their news programming. Children's edu-
cational television-the FCC requires that broadcasters "serve the
educational and informational needs of children." Exactly what
that means is up to the broadcasters, and that's why broadcasters
have claimed such programs as the Weird Al Yankovic Show, the
Jetsons and the Flintstones, as kid vid. And then we've also talked
about the indecency regs that are the focus, really, of the FCC's ac-
tions as of late. So that's reason one, the vagueness of what public
trustee means.
Reason two, the inherent First Amendment contradictions in the
public trustee doctrine itself. Congress codified the public trustee
doctrine in the 1934 Act as Section 302 where it directs the FCC to
issue licenses consistent with the public interest. But later on in
that same statute at Section 326, Congress warned the FCC not to
censor broadcast communications. So you see the obvious tension
there. In the 1973 CBS v. DNC case the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that tension, and essentially said that the FCC was expected
to walk a tightrope between non censorship and prescribing public
interest programming or the public trustee doctrine. I agree with
Eric Alterman that the Lippmann/Dewey debate is an important
one to think about in thinking about media regulation. But there's
an even older one that really spans centuries that is at the very core
of this dysfunction, and that is the debate between Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and James Madison. Justice Holmes wrote in his
1919 Abrams dissent that the best truth is the power of thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market. So that's the
free market view of speech. In other words, the unencumbered
exchange of conflicting ideas comes closest to yielding truth and
the common good. By contrast, James Madison had a broader free
speech theory. To Madison, the First Amendment was at the core
of democracy itself. It was intended to create and perpetuate an
educated, informed and empowered electorate, and a responsive
democratic government. In contrast to the Holmesian view, which
argued against government interference, the Madisonian perspec-
tive was primarily concerned with ensuring that all voices were
present and heard in the marketplace. The Holmesian free mar-
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ketplace of ideas perspective presumes that all viable ideas have
access to the marketplace and to public consideration. The Madi-
sonian perspective does not so presume. It is Madison's conception
of the First Amendment that lies at the heart of the broadcast pub-
lic trustee doctrine, and is essentially what the Supreme Court has
looked for in justifying the public trustee doctrine in case after
case starting with NBC v. U.S. in 1934, and leading up to some of
the more recent cases.
The third reason why the public trustee doctrine is not working
is that TV simply is not capable of serving as a free marketplace of
ideas. It is narrow. It is edited. Everyone doesn't have access to the
TV station and its cameras. Television is mediated, it's narrowly fo-
cused, it can be isolating, and it can be distorting of reality. The
Howard Dean scream speech is a perfect example of that distor-
tion, in that while he looked and sounded crazed on television,
members of the audience later remarked that in reality his exuber-
ance could barely overcome the crowd noise in the banquet hall.
Four-marketplace realities-we've talked about them already,
right? Viewers, not public interest programming, are the commodi-
ties in the broadcasting marketplace. Five, the consolidation of
broadcast ownership-no need to elaborate that point, consider-
ing that it's been the focus of our conference.
The sixth reason for the dysfunction of broadcast regulation is
that of the unusual political power of the broadcasters. The FCC is
the quintessentially captured agency. It is not difficult to reach this
conclusion by examining the power of the NAB and how it has ex-
ercised that power in lobbying against the FCC's actions to quantify
the public trustee doctrine. The NAB is one of the richest lobbying
organizations in Washington. It has lavished gifts upon FCC regula-
tors and members of Congress. In 1999, Congressman Billy Tauzin,
then Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, which over-
sees the FCC, took a trip to Paris paid for by NAB members costing
$18,910 dollars, while his daughter, Kimberly Tauzin, was a key
lobbyist at the NAB. Examples of that kind of coziness between the
communications regulators and the regulated abound.
In my last three minutes I'm going to talk about proposals for
reform. First, Senators Bob Dole and John McCain argued in favor
of auctions, having the broadcasters pay a fair market price for
their spectrum. That idea didn't float for some of the reasons that
we've talked about here. Second, the Gore Commission, like a
number of task forces and committees through the years, urged
the FCC to implement a list of quantifiable public interest
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requirements so that broadcasters would earn their keep. As it's
done in the past, the FCC largely ignored the proposals. Third,
some have argued in favor of adopting the British BBC model,
which funds high quality broadcasting by means of an annual tele-
vision set license fee. That system won't work here for relatively
obvious reasons that we don't have time to get into. Fourth, former
FCC general counsel Henry Geller proposed an actual spectrum
usage fee of three percent of a broadcast licensee's gross advertis-
ing revenues that would go to pay or support public TV
broadcasting. I like that idea a lot, but it has some problems. One
is that there's no guarantee that Congress wouldn't reduce its sub-
sidy to public TV stations so that the public TV stations would get
no net increase in funding as a result of this deal. In fact, they
might actually be getting less because of the displacement from
Congress. Two, it would not guarantee local public interest pro-
gramming. Three, it would raise some of the concerns that have
been raised with the BBC, cultural elitism, etc., and by the way, let's
not forget what happened recently with Buster Baxter, the cartoon
rabbit and star of Postcards from Baxter. Baxter made the mistake of
visiting Vermont in an episode on maple sugaring and, horror of
horrors, included a couple of apparently lesbian mothers in a
scene, causing education secretary Margaret Spellings to denounce
the program as the promotion of-quote-the gay lifestyle-
unquote. PBS, which is beholden to the federal government by vir-
tue of its funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
promptly pulled the program, no doubt conscious of the amazing
gaydar of the Bush administration and its fundamentalist cronies,
evidenced most notably by their recent outing of the flaming
SpongeBob SquarePants, and the not so recent outing of the noto-
riously flamboyant sodomite Tinky Winky Teletubby.
My proposal in thirty seconds or less, which I'll write much more
about in the Journal of Law Reform piece, is a sort of friendly
amendment to Mr. Gellar's proposal. I propose a fee of three per-
cent to five percent of overall commercial broadcast revenues to
subsidize access to broadband Internet in underserved and poor
communities. It is no secret that the United States continues to suf-
fer from a race- and class-based digital divide and that, as President
Bush acknowledged in one of his campaign speeches, we are elev-
enth in the world in overall broadband Internet access. It goes
without saying that the Internet provides us with an unprecedented
and unlimited panoply of opportunities for enlightenment, educa-
tion and democratic engagement. But for many Americans,
broadband access to the Internet is too expensive or entirely un-
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available in their communities. Having broadcasters help provide
wider access to the Internet and all of the democracy-feeding re-
sources it has to offer would finally make it possible for
broadcasters to pay their fair share. It also avoids the problems that
have plagued public trusteeship in that it does not implicate
broadcasters' First Amendment rights and is not premised on the
beleaguered scarcity rationale. It also would help realize universal
access to the truly free marketplace of ideas that broadcasting
promised but never delivered.
In my Journal of Law Reform article, I also hope to examine how
the First Amendment's public forum doctrine may serve as an al-
ternative to public trusteeship for purposes of the public interest
programming regulation, and as an additional justification for the
broadcast to Internet cross-subsidy. Those of you familiar with First
Amendment jurisprudence know that the public forum doctrine
has both reactive and affirmative aspects. Reactive insofar as the
Supreme Court applies varying levels of First Amendment scrutiny
to speech regulation in public fora, and affirmative in the sense
that implicit in the Supreme Court's public fora precedents is an
affirmative duty on government to create and maintain public
speech fora for democratic engagement and debate. The Internet
should be viewed as such a public forum, or amalgamation of fora,
and broadcasters should help make it accessible to all. There will
be much more about this in my piece in the Journal of Law Reform
so you'll have to stay tuned for that. Thank you.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Thank you very much, Professor Varona.
After this panel, I'm sure there are a number of questions, so I'd
like to ask those who would like to ask questions to be as brief as
possible, and I'd like to ask the same of our panelists when re-
sponding. Yes? Can we get the microphone down here please?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Tony, I enjoyed your talk. I didn't think
you were going to go where you ended up going, but the question I
wanted to ask, which may be mooted by where you ended up, con-
cerns newspapers. With the exception of the New York Times I
haven't seen a generally just daily newspaper worth a d** in this
country, and even the New York Times fails miserably when it comes
to quality funnies, whereas national public radio and CNN I find
far more sophisticated analysis. What if we took everything you're
saying and the public interest standard, picked it up and plopped it
down in newspapers? Would that be constitutional, and if not,
what's the basis of the distinction?
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ANTHONY E. VARONA: Well, we would certainly have to go
back to the case and the fundamental distinction between newspa-
pers and broadcasters.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What was that distinction?
ANTHONY E. VARONA; Broadcasters do not own their news-
print. Broadcasters use our spectrum, and they're using it without
giving us back something that is of value. Some would argue, and I
could also make this argument, that broadcasters actually are giv-
ing us back something of value, but it's not the fair market value of
their spectrum. Every one of us can publish a newspaper in this
room if we had access, and Judge Bork has actually made this ar-
gument-you can argue that it's very expensive to get newsprint
and to get a press up and running. That's true. But that's a differ-
ent kind of scarcity. What we're talking about in the over air
broadcast medium, is allocational scarcity. It is the sort of scarcity
that points to the fact that there are just so many frequencies avail-
able in each city. There is not that kind of scarcity when you're
talking about newspapers.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question can be addressed to any of
the panelists. But when we discuss diversity in the media we tend to
focus on African Americans and women, which is obviously very
important, but there are also other minority groups, and you know,
one that concerns me personally is the portrayal of Arab Ameri-
cans in the media, which I think is a huge problem right now. The
solutions offered by the panelists, do you think that they could be
applicable to these fringe minority groups that lack any sort of po-
litical power or any sort of popular support at this point?
SONIA R. JARVIS: Well, I'd start by saying I don't view them as
fringe, that we're really talking about the minority population right
now being 30% and growing, and what responsibility do broad-
casters, newspapers, other media outlets, have to make sure that
people within that third of the American population have access.
There have already been studies showing how over the last couple
of years portrayals and imagery concerning Muslims and other
Arab Americans have worsened, and where's the counter to that?
Where are we going to see that counterweight being exerted?
I'm not even sure a fairness doctrine, which the prospects of
having that restored I would say are minimal to none, is one an-
swer or even the public interest doctrine that Professor Varonajust
mentioned. I think it's got to be through actions of American citi-
zens and people of good will to attack negative imagery when it
appears, but also to continue to make the argument that part of
being in a democracy means having your entire experience re-
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vealed, not just when you're in trouble or being accused of being a
terrorist. So it's how to make sure that using that argument as a way
of connecting up with African American groups, and Latinos, and
Native Americans and others. As you may recall, the NAACP was
criticized for cutting a deal with NBC on diversity and a number of
the other minority groups felt that that [deal] hurt their efforts to
force all of the broadcasters to do more. So it needs collective ac-
tion in a way that's consistent with the needs of your own
community, but within the broader context of what we're trying to
do within a democracy.
LEONARD M. BAYNES: I'm working on a project examining
how to regulate broadcast television news stereotypes. My proposed
regulations would include all U.S. racial minority groups. Some
may say that the First Amendment prohibits any such regulation.
In the U.S., many use the First Amendment as a means to thwart
any regulations that they do not like. However, I believe that this is
an overly circumscribed view of the First Amendment free speech
protections. I also believe that people's views on the First Amend-
ment expand and contract depending on the issues. With some
content, like indecency, we as a society are ready to regulate. The
Supreme Court permits the FCC to define broadcast indecency. As
a society, we are comfortable letting FCC regulate that.
When it comes to images of people of color, American society
seems more reluctant to have these kinds of regulations, But as
people of color, we need to be active and demonstrate collectively
that these images are wrong. They're just as harmful as indecent
images. If people say indecency's wrong, why aren't images of peo-
ple of color that are that are clearly stereotypical not also wrong?
That's the question. Many First Amendment scholars would ex-
press horror at such regulations. As a result, nothing happens
about them. But we have to be active to write proposals, lobby for
them, bring them to the Supreme Court. We do not know whether
they are unconstitutional until the Supreme Court decides. If we
limit our vision about what is right before we know whether some-
thing is constitutional, we have stifled our creativity. We can only
get these images changed through grass root activism and for peo-
ple to talk about the damage that these negative images cause. We
need to design proposals to combat them because if the FCC can
determine whether something is "indecent," then why can't it also
determine whether some image is a stereotypical depiction?
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Yes, sir. In the back?
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JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: Thanks a lot. I'm Commissioner
Adelstein, and I want to note I'm not captured yet. A question on
minority ownership. I'll note tonight in the presentation that mi-
nority ownership of media outlets is at an all-time low. I think that
might help to address the previous questioner's concern about re-
flecting what's actually happening in the communities. Certainly,
our ownership of media does not reflect the broader population
here, and as we confront the ownership rules that are now under
review I just wanted to get your perspective on what the FCC can
do when it comes up with new media ownership rules to ensure
that there's a wider ownership of outlets by minorities? [Inaudible
comments]
LEONARD M. BAYNES: The FCC needs to re-establish affirma-
tive action programs. The studies that I discussed in my
presentation present a sufficient basis for establishing affirmative
action programs. The difficulty that the FCC may have, which I dis-
cussed during the FCC Task Force hearings, is that the FCC has
historically relied on diversity for its affirmative action programs.
Assuming that Grutter's analysis extends to FCC licensing and diver-
sity can be used as a factor in awarding FCC licenses, the issue
becomes, how do you have an individualized determination as
Grutter provides? Pursuant to an individualized determination, the
FCC would have to consider race as one of many factors in award-
ing a license. However, the decision cannot be mechanical and
there would have to a holistic review of each applicant. In my arti-
cle: Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and Re-
Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing I
suggest that the FCC could internally evaluate and select candi-
dates who would then participate in an auction process. The
process could be similar to the C-Block auction of wireless spec-
trum. The criteria for this block could be the provisioning of
programming that people of color might be interested. The special
auction could not be conducted solely for applicants of color. Pur-
suant to the diversity rationale, an auction geared to diverse
programming would likely be constitutional.
If the FCC relied exclusively on the past discrimination rationale
for re-establishing affirmative action programs, the FCC could
remedy the past discrimination and could have a narrowly tailored
auction solely for applicants of color. The contours of such an auc-
tion would have to be worked out so that the remedy, i.e., the
4. Leonard M. Baynes, Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and Re-
Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 235
(2004).
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exclusive auction would have to match the harm. It probably would
make sense for the FCC to base any re-establishment of an affirma-
tive action program on past discrimination and also diversity. And
if they use both of those bases an affirmative action program
probably would be permissible.
SONIA R. JARVIS: I think another issue is how do we get past
the chicken and egg problem of trying to demonstrate the prob-
lems of opening the process to more minority ownership when the
numbers are, as you noted, at an all-time low. So what is it going to
take to get sufficient numbers to demonstrate that barriers to own-
ership continue to exist? And I would challenge the folks here to
do some studies and articles for this journal and others to help
make that case, because that is what it's going to take.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When we talked earlier about the cover-
age of the civil rights movement by the media, would you think it
would be fair to say that a fair proportion of the reason that they
did that kind of coverage is because of the sensationalism of it at
the moment, because it was a ratings grabber-because it was
something that they thought people would be interested in seeing,
and it would get them more viewers, and that part of the reason
that we're not seeing those kind of issues as much now is that there
are more sensationalist elements that they can turn to instead that
are provided by other people, by the government, by corporations,
that they can turn to instead and that with that impetus removed
they've basically just fallen back? In other words, there really hasn't
been that much change in the media, they haven't been corrupted,
it's just they've just used a different source for their ratings grab.
SUSAN DOUGLAS: I think what Sonia and I were saying, al-
though we hadn't planned this, is that television news in particular
was the civil rights and the women's movement best ally and worst
enemy I would say at the same time. And, television news, just like
any media, is very incoherent and filled with contradictions. Televi-
sion news started with people like John Cameron Swayzee doing
the Camel News Caravan where he was required to smoke Camels,
while he was reading the news, and it was fifteen minutes of rip and
read. And what the civil rights movement did is it brought these
incredibly powerful images to television, and it drove the news,
which was fifteen minutes, to go to half an hour. So one, they had
the images. The images were incredibly powerful. It was a huge
national story. Yes, they were sensational. There was a conference
here several years ago about sort of the coverage of race over time
in the media, and one of the things that happened, and however
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self-serving or self blinded this was, there were journalists from the
north, and even liberal journalists from the south, who were so
horrified by the racist segregation stance of White southerners that
they were determined to expose that, and some of it came from
geographical snobbery, and some of it came from class spite. But
all of these things interacted, and also, television news was new. So
all of these things came together to make the civil rights movement
a huge story. And as Sonia said when that footage in 1963 from
Birmingham aired it had a lightning effect on public opinion when
people saw those kids being hosed down and those german shep-
herds coming at them. So there have been moments when this
coverage was great. But by the time just a couple of years later
when you start getting the uprisings in Newark and Detroit and
elsewhere, that coverage was no help to Black folks. The coverage
of the Black Panthers absolutely demonized Black power. So it was
a mixed bag. Same thing with the women's movement. This was
huge story. Here were a bunch of women transgressing every kind
of value that's supposed to be sacrosanct about femininity made it
a big story. And feminist demands were simultaneously marginal-
ized and ridiculed all throughout the national news, but feminists
got a podium. They got long sound bytes. The news was different
then too, people got longer sound bytes. And so yes, what's hap-
pened now is there's just a very different calculation in the news,
and there is a different sense of what will grab viewer's attentions
and what they care about, and that calculation is they care aboutJ-
Lo's latest romantic relationship. They care about Lacey Peterson.
They care about the Jackson trial. To get back to the first question,
they don't care about what's going on in the average streets. I actu-
ally think a lot more people care about what's going on around the
world, including what young people are thinking in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, than anybody gives them credit for. But I do think
you're right. But I wouldn't say that the motivations were purely
cynical or sensationalist back then. I think there were a lot of un-
fortunate biases that entered the coverage over the civil rights
movement and the women's movement.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: I'd like to ask the next question. I'll di-
rect it to Professor Baynes, but I'll be happy if anyone on the panel
would like to take a stab at it. Dr. Martin Luther King once said,
"What good is it to have the right to sit at a lunch counter if one
cannot afford the price of a meal?" And, Professor Baynes, you al-
luded to this during your PowerPoint presentation about the
difficulty of women and minorities accessing the capital markets to
be able to afford to participate. Can you elaborate a little bit more
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on some potential solutions to that very important problem as
well?
LEONARD M. BAYNES: Sure. First, we need to make sure that
the laws that prohibit banks from redlining communities of color
and providing access to credit to borrowers are enforced. Second,
the FCC should join forces with the Small Business Administration
to create a program specifically for the particular needs of small
broadcast applicants that want to get licenses. The FCC has previ-
ously experimented with different kinds of programs that have
helped finance a loan over the term of the license. Unfortunately,
this program was badly enforced since the FCC did not have the
wherewithal to monitor these loans and several of the licensees
ended up in bankruptcy court. These programs need to be re-
examined because on its face it's a perfect solution. It allows the
small licensee to pay for his license over the term of the license.
Maybe the program needs to be modified so that the FCC ensures
that the applicants are credit worthy. Instead, maybe some banking
association or the SBA could monitor the loan to provide the fund-
ing.
But Professor Evans is right, as licenses become much more ex-
pensive, it becomes much more difficult for any small owner to
afford them. The owners of color may have to depart from diverse
programming in order to pat their expenses. For example, in New
York, WLIB is an AM station that has historically been a Black sta-
tion. It was the only station in New York that actually broadcasted
news and music to New York City's large Afro-Caribbean commu-
nity. At least thirty percent of the Blacks in New York City are
foreign born. Maybe fifty percent of the people of African descent
in New York City are of Caribbean ancestry. Because of the advertis-
ing discrimination that I discussed in my formal remarks, WLIB
decided to broadcast Air America. As a consequence, the Blacks of
Caribbean ancestry in New York City are no longer able to get the
kind of broadcasting that's useful for their particular community.
This situation is a combination of two factors: First, how do small
minority broadcasters afford to get an FCC license and once they
have the license given advertising discrimination, how do they raise
funds to sustain the station? Can you fault the broadcaster who can
make more money with less diverse content? Rational business per-
sons want to maximize profits, even though they're not able to
necessarily serve their particular community. We have to explore
creative programs to allow these business people to maximize prof-
its and still serve the minority community.
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ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Yes, sir?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just wanted to suggest that the I think
almost all of the panelists have suggested that new creative think-
ing about structural regulations is one of the things that people in
communication schools and law schools ought to be encouraged to
do. So just in reaction to Commissioner Adelstein's question, not
talking about its political viability, but as an imaginative response,
the notion is that the FCC has to approve the licensees and the
public interest, and so when you have hearings and [inaudible]
licenses you had to make that one of the comments that was made
by an earlier Commissioner about, "This is a h** of a way to run a
railroad," was that, you do all this stuff, and you pick out the best
[inaudible] and two weeks later it's sold to the person that had the
most money. One could imagine that if you think the current li-
censees, which you officially do by having a license, is in the public
interest you can say, "If they transfer it we don't have any reason to
have confidence that the person that receives it is in the public in-
terest," and say, "Any time there's a transfer of a license, which is
basically a sale." I've always regretted the idea that we say that peo-
ple get their licenses free. Most corporations get their licenses by
paying a huge amount to them, which is not for the government-
or not for the public, but they pay for them. They capitalize the
income stream in that payment. But the FCC could say, "We don't
assume that the person that's getting it is in the public interest."
However, the FCC could say, "If it increases diversity, because
you're selling it to a minority community, or if you're reducing the
level of concentration in the industry, so you're selling it to some-
body that owns less media properties than the person that's selling
it, then we'll presume that is in the public interest," and if you did
that you would fairly quickly and with high pressure push owner-
ship of the media, I mean, given that there's constant switching of
who owns it, in a direction-and you know, people would still be
able to sell, but [inaudible] sell to a conglomerate owner, because
that wouldn't be presumed to be in the public interest. So you'd
open it up to comparative hearing. And if you could sell to some-
body else like minority community or somebody who's ownership
would de-concentrate the industry and have that person need to be
in the public interest, then you'd quickly move towards a-from
the types of things discussed here, a better set of ownership distri-
bution. Now, I'm not suggesting that's viable, and I'm not even
sure that I would go with that in the long run, but that's the type of
thinking that I think all the people on the panel have been calling
for is thinking of new ways to think about how the government in-
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teraction with the industry can create a better structure of owner-
ship.
LEONARD M. BAYNES: The FCC used to have anti-trafficking
regulations that would actually limit the "flipping" of broadcast
properties. Once a licensee acquired a license through compara-
tive hearings, the licensee was required to hold the license for a
number of years before selling it. As part of FCC deregulation, the
anti-trafficking regulations were eliminated. The FCC also used the
tax certificate program, which would allow a majority licensee to
defer capital gains if he/she transferred a broadcast property to a
minority buyer. Research indicates that this program was the most
effective in increasing minority ownership. This program was
eliminated in 1995. A lot of the mechanisms that were in place are
no longer in place. And so the question, what do you do now? I
think the best thing is to sort of aim for the most that you possibly
can get and see what happens.
ALICIA DAVIS EVANS: Well, great. Thank you to all of our pan-
elists. We are out of time. And now Dr. Douglas will give us a few
closing remarks.
SUSAN DOUGLAS: Very few closing remarks. I want to thank
everybody for coming to this terrific conference. I think, you know,
we've had a really lively discussion with multiple perspectives, and a
host of differing expertise brought to the table, and now unlike
what we get to see on most public affairs broadcasting on televi-
sion-which consists of verbal food fights and/or pundits who
really have no expertise about the subject under discussion holding
forth nonetheless-this was actually a respectful and illuminating
and very thought provoking exchange. We had debates and discus-
sions about what constitutes diversity and how do you measure it.
We got a lot of information about different court cases and/or
precedents that could enhance or inhibit public discourse that
could help us think more creatively about what to do in the future,
and what could promote diversity in the media. We had very inter-
esting thoughts about First Amendment within a dramatically
shifting ownership and regulatory environment, and we got even
some proposed solutions for people to think about. So, I certainly
learned a great deal. I hope you did too, and I first want to thank
all of the panelists who came to Michigan to participate in this. So
please join me in thanking all of the panelists. [Applause] I also
want to thank, one more time, because you can't thank them
enough, these two incredibly energetic, dedicated, enterprising law
students-Ryan Calo and Liz Wei-who put together a fabulous
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event, and worked like dogs on it. They deserve yet another big
round of applause. So thank you again for coming. It's been a real
delight to collaborate with the law school for us in communication
studies, and Liz Wei has some final remarks she'd like to make.
LIZ WEI: Thank you, Professor Douglas. I just have two quick
points. For those who've pre-registered for the banquet and only
for those people I want to remind you that it's going to be tonight
at Campus Inn. Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein will be our clos-
ing Keynote Speaker, and dinner is to be served at 7:00. So if you
could arrive earlier, any time after 6:30, would be great.
For Ryan and I, one of the driving forces behind putting on this
Symposium was not only our interest in the topic of media concen-
tration, but also a reaction to the absence of any media law classes
here at the University of Michigan Law School. But of course our
logical solution was to bring all these fabulous and wonderful ex-
perts and practitioners here to us. So by default to all of you as
well, and to the readers of our journal. And that was a wonderful
decision. I'm sure you'll agree with me, as our panelists have been
dynamic and have only left us with more questions. Which is as I
believe it should be. So if you will join the Journal of Law Reform one
last time as we thank all our wonderful panelists today. [Applause]
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CLOSING REMARKS
LIZ WEI: We're all very honored to have, as our Keynote speaker
tonight, Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein from the Federal
Communications Commission, and we were very lucky that he
would be able to work this into his schedule. So here to introduce
him is Professor Molly Van Houweling.
[Applause]
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: It's only thanks to Liz
and Ryan's excellent organizational skills that they were so fore-
sightful to get on the Commissioner's schedule a year in advance
which is why we are all so fortunate to have him here tonight. I met
Jonathan about ten years ago when he was a staff member for
Senator Tom Daschle, and followed him then as a true public ser-
vant, and he's shown that even more so, I think, in his service at
the Federal Communications Commission, where he's been in the
middle of some of the most controversial issues that we've talked
about during the course of this conference, and in some instances,
on the dissenting side of those controversial issues, where he's
been an eloquent spokesperson for the public interest. And, I
think today we've heard about the metaphor with television as a
toaster with pictures, and Commissioner Adelstein has worried that
in light of recent deregulatory moves we might only get Wonder
Bread out of our toaster with pictures. [Laughter] So we're hon-
ored to have him. As I said, he was previously a staff member, a
Senior Legislative Assistant for Senator Tom Daschle, where he
worked for seven years working on issues including telecommuni-
cations, financial services, transportation and banking, and other
key issues. Before that he held a number of other positions on the
Hill, including staff member to the Senate's Special Committee on
Aging for Chairman David Pryor, an assignment as a special liaison
to Senator Harry Reid, and as legislative assistant to Senator Don-
ald Riegle, Jr. of Michigan. Before his service on the Hill he had
several academic appointments at both Stanford and Harvard, and
tonight he'll honor us by educating us, which I'm looking forward
to. So please welcome FCC Commissioner, Jonathan Adelstein.
[Applause]
JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: Thank you, Molly. I did not realize
anybody remembered my "toaster with Wonder Bread" popping
out comment. In the midst of all these great debates about regula-
tions and what the rules are going to be, we also are spending our
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time trying to come up with just the right metaphor. So I am glad
that my dear friend, Professor Molly, remembered it all these years
later. [Laughter] And it is, thanks to her, that I am here. She told
me a year ago that Michigan was sunny and beautiful in the middle
of August. Now, I have some friends on the FTC, and there may be
a false advertising claim here.
It is good, though, to be back in Michigan, especially to be part
of such a well organized conference. The students that put it to-
gether did a fantastic job, and with a great group of participants-I
have heard some of it, but not all of it. Extraordinary! I think eve-
ryone knows I take my media ownership hearings around the
country; I want to make sure law students organize them!
I did get my start in Washington actually working for a senator
from Michigan. So it is appropriate that I am back here. Molly
mentioned Senator Don Riegle from up the road there in Flint,
and we have been back here in Michigan recently as part of our
effort to reach out to the public.
We were in Dearborn this last September for a meeting that
some of you might have attended to talk about these issues. It was
coordinated by Free Press. We had more than 300 local citizens
come out to share with us their views on how the media here is
serving all of the different interests and people in this community.
These types of discussions are exactly what we need now at the
FCC. Particularly, I think scholarship and input from the academic
community is so important as we try to figure out how we are going
to intelligently oversee broadcasting and media so that they best
serve the public interest. And of course, we also need direct input
from local communities on how broadcasters are serving or not
serving those local communities. And there is only one way to do
it, which is to get out of Washington-go outside of the Beltway
and come to places like Dearborn and Ann Arbor and hear from
people that are actually affected, people that have the time to
think this through. And that is what we need to do now as the
Third Circuit remand, that Andy Schwartzman had so much to do
with, has put this whole issue back on our plate and asked us to
start from scratch to determine what the proper landscape should
be in the media going forward for generations to come.
Now, when we are in Washington, even though it is a beautiful
day there, sixty degrees and sunny, [Laughter] we have so many
broadcasters, and media companies, and their lawyers. All of these
hired experts wear the carpet thin at the FCC, and of course, also
in the halls of Congress. But, sadly, we really do not get as much
input as we need from smart, dedicated, thoughtful people and
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from the public at large, and that is why we need to kind of reach
out. And we have reached out to try to get a broader perspective
on these issues, and that is why today's panels are so important. I
look forward to seeing the transcripts of those I missed. I would ask
you to make the. entire proceedings part of the FCC record as we
go into another media ownership proceeding. I think that the en-
tire discussion today belongs on the record so that not only me,
but all of the Commissioners, their staffs and the Media Bureau
have the opportunity to review what came out of today.
And in light of the discussion that you have held, and the need
for information from groups like this, I really think I need to keep
an open mind, and all the Commissioners do, about what the right
place to go from here is with these rules. But I do think there are
some basic fundamental principles that should guide our decision
making. I would like to just talk about some of those here today.
In particular, I would like to focus on the issue of diversity, which
has been a discussion that I think has threaded throughout this
program. And as you know, the Third Circuit remanded much of
what we did as mistaken, and I share a lot of the court's concerns.
And it may not be that coincidental because a lot of the court deci-
sion does track my dissent in that item, and I certainly hope the
Supreme Court will let the Third Circuit's decision stand. So we
will see what happens, because right now, as a lot of you know, ap-
peals have been filed by broadcast and newspaper interests, NAB,
Fox, NBC, Tribune and Viacom, among others. You have all of the
big media giants that want nothing more than to get bigger and
are trying to -get the Supreme Court to take up that decision and
basically knock the legs out from under all of the bases for broad-
cast regulations in this country. I think they may learn that if they
were successful, and I hope they are not, that in some ways it will
also come back to bite them, because if they are not treated spe-
cially in the terms of ownership rules, then they may lose the
opportunity to be treated specially in other ways that they find are
of great benefit.
Now, we have seen conditional cross petitions filed by the fed-
eral government, and by Sinclair, but the government wisely
encouraged the Supreme Court not to take up the issue because
we do not want to lose the basic underpinnings of all the broadcast
regulations that would lead to our ability to enforce things like in-
decency rules, for example. My concern, much more than that,
though, is the role of the media in the functioning of our democ-
racy. In order to get that right-clearly we got it wrong before-we
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need to start from scratch, and that is what the Third Circuit re-
mand gave us the opportunity to do. Now, throughout the day, I
am sure you have heard about the historical underpinnings of FCC
regulation and congressional dictates on this. The real goals of the
public interest standard are to promote competition and diversity.
And of course, they are also designed to promote localism and the
responsiveness of broadcasters to their own local communities. Lo-
calism has been a hallmark of broadcast regulation since it began,
and that is why we do not issue national licenses, as they do in
some other countries. We always deal with the local market, but
then this needs to become more nationalized in terms of the dis-
tribution of these networks, so you wonder about the roots of our
policy and whether or not the basic direction that underlies our
regulation is not being lost.
Just to go back to our roots, Section 307(b) of the Communica-
tions Act clearly states how broadcasting is locally based, as it says
that "the Commission shall make such distribution of licenses, fre-
quencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several
States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of the same." So this was Con-
gress' intention.
Now, among these issues, I think diversity and localism should
be of the greatest concern to the FCC. Competition is very impor-
tant. I think you have heard it discussed today that antitrust
authorities exist to deal with anti-competitive issues, and they do
that very well. They have mechanisms that in some ways are better
than ours to get the kind of information they need under confi-
dentiality to make certain decisions about competitive issues and
market issues. In a strictly market sense, advertisers are the most
direct consumers of broadcasters. But the FCC is truly most con-
cerned with listeners and viewers. To be clear, competition is
important, and the FCC does have a role to play, because we have a
unique expertise in communications that enables us to provide a
special perspective on competition. But only the FCC can protect
diversity and localism. The DOJ and FTC have no authority in this
area, and these areas are crucial to the functioning of our democ-
racy.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not undercut the im-
portance of these goals in any way. If you look at Section 202(h) of
the Communications Act, it instructs the Commission to look at
our rules biannually to determine whether they continue to be
"necessary in the public interest as a result of competition," so we
must affirmatively determine whether or not we maintain the rules.
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However, the overriding obligation is to change a rule only if it no
longer is in the public interest. Now, contrary to the contention of
some, the omission of diversity explicitly there does not in any way
eviscerate the goal, because the 1996 Act specifically directs the
FCC to take diversity into account elsewhere. And the courts have
subsequently vindicated the continuation of diversity as a goal that
the FCC can, and I think must, pursue in order to discharge its
duty to promote the public interest.
So a lot of what you talked about today is what we mean by diver-
sity. And I want to talk about the importance of diversity of
viewpoint, in particular, because over the years the FCC identified
many different types of diversity in its ownership regulations that
we are trying to promote through these limits, such as format di-
versity, programming diversity, and source diversity. But of all of
these, viewpoint diversity is the most important. In fact, the pur-
pose behind promoting these other kinds of diversity is often, at
bottom, promoting diversity of viewpoint. This is especially critical
because in terms of news and information and issues of public im-
portance, diversity of viewpoint is what matters most. Exposure to
different ideas in these areas is how people educate themselves and
how citizens are able to conduct themselves in a democracy by in-
telligently and meaningfully participating in a democratic society.
As a result, the courts have long and repeatedly recognized that
the goal has a constitutional dimension in that it furthers First
Amendment values. For example, go back to Associated Press v. U.S.
in 1945. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment, "rests
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public." And that bears repeating because that is the
law of the land, and that is really our touchstone. In a society such
as ours that treasures its free expression and limits on government
regulation of speech, the best way to promote the goal of viewpoint
diversity is through ownership regulation. Indeed, because of the
deregulation of the industry, it is virtually all that we have left, to
the degree that we are able to maintain it. The means are obviously
indirect, to be sure, but more direct mechanisms would be more
constitutionally suspect. Take, for example, FCC v. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting in 1978. In upholding the newspaper
broadcast ban, the Supreme Court said that the Commission had
acted to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public
without ongoing government surveillance of the content of speech.
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So this is the way that the Commission can do it-through these
structural regulations.
And I do not think that reasonable minds really can differ that
ownership matters. Whether or not you think it is appropriate for
us to be involved in regulation, it certainly matters in terms of what
the public is going to hear. The FCC talked about this in 1975
when it adopted the newspaper broadcast cross-ownership rule in
the first place, saying that ownership carries with it the power to
select, to edit and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of
a presentation. Obviously, this is the case. In the 2003 media own-
ership decision, to its credit, despite all of the bad thinking and ill-
reasoned logic that was behind it, at least the FCC again affirmed
that ownership matters.
What the FCC recognized decades ago remains true today and
will remain so in the future, particularly as media outlets become
more explicitly linked with ideologies and viewpoints. I am afraid
that we are losing the notion that journalism is supposed to be in-
dependent or even has to pretend to be objective. Somehow, now
it seems okay to be explicitly ideological. And if that is the case,
then it is even more important that we have a diversity of view-
point. I am not saying whether I agree or disagree with a particular
perspective because I do not think that matters at all. The point is
that if there are a lot of different viewpoints available over the air,
then the public can make up its own mind and not have it made up
by a disproportionate influence that is resulting from the domina-
tion of the airwaves by any particular owner or any particular
viewpoint or small number of viewpoints.
Again, the means/ends relationship is not perfect. Not every dif-
ferent owner will provide a different viewpoint, nor does every
owner even try to express a viewpoint over the air. But that is not
for the FCC to have to prove one way or the other-our rules are
content neutral. To be more direct would implicate constitutional
concerns more than what we currently have with the ownership
regulations. So Red Lion, which is really our touchstone here, re-
mains good law. But the authority that the case relies upon, and
the authority on which our ownership rules rely, is not entirely re-
liant on spectrum scarcity. The standard also relates to content
regulation to promote viewpoint diversity. But spectrum scarcity is
still correct. If spectrum is not scarce, and I cannot imagine why
broadcasters are spending so much money to buy up stations with
these licenses. I was with some brokers for media properties and
talked about radio licensing-some are going for around $100 mil-
lion now and some television stations are going for around $800
(VOL. 39:2
Media Regulation at the Turn of the Millennium 375
million. But somehow my colleagues that voted the other way than
I did in June of 2003 were arguing that free over-the-air television
is going by the wayside and that these broadcasters were in trouble.
Then the broadcasters started reporting record profits and record
advertising revenues. It is not our job because some of them are
losing money to make sure that they all make money. I guess that
was not universally agreed upon by the Commissioners, but maybe
in hindsight they have reviewed their thinking and will change
their mind next time around.
If you really think about spectrum scarcity, the theory is not
based on scarcity of media outlets as some attempt to argue. It is
instead based on the scarcity of the public airwaves. If one station
gets to operate on Channel 4, nobody else gets to operate on
Channel 4 in that time. If somebody gets 98.7, then it is the only
licensee that is going to be able to operate there, and we will en-
force the licensee's right to operate exclusively on that channel.
So, because diversity of ownership matters, it is also important to
have diverse owners, and the FCC has independent statutory au-
thority to diversify owners. I do not think we have exercised it as
much as we should. There was a good topic of discussion in our
third panel today, but I think it bears repeating, going right back to
the statute again, to think about whether we are actually doing
what the law requires. Section 3090) instructs the FCC in licensing
new stations through competitive bidding to promote equal oppor-
tunity by "avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, includ-
ing ... businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women."
There are certainly constitutional sensitivities that are implicated
by implementing this policy. That is why I raise it today, and I think
we need to talk a lot about how we work our way through those is-
sues. But that is what I am directed by Congress to do, and that is
what we should be doing more than we currently are at the FCC.
We now have the lowest level of minority ownership in the history
of broadcasting ever since the statistics have been compiled. I
talked to Professor Baynes about this today. The FCC does not now
have anything on its books to promote this goal that Congress
asked us to promote. As a matter of fact, in its 2003 Order, the FCC
eliminated the only rule that we had on our books, which was de-
signed to ensure that minority broadcasters have a shot. It was the
so-called "failed station solicitation goal," and it was designed to
ensure that minority broadcasters could learn about financially
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troubled stations which were more affordable when they came
onto the market. In the repeal of this rule, the FCC did not even
analyze how this would impact minority ownership. The Third Cir-
cuit recognized how egregious this was and said that the
Commission was failing to meet its responsibilities under Section I
of the Act, to make spectrum available to "people without dis-
crimination on the basis of race." How embarrassing is that to a
federal agency to have a circuit court say that we are not even do-
ing that? And I hope that we do better next time. I hope that not
only will we support the mechanisms which are designed to pro-
mote minority ownership, but we also will find more means of
enhancing and expanding opportunities for minority ownership.
If you think about the issue solely in terms of diversity, it is usu-
ally better to have fifty-one voices than fifty, but there are trade-offs
on other concerns. I understand that some combinations may ul-
timately be in the public interest, particularly where we can
preserve voices on stations that otherwise might go dark. If you
have a station that is not providing any news or any real respon-
siveness, then if somebody else buys it, it can enhance local service.
These are always possibilities, and the challenge is to determine
what are the right levels where you can draw that line, and it is
hard to do with a "one size fits all" approach.
That is why I have always thought that the case-by-case approach
has some merit, particularly if it were properly enforced. My fear
about a case-by-case approach, though, is that the lack of bright
lines gives the possible appearance that the Commission does not
have a deep commitment to the public interest, and that we might
administer in practice something akin to a rubber stamp. Also, the
case-by-case approach may not meet its theoretical promise of ac-
tually ensuring that each transaction somehow benefits the public
and notjust the broadcasters who seek to merge. I am not opposed
to bright line rules and the many advantages that they have, such
as predictability, but the FCC is always going to retain its ability to
adapt its standards to any given case. Our statute is very clear about
that. And again, Section 309 requires us to determine in the case of
each application filed with the Commission whether the "public
interest, convenience and necessity" are served by the granting of
that particular application. So we have to ultimately make sure that
each one meets that standard. The idea of these bright line rules is
not to come up with some arbitrary decision about what does serve
the public interest. I could not believe the lines that were drawn on
June 2003 saying that ninety-five percent of the country could be
served by duopolies is a matter of automatic public interest benefit,
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or ninety-seven percent could benefit from having the newspaper
broadcast cross-ownership rule eliminated. Those are not bright
lines. Those are kind of pretty dull lines-pretty far out toward the
end zone.
I was also troubled by the end of the practice to flag of radio sta-
tion transactions that may require careful FCC review before final
approval. We used to look at those radio cases where there was a lot
of concentration, and then we would subject them to extra scrutiny
in most cases where there was an issue presented, even when they
complied with our numerical limits. But we did away with that, and
that has not been restored despite protestations by myself and
Commissioner Copps.
So, whether you are analyzing ownership under general rules or
on a case-by-case basis, we need to understand that, of course, not
all media are created equal. Again, I understand this was a discus-
sion that went throughout your panels today. For example, we
know from our own studies that TV is the primary source of news
and information for most Americans. When people talk about
other news sources and technology, they are usually talking about
the Internet. We think the Internet is wonderful. That is my day
job, trying to get broadband out there to people. But that does not
mean that it is in some way a substitute for television, radio and
newspapers. And with respect to local news, it is broadcast TV and
newspapers, in particular, that people really get their information
from. And the FCC decided and recognized in its own diversity in-
dex, as poorly constructed as it was, that cable is not often the
source of independent local news. News-only cable channels are
usually operated by local TV stations anyway, so that is a voice that
already exists in the community. Then that happens in re-
transmission consent contracts.
But as the Third Circuit observed, the FCC incorrectly relied on
the Internet as a substantial source of local news. As the court said,
there is a critical distinction between web sites that are independent
sources of local news, and web sites of local newspapers and broad-
cast stations that merely republish the information already being
reported by the newspaper or broadcast station's counterpart. In
other words, washingpost.com is not a different voice from the
Washington Post. The fact of the matter is, if you look at the num-
bers, and Commissioner Copps has been very clear about this, the
top twenty news web sites are pretty much the ones operated by
those five media conglomerates you have been hearing so much
about during the past few days. So they are not new voices. And
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you certainly cannot expect people to be their own editors. Let us
be real. I do not care how advanced the technology gets, people do
not want to sit there and compile their own news. They do not
want to go to the raw sources and figure out what the real story is.
People want journalists to put it together for them, and they do not
have time in this information society, as they are increasingly inun-
dated, to do that for themselves. Some people always will want
primary sources. And so the Internet is somewhat of a mitigating
factor and a blessing as a source of additional information. We
want to promote that. But at least for now we cannot forget that
newspapers and television are the basic sources for most people.
And the Third Circuit also noted that the FCC got it wrong in
treating all media similarly within a given market. It stands to rea-
son that stations with dramatically different levels of listenership do
not contribute to diversity similarly. It is nice to have the Third Cir-
cuit decision to rely on in thinking about these things. I do not
pretend to have all the answers myself, and that is why I think we
need more studies about where people get their news and informa-
tion. As I said when we adopted the rules in 2003, the diversity
index really was a good idea in theory. It was well intentioned but
ended up being misused. Studies that accept diversity as an appro-
priate and important goal are good, and they recognize the
different contributions of the different media. You could create
one that is genuinely and sincerely designed to help the FCC
evaluate these critical issues, but we need help in coming up with
one that actually works and accurately reflects the marketplace. We
need studies about how listeners and viewers use different media-
radio and TV-to inform themselves about issues of local concern
and public importance, as well as the role of the Internet in that.
We need to know more objectively how the web plays a role and
whether it is a significant enough role to displace the more tradi-
tional media. We need studies to distinguish between media within
types. We have got to distinguish between broadcast and cable TV,
as well as between local community radio stations with full listener-
ship and a larger station with less listenership-maybe the one that
is the outlet of a giant conglomerate that has a huge market share
versus the little mom-and-pop. We cannot just equate these. We
also need ideas and input on how to improve minority ownership
within constitutional limits.
As I said at the outset, we must hear from the public as well. I
know that there was a discussion today about whether or not you
should weigh the postcards, and whether the FCC should base
what we do on how many letters and emails we get. And let me tell
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you why in this field, in particular, I think it is important that we
listen to the public. It is very simple-it is our statutory obligation.
We are guided in this field by a very short piece of statute. We do
not have a lot of guidance, like we do in some of the wireline and
wireless areas dealing with reciprocal compensation or the unbun-
dling rules for telecommunications; these are areas where the
expert agency needs to give its best technical opinion. But in the
field of media regulation, it is simply the public interest that guides
us. So who is to say that we should not go to the public and ask
people what they think is in their own interest? Who are we to say
that we know better than the public? What type of arrogance would
that be for people in Washington to think that somehow we know
better and that we do not have the time or the need to go out and
ask them what they think for themselves or that they are not smart
enough to know? Particularly considering how much they watch
TV and radio. [Laughter] These are experts. There is no better
expert witness-there is no better jury-than the American public
on what is going on in the media. And when I have gone out and
talked to people about it, I have realized that we have some expert
witnesses on our hands, and they feel very strongly about it. I have
benefited every time I have heard from people about it; be it here,
in Dearborn, or anywhere across the country, in any season. I
wanted to come here in the winter. I went to Minneapolis the other
night. You can question my judgment, if not my commitment.
So we need to go out; we need to have that kind of input. We
need to have a kind of depth and breadth of a record that we did
not have last time because the court told us that we did not have
the basic rationale to support what we were doing. So we had bet-
ter go back and get it right, and this proceeding, what we spoke
about today, will be part of that. We will reconvene with a formal
proceeding through an NPRM, but we will also need to engage the
public, and so we are going to be running around the country
more. We want the new Commission, as it is confirmed, to come
out and join us. We need to get this process going.
I do not see the need to wait on the Supreme Court. A lot of
people now are waiting to see whether the Supreme Court is going
to take up the Third Circuit case. We should be out conducting
hearings instead. I am glad I am here now listening to you all and
learning about your contributions. We need to find ways to coordi-
nate input from the public and academic studies to come up with
the best answers that we can that are intellectually sound, respon-
sive to the public, and within the bounds of our authority.
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So just to sum up, I think that diversity is a goal of great impor-
tance to the FCC and media ownership. We must strike the right
balance and protect the public interest, so we need to find the in-
tersection of what was so fondly referred to in ourJune 2003 Order
as "efficiencies from the combinations that highly affect the public
interest." I know efficiencies help the corporations that want to
merge, but that is not our statutory concern unless we can con-
clude somehow that those efficiencies benefit the public. That is
our only obligation under the law. Now you can argue that some-
how efficiencies that benefit a corporation may then in turn
benefit the public through additional news resources, but to just
assume that is to be naive in the extreme. A publicly held corpora-
tion's responsibility to their shareholders is to maximize profits-
and there is nothing wrong with that. But to assume under this
kind of a market system that whatever efficiencies will come out of
those mergers automatically accrue to the public is just closing
your eyes and being blind to the very nature of our economy and
all of the structures under which the media operates. So I look
forward to input knowledge from the broadcasters, the media
companies and their advocates, but I also look forward to hearing
from local communities and in particular, academic communities.
I was inspired today to hear these discussions, and I think we need
to reach out more. It is only with this kind of input that we can
really drive intelligent and sensible rules that will promote the
goals of diversity of viewpoint, localism and competition through
ownership regulation. So thank you very much for having me here
today. I appreciate the warm welcome. [Applause]
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING: Mr. Adelstein has gra-
ciously agreed to take a few questions, and if he feels like it to
answer them. [Laughter] So keep your answers brief so we can
maximize the number of people who get a chance. Go ahead.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Would you give us a sense of the kinds of
pressures that you get subjected to on a daily basis. A day in the life
of an FCC Commissioner?
JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: Interesting question. I've been under
these pressures for a while. On the Hill it's kind of similar.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I don't mean guilt... [Laughter]
JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: People are constantly saying, "I have
got the right answer. I know the whole story. You have got to see it
my way." And then the next media expert comes in and says it is
just the opposite. And the pressure is an intellectual one because I
just want to know what is right. The wonderful thing about being
an FCC Commissioner is that we are independent. I do not have a
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boss. I do not answer to the Chairman. He wishes I did. Sometimes
we work together very closely, and sometimes we do not. You are
your own boss. And so, ultimately, it is your own conscience that is
the driver, to a degree it is sensitized. It is a lot of pressure spiritu-
ally, morally, and intellectually to try to figure out what the right
answer is. There are political pressures as well, but they are easier
to resist because they are so varied. I used to be on the Hill, and we
would send letters to the FCC because that is where the real policy
is. Now that I receive these letters from the Hill, I see that there is
usually someone on each side and you can kind of do what you
think is right and not necessarily succumb to that, while being re-
sponsive to Hill concerns. So, ultimately the pressures are trying to
do the right thing in the context of the environment that you are
in. It is an environment where there are four other Commissioners,
or, in the current situation, three now. We are down to three oth-
ers, which is good for me as a Democratic minority Commissioner.
Just so people understand this, there are three Commissioners
from the majority party and two for the minority party, and right
now because Chairman Powell has resigned and his successor has
not been named, it is two/two. It is really an opportunity for us to
work together as we should. Most of what we do is by consensus,
and so there is not that much pressure when we all agree. The big-
gest pressure comes when it is a three/two vote, or a so-called
two/two split, and I am the third vote. I am trying to decide. The
other sides are both decided, and those are the times when you
feel most pressure, because you want to get that one right. If two
people have decided, and maybe two others have not, to be the
third vote is often a lot of pressure because everybody wants your
vote. Of course, the other side does not want you to do it, and so
everybody is desperately trying to get your attention and stop you
from doing something or get you to do something-to be that cru-
cial third vote. So that kind of weighs on me heavily, and
sometimes wakes me up in the middle of the night. But those pres-
sures, I think, are somewhat internal. It is how much you care, and
I happen to care a lot. So it is difficult, and the answers are not al-
ways clear. That is where it really gets tough, because you will hear
an argument, and both sides make a lot of sense. I suppose if you
have really good lawyers that come along, and you get two argu-
ments, and both of them just make perfect sense, then you have to
figure out from more objective sources what is right and what is
wrong. And there are not that many objective sources in my busi-
ness. We have a few that you can kind of trust do not have another
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agenda, but for the most part, everybody has their own agenda.
And so you kind of feel lonely in that situation where you are the
one who has got to decide what is in the public interest or do what
is right for the American people, and you are also constrained by
statute. In some cases, you might not be able to do what you think
is right because ultimately I have got to do what Congress asks me
to do, and even if I do not think it is my best policy judgment, I will
always defer to Congress and the law. The advantage is and the
pressure is that Congress is often vague when it writes a statute be-
cause the difficult issues are so hard to resolve, and they are under
much greater political pressures than me in a sense. They end up
coming up with fairly broad statutes and then kick it to us to make
the tougher final cuts. Applying these statutes can be quite difficult
at the FCC, and then the courts often second guess us, particularly
the D.C. Circuit. And so we have got to get it right. We want to be
upheld.
PANEL MEMBER: I think the average person imagines the FCC
the way they imagine the [inaudible] in Russia. They just don't
really have a sense of the human [inaudible]?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You said that there's a need for more
studies to understand how the [inaudible]. What's the process that
you go through to get those studies. Can the FCC sponsor studies
itself? Or do they have to wait for industry? Government industry
has really been cracking down, or I should say, not giving money to
people who might put out studies that might disagree with the
things that they want to believe, so it's been very hard to kind of
get those going.
JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: Well, we get studies from all of the
above, and we have actually sponsored a few studies ourselves at
the beginning of this process. Before I even got on the Commis-
sion, Chairman Powell had commissioned a number of studies,
spending quite a bit of federal money to do them, and some of
them were decent. They helped spur debate in some cases, but
there were not enough studies, and they were not deep enough.
There was a study about format diversity in radio, for example, that
we did, concluding there is plenty of format diversity. And then
The Future of Music Coalition managed to scrape together around
$50,000 to do their own study that showed that the way we were
defining formats made no sense, and, in fact, completely blew the
FCC study out of the water. That is one of the reasons that we did
not liberalize the radio rules any more than we did. But what if The
Future of Music Coalition could not have come up with those kinds
of funds? At least the FCC got the discussion started, so I think the
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FCC needs to sponsor more studies. We need to have academics
doing more studies, because it is a critical time for us to get that
kind of information. We need foundations to consider the extent
that they feel it is appropriate to their mission to do what they can
to promote these kind of studies. And of course, industry will fund
their own studies, which are helpful too. We need to get that per-
spective. Public interest groups like The Future of Music can do it.
It is tough to get people really ginned up to get as much as we
need. And ultimately we need to know where people get their news
and information from. For example, that question about the role
of the Internet deserved a lot of scrutiny. Is it really an independ-
ent source? How much of people's time on the Internet getting
news and information is from existing sources? I do not think there
are any studies that give us the kind of certainty we need to know
to what degree we can use the Internet as a source of independent
news information, particularly for local news and information.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is what kind of lens or filter
have you developed for determining among the information that
you yourself as a Commissioner are inundated with about what you
should do? How do you tell a genuine grassroots citizen group
from an Astroturf group that's funded as a front for a larger tele-
com corporation or merger media conglomerate or some private
interest?
JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: They are pretty easy to tell apart, I
think. You can really look at where their funding is coming from.
Sometimes they try to obscure it. I just heard today in the social
security debate that a group called The Seniors Coalition is argu-
ing against allowing imported drugs from overseas. I wonder who
paid for that one? I actually happen to know this huge coalition is
funded by the pharmaceutical industry. You get to know these
things, but you really have to study it pretty closely, and there has
been a lot of discussion about how many of the e-mails we get are
from a given group. I think there was some discussion about that in
your meeting today. In fact, they can be from a lot of different
groups. The NRA gave us approximately a half a million postcards
against media consolidation, and Moveon.org might have clocked
a million, plus we might have received a couple hundred thousand
from just individuals who were mad. But you try to tabulate where
they come from. I think there were recent tabulations and some of
the indecency complaints that we received were very organized,
and you can tell that they are all coming from the same, exact
source because they all say the same thing, and they have the same
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header. But still, 100,000 people complained. You cannot get them
to just write on anything either. That is not what you measure it by,
but the fact that they care enough to go ahead and do what the
organization told them to do is notable. You cannot decide things
completely based on that, but we certainly at least look at them. I
just got a whole pile, and I was kind of encouraged about it, about
the video news releases. Did anybody see the New York Times article
on Sunday, I think a week ago, about the fact that radio news re-
leases are not being disclosed as such? I am getting thousands and
thousands of e-mails at my own personal e-mail account. It is fun to
see because I kind of have to agree with these people that this is a
problem under our rules. But they are clearly coming from one
organization. I can probably guess the name of the organization,
but at this point I do not know. I actually replied to one of the
people and said, "Hey, who put you up to this?" I do not know if I
got a response back because they come in so fast that I would never
see the one with the "Re:" in front of it. Maybe I will see it Sunday
when I get back to town. But you can kind of tell that way, and you
get underneath the surface of it. People feed us good information.
Some of the public interest groups will tell us who is really behind
things, and people that we trust will help us to break down those
that make up these organizations. I have been in Washington long
enough to sniff them out.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, that makes me happy.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks again for coming to Ann Arbor.
Getting back to the question of studies, I was wondering in a lot of
areas-I'm an economics student here as well as a law student. In
economics we're always constrained by what government data we
can get access to and how much the government provides. In the
FCC context, I believe the studies of the FCC Commission, as well
as any public interest group or academic studies, have to rely on a
privately collected data base, which is mainly on radio and televi-
sion. You collect mainly from use of advertising. Whereas I'm a
little bit skeptical about the usual regulatory [inaudible]. One of
the ways in which the industry affects and influences the debate is
that they can choose not to collect certain pieces of information
and not include them in the database that the FCC itself is trying
to use to regulate those very industries. And one of those fields, for
instance, is the affiliated network. So, if I want to know, okay, this
local station is WPRB in Princeton, NewJersey-where do they get
their news, or do they create local news-that field is just blank. So
my question is-and I know there's different constraints because
corporations don't want to give up information, but what extent
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can the FCC affect what kind of information gets collected and
could that be part of a licensing context where maybe renewal is
closer to a rubber stamp now. Maybe it's a condition of a renewal
that they have to provide certain information about their broad-
casting in some kind of format so that FCC researchers and others
might be able to use it. I'm just wondering what your perspective is
on that.
JONATHAN ADELSTEIN: It is a little tricky. Some of the infor-
mation is proprietary and they have legitimate reasons for not
wanting to expose it to the government. Anything that gets dis-
closed to the FCC has to go out on the public record unless it is
part of an enforcement action, which are unique circumstances,
and we will provide for some measure of confidentiality. But, ulti-
mately, we would need to make that public if we were going to go
forward based on that evidence. So they are sometimes hesitant to
do it. Unfortunately, the climate of the FCC in recent years has
been against any disclosure. I mean, amazingly enough after the
whole implosion of the telecommunications sector and vast fraud
for which Bernie Ebbers, for example, was just convicted for up to
eighty-five years in jail, we did away with some of our accounting
requirements for telecommunications companies. I was thinking,
"why would we do this?" But companies spend millions and mil-
lions of dollars lobbying us. I am sure they spent infinitely more to
lobby us than they do in collecting information that they compile
anyway, and this information that we were asking for is what they
provide as a matter of course for their own internal accounting and
for state regulators. But state regulators in some ways cannot col-
lect what we can, and so they do not get the confidential data, and
they relied on the data that we have, then we eliminated some of
the requirements over my objections. So you just got to wonder
what are we thinking when we do that kind of thing. And in the
broadcast media, again, getting some points from their lawyers,
claim, "oh, this is so burdensome. We do not want to put our pub-
lic file up on the Internet." Why not? They put it in all kinds of
other things up on the Internet. I am glad they do. All kinds of
news and information. It would not take a lot to get that public file
up there. But for some reason they are not interested in doing
that, I do not know what it is. But trying to get the FCC to do that
has been like pulling teeth. We are getting closer now, and I think
we are hoping to actually get that rule enacted, but everything goes
like that-two years of urging, pleading, and cajoling, and now at
least we have something that we can look at on that small issue. We
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are trying to get more information to require a more significant
licensing and renewal process, and we have had a hard time get-
ting any teeth into that process. That process has largely been
turned into a postcard renewal process. There are all kinds of ideas
about how you can turn that into something that requires licensees
to do more news and local affairs without interfering with constitu-
tional concerns. But just saying that-not that they have to do: it,
but if they want a streamlined review process they have to provide,
say, a certain amount of news and public affairs-and they would
have to let us know what that is as part of their renewal process.
And if they choose to go through a long drawn out proceeding in
front of the full Commission, then they do not have to provide that
information. So there are ways of doing it and ways that do not
necessarily compel an outcome or impede on constitutional rights,
and I think we should do more. I think there should be more ac-
countability, but I am swimming upstream a little in the current
environment.
Anything else? Everybody's ready to eat. [Laughter]
TRAVIS SKELTON: Thank you, Commissioner Adelstein. I'm
going to be extremely brief. My name's Travis Skelton and I'm the
Editor of the Journal for, like, another week. So I'm pretty much
unaccountable right now. Ryan asked me to come up and tell you
briefly about the Journal, but I'm not going to do that, because we
don't have very much time, and I think this time's better used revis-
iting a topic that we've talked about already. And that is thank you,
Ryan and Liz, for doing such an amazing job putting this together.
Now I'm going to hand it over to them. They're going to thank the
speakers, and then we're finished for the evening-then it's time
to go to the bars.
RYAN CALO: I too am going to be very brief. So basically just
thank you everybody for attending this Symposium. This has been
something that Liz and I have been thinking about for a year. It's
no exaggeration that we began our attempts to get our banquet
keynote a year ago. It's just really exceeded my wildest expecta-
tions. There were many points throughout this Symposium, but
there was one point in the third panel when Commissioner Adel-
stein asked, "what is it that we can do" and got some real feedback
as to what some legitimate ideas are for directly diversifying view-
point, and it was like this discussion that sort of, like, I was
dreaming of. That people that are making decisions talking to aca-
demics and practitioners, and the fact that we've generated a real
record here and that, I thought, a really candid and polite and
wonderful debate in my untrained view. I just want to start off just
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this once to thank every single speaker, and we'd like for them to
just stand just for one moment if you don't mind. We'd just like to
thank all the speakers. [Applause]
Thank you very much. Also we'd like to, of course, thank the
moderators who did such a greatjob.
LIZ WEI: We also have some gifts for the speakers. If you could
just wave your hand. Let's start with Commissioner Jonathan Adel-
stein. We also have Professor Molly Van Houweling, and Alicia
Davis Evans, and of course, Professor James Boyd White, who's not
here. Then Professor C. Edwin Baker is over there; Dr. Michael
Bauman, and Professor Leonard Baynes.
RYAN CALO: Robert Corn-Revere, Professor Douglas, who
couldn't be here tonight; Professor Good, Professor Jarvis, Profes-
sor Neuman. The thing is the Communications Department has
their own graduate event tonight, so unfortunately, they were sup-
posed to be at a table and they couldn't be here. But they were
such a great resource to us. Also to Professor Redish and Mr.
Schwartzman, Professor Varona and Professor Weinberg. Thank
you guys so much. This really could not ever have happened with-
out you and we really appreciate your input.
LIZ WEI: So did all the speakers get a gift yet? We don't want to
leave anyone out. Additionally there are several other people we
want to thank who were intimately involved in making this work.
Everyone's been saying that it's been well organized. Thank you,
but we didn't do it alone. We had a lot of help. So if you could just
stand up when we say your name so everyone can recognize you.
Travis Skelton, who's our Editor in Chief, and Kristen Jacoby, who
is our Managing Editor, and Bill Novomisle who is an amazing or-
ganizer and person, and he is the man who made the trains run on
time actually. He arranged all our transportation.
RYAN CALO: I just want to interject. I cannot stress enough in
terms of ... if you felt that this was well organized, that person
right there is one of the main reasons.
LIZ WEI: And then Brian McClatchey helped us organize all the
students with the microphones and the timing. Nada Abu-Isa and
Mia Solvesson did a lot of the advertising work with us, and
emailing the students, and trying to get people to come. Steve
Gertz is the person who designed our icons and our graphic.
You've seen it around. He just did a fantastic job on it. Then Shawn
DeLoach who's actually our AV person ... there he is. He's doing
his job. [Laughter] Thank you so much, Shawn. Finally, Maureen
Bishop, who's just been such a resource for us. She's the continuity
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every year and she's the one that tells us what to do. And you've all
worked with her, and she's helped everybody here tonight. Thank
you very much everyone
[Applause].
